

The rue d'Isly, Algiers 26 March 1962:

The Contested Memorialization of a Massacre

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Abstract

This article examines the memorial discourses surrounding the massacre that occurred on 26 March 1962 when, in the week following the Franco-FLN ceasefire, French soldiers opened fire on a demonstration of unarmed European settler civilians, killing 46 and wounding 150. Largely unknown amongst wider French society, references to the massacre have become a staple of the *pied-noir* activist discourse of victimhood, often advanced as evidence that they had no choice but to leave Algeria in 1962. The article draws on French and Algerian press articles, as well as online, print, and film publications produced by the repatriated European population. It reveals how settlers' narratives first dehistoricized the massacre and then invested it with a significance that drew on multidirectional memories borrowed from a range of sometimes jarring international contexts. The analysis accounts for why the massacre contributed to the repatriated settler community's sense of identity and relationship to the wider French nation.

Keywords: Algeria, commemoration, massacre, massacre, *pieds-noirs*

On Monday 26 March 1962, almost a week after the Evian Accords had put an official end to the Algerian War of Independence, soldiers of the French army opened fire on unarmed civilians from the European population demonstrating on the rue d'Isly in the center of Algiers. Twelve minutes of gunfire left forty-six people dead, and two hundred wounded. Remembered and commemorated by the European settler community, the majority of whom were repatriated to France later that year, the massacre has been otherwise largely forgotten,

despite the fact that the deaths were reported at the time and were recorded in film and photographs that are still readily available.¹ The massacre also features in fictional texts published as early as 1963 and as recently as 2006. Within the repatriate *pied-noir* community, it has become an iconic memory.² Nevertheless, within the wider public sphere the rue d'Isly deaths remain relatively unknown when compared with similar events that occurred in the months immediately preceding, notably the civilian deaths during the barricades week of 24 January 1960, the massacre in Paris on 17 October 1961, or at the metro station Charonne on 8 February 1962.

This article examines the development of the memorial discourses surrounding the massacre on the rue d'Isly in Algiers to understand how and why the event has assumed such importance within *pied-noir* discourse, while remaining little known to the general public. Recent research has seen the development of a range of tropes to conceptualize the uneven distribution of memory. Debarati Sanyal refers to the phenomenon of memorial “folding” or “pleating,” whereby some events are highlighted and brought into dialogue with similar events, leaving others in their shadow.³ Memory is far from static, however, and Marianne Hirsch uses the image of the membrane, or connective tissue, to capture the organic growth of memorial discourses, and their evolving connections to other memory events.⁴ Ann Rigney talks of what she terms the “differential distribution of memorability” to account for the inequalities in remembrance.⁵ But what happens when an event is not remembered, or where it exists as a counter-memory, remembered only by a few? Much recent memory scholarship has focused on the propensity of memory to “travel,” but this article argues that we should be attentive to the processes at work not only in memories that travel, but in memories that become stuck and do not travel.⁶ What happens to the memories of an event which is remembered only by a particular community, which sees itself as a memory guardian? How does memory work transnationally, at personal, local and regional levels of multiscalearity,

when the memory-bearing community itself crosses national boundaries, and seeks to borrow from other memorial contexts? What ideological uses might be made of the past in such circumstances? This article considers these questions in the context of Michael Rothberg's work on multidirectional memory, in which he argues against the necessity of "competitive" memory, in which one narrative of the past is privileged at the expense of others in a "zero-sum game," and which views history largely in terms of "victors" and "losers."⁷ Instead, Rothberg argues that memories are constructed in relation to others, and that in understanding them we must be attentive to the memorial landscape produced by connection and association. This model challenges the tendency to view collective memory within the "centripetal" confines of the nation-state, in favor of a "centrifugal" or transnational approach that acknowledges memory as a dynamic, shifting process that crosses national borders and alters, through emphasis or elision, the significance attached to events. As De Cesari and Rigney indicate, the transnational brings with it a new attention to the unspoken hierarchies of scale at work in memory, and the constructions of the local, national and global that constitute them, and that are present in how the massacre of the rue d'Isly has been understood by those who remember it.⁸

This analysis examines the vectors of memory – competitive and multidirectional – at work in the diachronic evolution of memories of the massacre of the rue d'Isly. The European settlers, known since independence as the *pieds-noirs*, are commonly viewed as exemplars of the competitive memory struggle identified by Rothberg. During the colonial era many people in the French metropole, particularly on the left, viewed the *pieds-noirs* as beneficiaries of colonialism who derived wealth and a life of ease from cheap indigenous labor and domestic services while jealously protecting the systemic inequalities of the colonial system. However, the abrupt manner of their departure from Algeria in 1962, and the widespread hostility with which they were met in France have led *pied-noir* activists to reverse the narrative which cast

them as perpetrators in favour of a diametrically opposed version in which they become the victims of decolonisation. Their campaigns adopt a reductive, politically expedient approach to the highly complex realities of the end of French Algeria that instrumentalises remembrance of the past, and that may deepen the divisions between the *pied-noir* community and the wider French nation.

This article examines why *pieds-noirs* activists have invested this massacre with symbolic significance in the decades since independence. It argues that the lack of awareness and acknowledgement of the massacre by both French authorities and general public has enabled the development of a dehistoricised and consequently malleable narrative. The massacre has become a totem of the repatriate community, discursively positioned as a pivotal event and instrumentalized in ways that have not been fully acknowledged by scholars, and that remain unchallenged within the wider public sphere. The long silence surrounding colonial loss enabled the *pieds-noirs* to construct a narrative of France's callous abandonment, while the absence of public outrage at the massacre contributed to the *pied-noir* belief in their victim status. It argues that the meanings assigned to the event illuminate the shifting perspectives from which the *pied-noir* community has viewed itself and its relation to the French state post-independence and post-exodus. It does this by first setting the massacre in the historical context in which it occurred and was initially reported, before tracing the event as it was commemorated within the *pied-noir* community, and then later within wider civil society, culminating with the fiftieth anniversary commemorations of Algerian independence in 2012. The rue d'Isly's memorial trajectory is read in conjunction with other contemporaneous massacres, including the week of the barricades in Algiers, the events of 17 October 1961 in Paris, at the Charonne metro station in February 1962, and the killings in Oran on 5 July 1962. Employing a comparative framework and tracing the transnational memories borrowed from other contexts allows the development of a broader understanding

of how the narrative of the massacre was constructed. The resulting analysis exposes the fundamental instability of the circulating subject positions, with the aim of opening the way to a more respectful perspective in which contradictions are acknowledged but not flattened.

The Massacre of the rue d'Isly: History and Press Reports

In separate studies of state violence, Ann Rigney and Jim House and Neil MacMaster note the tendency for extended periods of heightened violence to be overshadowed by the drama of a massacre.¹⁰ Such was the case for the rue d'Isly. The immediate causes of the massacre lay with the ceasefire of 19 March 1962, and the response of the pro-French Algeria paramilitary group, the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS). The historical work of Yves Courrière, Rémi Kauffer, and Alain Ruscio reveals the central role played by the OAS, which, refusing the Evian Accords, embarked on a final desperate campaign of violence that targeted the French army as the enemy occupier.¹¹ On 23 March an attack on vehicle transport in the OAS stronghold of Bab-el-Oued in Algiers left seven French conscripts dead and eleven injured. When a further seven soldiers and gendarmes were killed, the situation escalated dramatically. The army deployed tanks and blockaded Bab-el-Oued, while T-6 military aircraft strafed the residential area with machine-gun fire causing, by Courrière's estimate, at least twenty dead and eighty injured. When the attacks ceased, the French army searched over 7,000 apartments thought to harbor supporters of the OAS, and detained 3,309 men. The siege continued for four days, with women only allowed out for short periods to buy essentials such as milk and bread.

It is against this backdrop that the OAS commanders decided to break the blockade by calling for a peaceful civilian demonstration on 26 March. Courrière describes it as a "test," designed to establish whether the army was willing to pursue the OAS into a residential area.¹² Salan's infamous Instruction 29 of 23 February 1962 demonstrates the OAS disregard

for civilian well-being: it described the civilian population as an “outil valable” and announced that when the time came, “la foule sera poussée dans les rues.”¹³ In the first of a number of transnational framings, besieged Bab-el-Oued became figured as a French Budapest. It was to be a fertile image, understood in different ways by different constituencies. Ruscio notes that members of the OAS, and Roger Degueldre in particular, believed that a swell of popular resistance from the general population would reproduce Budapest in 1956, where civilians had faced down Soviet tanks.¹⁴ This was to be the OAS’s opportunity to seize control first of Bab-el-Oued, and from there adjacent neighborhoods, carrying along the Muslim population in the wake of the movement until it held all of the major urban centers. For Degueldre, Budapest symbolized popular resistance against an army occupation that would sweep the OAS-led settlers to victory. The fact that Budapest was an inauspicious example--the resistance had been repressed in a bloody defeat that would ultimately find an echo in the rue d’Isly--seemed not to penetrate the romantic fantasies of the OAS. Others were more alert: on 26 March 1962, the Assemblée nationale grouping Unité de la République published a communiqué that in the light of the tanks besieging Bab-el-Oued acknowledged the danger of civil war and warned that for the sake of French honour, “il ne peut, il ne doit y avoir de Budapest perpétré dans l’armée française à Alger.”¹⁵ The image, which emphasized the French army in the role of Soviet oppressor, was arguably a more potent reference to the Budapest of 1956 than the OAS fantasies of revolution, given the very limited active support (as opposed to the widespread sympathy) that the Delta commandos enjoyed. In the post-war period the references to Budapest continued, but it no longer signified popular resistance; instead there was a new emphasis on the civilian suffering and deaths caused by the inhumane repression of the army. As early as 1963, references to the siege of Bab-el-Oued as the *pied-noir* Budapest appeared in literature, and they continue to feature today in contemporary *pied-noir* websites.¹⁶ Budapest 1956 therefore functions as a

mnemonic container into which differing interpretations of March 1962 have been loaded, revealing the range of memorial narratives at work in the various groups.

Facing the crowd summoned by the OAS on the rue d'Isly were the *tirailleurs algériens* of the 4th RT, and their Kabyle sub-lieutenant, Daoud Ouchène. Familiar with operations in rural areas, the detachment of Muslim soldiers was ill-prepared for the febrile atmosphere of the capital, where anti-Muslim feeling ran high. Consequently, the twenty-three nervous soldiers found themselves facing an impatient crowd behind inadequate barricades. Shots were fired, galvanizing the soldiers who fired into the crowd. The twelve-minute volley of gunfire was recorded by a Belgian television crew, with Ouchène's repeated desperate calls of 'Halte au feu!' clearly audible. When the gunfire ceased, forty-six demonstrators lay dead and two hundred were wounded, a dozen fatally. To the vital question of who fired first, Courrière, who was himself present that day, concluded that, despite the OAS claim that 'les Arabes' [the *tirailleurs*] fired first, the most likely explanation was that reported by the soldiers and other witnesses, who claimed that shots were fired from the terraces of three buildings: 64 rue d'Isly, the Warner building, and a third on rue Alfred-Lelluch.¹⁷ Cartridge cases and traces of oil were found at these sites, indicating the presence of OAS snipers.

The massacre was undoubtedly a terrifying and traumatic event from which many bereaved families never fully recovered. However, in the spring of 1962 Algeria was blighted by repeated violence, with dozens of daily attacks, and the massacre received less attention than might have been the case under different circumstances. This is acknowledged by Cécile Mercier who, in her study of metropolitan press representations of the *pied-noir* exodus in 1962, claims that the massacre of the rue d'Isly was not widely reported. She states that where it appeared in press reports, it was presented as part of a pattern of violence, "relégu[é] [...] aux troubles récurrents de l'Algérie."¹⁸ However, this summary neglects important nuances in

the reporting. Ironically, Mercier's assessment might more accurately be applied to the Algerian settler press. When, on 29 March, Bab-el-Oued made the headlines in *Le Journal d'Alger* with "46 Algérois tués, 200 autres blessés à la Grande Poste" there was no mention of those responsible. The details emerged only at the bottom of page 6, dwelling on general descriptions of the confusion surrounding the massacre, rather than individual accounts or analysis of the causes. *La Dépêche* was similarly coy: the front page of its edition of 27-28-29 March carried only headlines and subheadings without any body copy, whilst page 3 was devoted to reproducing brief excerpts of the coverage in the metropolitan and international press. The vagueness of the settler press reporting was the first step in divesting the event of its historical causes, and by 30 March the settler titles were united in emphasizing the return to normality in Bab-el-Oued.

In contrast, and despite Mercier's conclusion, the metropolitan titles were more forthcoming in their reporting of the period, giving detail about the OAS ambushes and assassinations that led to the siege, providing diagrams of the area around the rue d'Isly, and generally being explicit about the OAS involvement, including stating that the civilian demonstration had been called by the OAS. *Le Monde* and, in particular, *Le Figaro*, both sought to help their readers contextualize the events as they unfolded by citing comments from anonymous local officers and CRS.

This journalistic disparity laid the foundations for popular memory of the massacre, but it reflected the political atmosphere in Paris and Algiers respectively. The OAS attack on André Malraux's Paris apartment on February 7, which missed its intended target but blinded a seven-year-old girl living in the neighboring apartment, outraged metropolitan France and united the population in sympathy for "la petite Delphine," fueling the left-wing demonstration against the OAS at the Charonne metro station the following day. Public interest in the fight against the OAS, particularly on the mainland but to a lesser extent also in

Algeria, was therefore high, enabling the press to examine the full extent of their involvement in the post-ceasefire violence. Algerian journalists, on the other hand, had faced censorship and attacks from all sides. This included terrorist violence as well as state intervention: *L'Echo d'Alger*, the biggest title in Algeria, was shut down by the French government in April 1961 after the Putsch des Généraux, whilst *Le Journal d'Alger* reported on 8 Feb 1962 that the homes of employees at *L'Echo d'Oran* had been raided, and on 18 April 1962, *L'Echo d'Oran* reported the bombing of the offices of *Le Journal d'Alger*. Consequently, it is unsurprising that the Algerian press rarely mentioned the OAS or indeed the FLN: bank hold-ups, murders, kidnappings and other attacks were regularly reported without attribution, and their reports on the rue d'Isly massacre cited the authorities as they sought to reassure the public and avoid alienating elements of their readership. With Algerian titles studiously emphasizing the recruitment fairs, retail sales and “beau bébé” contests which demonstrated the normality of everyday life, the causal role played by the OAS in the deaths at the rue d'Isly quickly disappeared from settler discourse.

Memory and Commemoration: *Pied-Noir* Representations of the Massacre

The immediate coverage of 26 March was shortlived. However, a hint of the instrumentalization to come appeared two months later when the edition of *La Dépêche d'Algérie* on 3-4 June included a multi-page insert headlined “Le Journal de l'OAS.” The headline on page 5 – “Le massacre et l'abandon d'un peuple” – included a photograph of the rue d'Isly massacre. Memories of the massacre, shared privately within the community, were beginning to assume significance as evidence of *pied-noir* suffering.

Foundational to the *pied-noir* memorial narrative was the eye-witness account recorded by Francine Dessaigne. Dessaigne kept a diary through the later stages of the war (published in 1962 as *Journal d'une mère de famille pied-noir: 1960-62*), and her experience

of the massacre figured in her entry for 26 March 1962. Its apparent objectivity belied the selectivity of its content: Dessaigue, who was sympathetic to OAS aims and who later became part of the editorial team of *L'Esprit public*, the right-wing magazine closely associated with the organisation, made no mention of the OAS in her account of the days prior to 26 March, nor in the announcement of the demonstration. The focus instead was on the shameful actions of the army: “L’armée française, portant l’uniforme français, vise et tire sur des civils couchés. J’ai vu, je peux témoigner de cette honte.”²⁰ Her account maintained that the army was acting on orders when it opened fire: “Jamais nous n’aurions cru possible que l’armée tire ainsi *sur ordre* et sans sommations sur des civils [...] J’en porte le témoignage, comme je témoigne que l’armée a tiré sur nous alors que nous étions aplatis sur le sol.”²¹

Dessaigue’s diary entry has been frequently cited in *pied-noir* publications, in print and online; as a contemporaneous account of events by an well-known figure within the repatriate community, it had a decisive influence on the construction of the narratives surrounding 26 March 1962. However, the decades following repatriation were dominated for the *pieds-noirs* first by the immediate requirements of survival, and then by demands for financial indemnification obtained via legal redress. During this time annual commemorations were held across France for the victims of the rue d’Isly, the largest held in the Church of the Madeleine in Paris. It was not until the 1990s that *pied-noir* associations began to turn their efforts at memory transmission outwards beyond their community, in an attempt to gain acceptance of their narrative and incorporate what Jan Assmann calls “communicative memory” – that is, everyday communications about the meaning of the past – into “cultural memory,” the culturally institutionalized heritage of a society.²² As time has passed and the repatriate community has aged and shrunk, a sense of urgency has taken hold of the remaining activists. Given the accusations that the massacre was a *crime d’État*, their approach was combative and took the form of demands for an official response from the French state. *Pieds-*

noirs websites became increasingly vituperative, portraying the massacre as “un assassinat collectif de l’Etat” and accusing de Gaulle of personally ordering the army to open fire to break the settler resistance.²³ Attempts to seek official redress continue today: the first 2018 issue of *La Lettre de Vérité* carried the headline “L’assassinat des Français d’Algérie par un dictateur fou!,” whilst inside an interview suggested that further legal action relating to 26 March 1962 was planned.²⁴

The references to settler “resistance” highlight the tendency, present from the late 1950s onwards and analyzed by scholars such as Richard Golsan and Michael Rothberg, to read the Algerian War through the prism of World War II. Approaching the wars through connective memories have produced radically opposed readings, however. In the dominant narrative, advanced by anti-colonial protestors such as Jean-Paul Sartre, the Algerian War placed France on the wrong side of history, with many of the soldiers who had fought as *résistants* now carrying out institutionalized practices of torture in a manner reminiscent of the Nazis. However, those in favor of maintaining French Algeria, such as French *résistant* turned OAS operative Georges Bidault, or Jacques Soustelle, a member of the Free French Forces in London who later became Governor-Général in Algeria, saw their fight as consistent with the defense of the nation in the 1940s.²⁵ Focused on bringing about the end of the Occupation, the Résistance had never taken a position vis-à-vis the independence of France’s colonies. Some *résistants* either refused or were unable to understand that their devotion to their nation might be replicated by nationalist movements elsewhere within the empire. In their view, which was shared by many *pieds-noirs*, it was de Gaulle’s administration that, in its policy of abandoning colonial Algeria, was guilty of betraying the territorial integrity that was a fundamental principle of the indivisible Republic.

It was in these latter terms that in March 1990, *L’Algérieniste*, the monthly magazine of the Cercle Algérieniste, carried an open letter to the President of the Republic calling for an

enquiry into the 26 March 1962 massacre. It likened Algeria in the closing months of the war to the experience of living under the Nazi Occupation, with the OAS paras cast as resistance fighters for their country. In that spirit Georges Bosc's "L'appel du 26 mars" closes with the assertion "quand j'entends 18 juin, je pense 26 mars."²⁶

Not until the late 1990s did the Algerian War begin to emerge from a period of silence to become the subject of public discourse. The Papon trial of 1997-98 had unexpectedly cast a spotlight on the massacre of 17 October 1961. In 1999 the Assemblée nationale recognized the Algerian conflict of 1954-1962 as a war. The war's many victims, amongst them the dead of the rue d'Isly, drew renewed public attention. On 26 March 1999 a plaque honoring the dead of 26 March and 5 July 1962 was installed beneath a replica of the statue of Notre Dame d'Afrique in the Eglise Saint-Nicolas du Chardonnet, a parish with a large *pied-noir* presence. Since 2003, the Association du Mémorial de Notre Dame d'Afrique et Souvenir du 26 mars 1962 has organised an annual ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe to commemorate the massacre.

Key to the development of these memorial acts was a new campaigning group, known as the Association des Familles de Victimes du 26 mars 1962 et de leurs Alliés (hereafter the AFVA). It was formed by members of the Association Nationale des Français d'Afrique du Nord, d'Outre-mer, et de leurs Amis (ANFANOMA) who had lost family members in the massacre. Its leader, Nicole Ferrandis, had participated in the demonstration with her two sisters, one of whom was killed and the other injured. In addition to supporting the bereaved families, it had two political aims: to obtain the status of "Morts pour la France" for the victims of the massacre on 26 March 1962, and to have their names inscribed on an official monument in Paris. The demand for a symbolic place in the capital and at the heart of the nation reflected the longstanding deep insecurity and anxiety of the *Français d'Algérie*, reinforced by the hostility experienced post-repatriation., that they were not fully accepted as

French citizens and that the country would continue to ignore their history and their dead. However, the campaign was controversial on two counts. Firstly, the war was deemed officially to have ended with the ceasefire on 19 March 1962, meaning that the thousands of civilians who died at the hands of the OAS, FLN (and, in the case of 26 March 1962, the French army) after the signing of the Evian Accords were not considered as civilian victims of the Algerian War.²⁷ This wartime status was required for the designation of “Morts pour la France.” Secondly, the demonstrators were considered to have been responding to an OAS order, in defiance of the ban issued by the French authorities, and were thus opposing the French forces. For many commentators, while the massacre remained deplorable, this situation excluded the victims from being considered as “Morts pour la France.”²⁸

A groundswell of political interest in the repatriate communities following the presidential campaign of 2002, in which Jean-Marie Le Pen of the Front National reached the second-round run-off, benefitted the AFVA. Although Jacques Chirac eventually won the election comfortably, it led him to counter Le Pen’s rhetoric of colonial nostalgia with a more overt appeal to the repatriate community, then numbering over two million. The result was arguably the high point of *pied-noir* political influence, with the passing of the law of 23 February 2005, article 4 of which, although later rescinded, stipulated that the education system should recognize “le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord.”²⁹ The effective lobbying of *pied-noir* associations, including the ANFANOMA, Cercle Algérieniste and Véritas, found support from *députés* representing constituencies in the Mediterranean region, such as Christian Kert (UMP, Bouches-du-Rhône), Kléber Mesquida (PS, Hérault), François Liberti (PCF, Hérault), Rudy Salles (UDF, Alpes Maritimes) and Louis Giscard d’Estaing (UMP, Puy de Dôme) who in the course of the second reading of the law of 23 February, argued in the Assemblée nationale in support of the demand of “Morts pour la France” made by the AFVA. Although unsuccessful, their

intervention contributed to an environment in which, despite protests from veterans' associations, in November 2009 Hubert Falco, the Secrétaire d'Etat aux Anciens Combattants, announced that the central column of the memorial at Quai Branly to those killed in the conflicts in North Africa would henceforth bear the names of those killed in the massacre of 26 March 1962. The families had achieved their aim of having the names of their loved ones, who had died in what was now a foreign country, officially displayed on a public monument in the center of Paris.

Central to the success of the Association des Familles was its reliance on personal testimony. Annette Wieviorka argued that the aftermath of the Holocaust ushered in the era of the witness, in which fascination with the hero has been replaced with identification with the victim.³⁰ Eye-witness testimony became the keystone of (here, *pied-noir*) orthodoxy, which celebrated lived experience as the true source of authenticity, its power emanating from a valorization of affect over rationality. The emotive testimony of the victims of the rue d'Isly performs important work for the *pied-noir* cause because it acts as a microcosm of the *pied-noir* narrative, asking its audience to view the speakers not as perpetrators but as victims of the machine guns of the French army, which function as a synecdoche for the wider French state whose Gaullist policy was to abandon the settlers.

As part of their communications offensive, *pieds-noirs* associations produced a plethora of documentaries in which the massacre of the rue d'Isly features prominently.³² Testimony from victims of the massacre, frequently including the Ferrandis family, takes center-stage along with archive footage of the event. Daniel Sherman and Alison Landsberg argue that images have the power to create a "secondary" or "prosthetic" memory in those who view them; when coupled with the voiceover of eyewitnesses, the images are invested with lasting meaning for audiences new to this history.³³ Shorn of historical context or any reference to the blockade or the OAS, the massacre is presented in the documentaries as an

unprovoked attack by the army, and sometimes as a deliberate action by a Gaullist administration seeking to break the settler population's resistance. The aim is to create a prosthetic memory of the massacre which, by virtue of the eyewitness accounts, maintains and communicates the perspective of the settler victims.

The emphasis on eye-witness testimony was also present in the substantial press coverage of the fiftieth anniversary of independence, in 2012.³⁴ The media faced the challenge of commemorating two main dates – 19 March and 5 July – neither of which were moments of celebration for the nation, nor well known to French citizens born since 1962. The media's planned commemorations, designed in part to educate the public on the history of French Algeria, were complemented by press coverage focused largely on the experiences of individuals (some *appelés*, but primarily *pieds-noirs*) to personalize a lesser-known period of history. Coverage of the massacre of the rue d'Isly suited both media and activists: it gave journalists human-interest stories that made a case for the contemporary relevance of historical events, whilst it gave the *pieds-noirs* opportunities to tell their emotive stories. Together with similar accounts of the Oran massacre of 5 July 1962, the testimonies succeeded to a large extent in promoting the massacres of 26 March and 5 July as the focus of France's commemoration, eclipsing the significance of 19 March, the date of the ceasefire, and 5 July as the date of independence.³⁶ From the Quai Branly memorial to the coverage of the fiftieth anniversary of independence, witness testimonies proved to be the most effective weapon in the *pied-noir* campaigning armory.

The Creation of a Narrative: *Pied-Noir* Formulations of the Massacre

In her study of the *pieds-noirs*, Claire Eldridge challenges the notion that the Algerian War was forgotten until the late 1990s, arguing that a memorial narrative of the war was constructed, performed and transmitted much earlier within the disparate *pied-noir*, *harki* and

Muslim immigrant communities.³⁷ The case of the rue d'Isly massacre supports this reading as, disregarded by French civil society, *pied-noir* activists were free to remember, interpret and commemorate the massacre as they chose. Consequently, when the Algerian War re-entered French public discourse in the late twentieth century, the *piets-noirs* had already ideologically formulated the massacre and invested it as a vehicle for the unacknowledged injustices of the final months of the war. Shorn of historical context, it became a key signifier in the increasingly extreme narrative of *pied-noir* victimhood. Its function as a memorial shorthand was succinctly conveyed by Kléber Mesquida, the PS député for the Hérault, speaking in the Assemblée nationale debate on the repatriates in 2003:

Les accords d'Evian signés le 18 mars 1962 imposaient un cessez-le-feu. Et pourtant, combien de sang a encore coulé après cette date! Dès le 26 mars 1962, alors qu'une foule de citoyens manifestait pacifiquement rue d'Isly à Alger, l'armée française ouvrait le feu sans sommation. La fusillade dura douze interminables minutes et fit près de cent morts et deux cents blessés. Parmi les victimes civiles de toutes confessions, quelques noms tirés d'une trop longue liste: Albert Blumhofer, Tayeb Chouider, Charles Ciavaldini, Renée Ferrandis, Abdallah Ladjadji, Jeannine Mesquida, Domingo Puig Server, Elie Zelphati. Ces noms, par leur seule consonance, montrent dans quel creuset de nationalités a été forgé le peuple d'Algérie.

Mesquida's address demonstrates the extent to which the event had become dehistoricized, emphasizing certain features – the duration of the gunfire and the diverse origins of the victims – at the expense of the events that created the conditions for the massacre. Through the development of strategic memorial discourses, the event has been instrumentalized as material evidence of the unacknowledged suffering inflicted on the settler population after the putative end of the war. Much *pied-noir* memory is, as Anne Roche notes, descriptive rather

than narrative.³⁸ Consequently, moments of drama, such as the rue d'Isly or the Oran massacre of 5 July 1962, stand out as peaks in an otherwise flat memoryscape, and are assigned particular significance. While Jean-Jacques Jordi and Claire Eldridge have argued persuasively that “exile and arrival have become the prisms through which all other experiences and events are filtered,” there is a discernable strand within the cultural memory of the war that claims the massacre of the rue d'Isly as a turning point in the war, the moment that led directly to the exodus.³⁹ Following De Cesari and Rigney's observations that transnational memory is scalable from local to global, this discourse has its roots in the local experience of those living in and around Algiers.⁴⁰ Over time, individual memories of the massacre have surpassed their local origins and have been co-opted as an element in the strategic armoury of *pied-noir* activists. Speaking in the documentary, *Les Pieds-noirs: histoire d'une blessure*, eye-witnesses recount their experience and conclude that the massacre signaled the end of their life in French Algeria:

À partir de ce moment-là il y a eu désespérance. On a très bien senti c'était foutu [...] C'est *le*... l'évènement. [...] A partir de là, ces cons de pieds-noirs, leurs yeux s'ouvrent, il est temps de se tailler. Parce que n'esquinter pas que l'indépendance arrivant, vous allez pouvoir vous en sortir gentiment. Donc tout le monde se taille ou essaie de se tailler. C'est terminé.⁴¹

Moving from the individual eye-witness to the broader scale of the memorial community, the direct link between the massacre and the exodus is picked up and repeated by *Bab-el-Oued Story*, a major *pied-noir* website. Its webpage dedicated to the rue d'Isly massacre introduces the event and claims that it marks the start of the exodus:

Le 26 mars 1962, une semaine seulement après la signature des accords d'Evian, des centaines de citoyens français tombent en quelques minutes sous les balles de soldats français rue d'Isly à Alger à la suite d'une manifestation. Fait traumatisant de la guerre d'Algérie, ce massacre marque vraiment le début de l'exode massif des Pieds-noirs.⁴²

From individual memories the narrative has gradually become multi-scalar, now sufficiently established for it to transcend periodically the boundaries of the *pied-noir* community.

Writing in *Le Monde* about the documentary on the massacre directed by Christophe Weber, Francis Cornu uses familiar terms: 'Pour les Français d'Algérie, cette fusillade est le signal de la fin. L'armée ne les défendra pas. Il faut partir. Pour des centaines de milliers de personnes, c'est l'exode.'⁴³ The inclusion of their narrative within the French mainstream media is a victory for *pied-noir* activists and their presentation of the repatriate community as the victims of decolonization.

The account finds little support amongst historians. Todd Shepard argues that, empirically and symbolically, the start of the *pied-noir* exodus can be traced to the arrest of Raoul Salan on 20 April which signaled the collapse of hope in an OAS victory, and plunged the European community into despair and panic.⁴⁴ Another interpretation is offered by *France-Observateur's* Paul-Marie de la Gorce, for whom the Algiers raid on 14 May ('the first Muslim response to OAS violence') was responsible for unleashing the massive exodus of the European community.⁴⁵ In contrast, Martin Evans argues that earlier departures were the result of decisions based on individual circumstances and that the final realization came much later: 'In the wake of Oran [the massacres on 5 July] most Europeans came to the conclusion that for their own safety they had to leave'.⁴⁶ Mercier reaches the same conclusion: 'Cet évènement [on 5 July] détermina beaucoup de pieds-noirs à partir pour la France et ce, dans la précipitation'.⁴⁷

Historically, there is evidential support for each of these events. Crucially, however, only the July massacre in Oran is remembered as significant by the *pieds-noirs* themselves, and it tends not to be identified as the major cause of the exodus, perhaps because the month with the highest number of departures – June – had already taken place. Instead, the massacre of the rue d’Isly is privileged. On a personal level, for the families of those involved the massacre was clearly a life-altering moment from which many would never fully recover. But on a community level, cultural memory worked somewhat differently. There, the human drama of the massacre was remembered because it served as a screen onto which a range of fears and anxieties about the settlers’ relationship with the French army and, beyond that, the French state, could be projected. Rémi Kauffer comes closest to understanding this:

L’hécatombe de la rue d’Isly va littéralement « casser les reins » aux pieds-noirs. Un jour ou l’autre, l’armée se rangera de notre côté, s’étaient-ils longtemps imaginés. La mort brutale de dizaines d’entre eux atteints par des balles françaises vient de leur démontrer le contraire. Les moins lucides peuvent toujours bomber le torse en invoquant un hypothétique renversement de tendance, les chances de succès de l’OAS apparaissent désormais comme minimales. Alors, le désespoir commence à gagner cette communauté au pied du mur. Désespoir et haine face à ce de Gaulle inflexible, à ces officiers « sans honneur » qui « bradent l’Algérie », à ces soldats du contingent qui les détestent, à ces métropolitains prêts à les abandonner.⁴⁸

Kauffer’s identification of the sources of the settlers’ despair highlights some of the factors that led to the massacre’s notoriety amongst the *pieds-noirs*. The survivors’ trauma, already profound as a result of being fired on by their own forces of order, was intensified by the indifference of metropolitan society. Protecting, honing, and disseminating the memory of the massacre therefore became a mission for *pied-noir* activists.

Drawing parallels: the rue d'Isly and Barricades Week

The choice to foreground 26 March and, to an extent, 5 July as the key dates in the *pied-noir* calendar of the war bears examination, given that the rue d'Isly was not the first site of violence between European civilians and French soldiers. Famously, violent exchanges took place during Barricades Week when, on 24 January 1960, gunfire left nineteen dead (ten civilians, and nine *gendarmes* and police). Marc-Olivier Gavois makes a link between the deaths of Barricades Week and those of the rue d'Isly, observing that both events were marked by memorials of flowers and hand-drawn signs placed where civilian victims (rather than soldiers) had fallen.⁴⁹ However, the two events were remembered quite differently. Gavois notes that school textbooks commemorated the Barricades deaths and presented them as marking the rupture between the *Français d'Algérie* and the metropole, whilst not mentioning the massacre on the rue d'Isly at all. In contrast, the *pieds-noirs* rarely mentioned the civilian deaths of Barricades Week.

To explain the unevenness of memory, Rigney refers to the notion of “scarcity” – the finite appetite for memories of certain events. Here, the deaths on the rue d'Isly obscure the civilian deaths on the Barricades (just as they also obscure the young conscripts whom the OAS killed in the week following the ceasefire).⁵⁰ The Barricades' deaths are caught in what Sanyal terms a memorial “pleat” in which they are covered by the events of the rue d'Isly. While this might seem an example of the zero-sum game abjured by Rothberg, it encourages attention to the political context which conditions the selectivity of scarcity. Barricades Week is a story of settler agency, of heroic individuals defending homes and homeland against overwhelming odds. In contrast, the rue d'Isly is a victimhood narrative of citizens whose peaceful protest was met with brutal state repression. Laleh Khalili notes that ‘battles’ tend to be celebrated in memorial discourses as evidence of heroism: the Barricades, with its

emphasis on *pied-noir* agency, falls into this category.⁵¹ Heroism may be celebrated even in cases of defeat, as in the case of Great Britain's retreat from Dunkirk in 1940, particularly where the larger narrative is one of eventual victory.⁵² However, given the war's eventual outcome of *pied-noir* exodus and exile, the heroic agency of the Barricades no longer fits the post-war narrative; consequently the emphasis shifts to the iconography of massacre and the rue d'Isly images of suffering and victimhood.

The massacre of the rue d'Isly is also significant because of the settlers' supposed complicity with the French army. Gavois cites the lack of military support for the settler uprising on 24 January 1960 as exposing the myth of collusion between army and settlers.⁵³ Ruscio disputes this, pointing out that the *gendarmes mobiles* who had fired on the demonstrators were quickly replaced by paratroopers who, being more sympathetic to the settler cause, entered into "une cohabitation harmonieuse" with the Europeans.⁵⁴ If given an order, Ruscio argues, no para would have taken action against the *barricadistes*. If correct, it moves the decisive breakdown of settler confidence in the army forward in time to 26 March 1962. Certainly the settlers' dependence on the army was such that, in a front-page article for *Le Monde* (27 March 1962) that he entitled "La garantie des garanties," Maurice Duverger identified the presence of the French army as one of the elements (along with French economic support, and the Europeans' own will to remain) that secured the Evian Accords and would enable the Europeans to stay in Algeria. The hope that the army would eventually join them does not figure in the *pied-noir* narrative, although it may have existed but remained unvoiced because history has proved that confidence to be misplaced. Instead, *pied-noir* discourse emphasizes the scale and unforeseen nature of the army's betrayal on 26 March 1962 with, as supplementary confirmation, its betrayal on 5 July during the *chasse à l'Européen* in Oran. Together, these events provide evidence for the *pieds-noirs* that,

regardless of the presence of the French army, there was no future for the Europeans in Algeria.

Although the *pieds-noirs* have chosen not to commemorate the deaths during Barricades Week, they have nonetheless seen a utility in instrumentalizing transnational comparisons with major international upheavals to inscribe their victim status into a cosmopolitan narrative of suffering at a global level. Eldridge has traced references to the Kosovan refugee crisis of the 1990s, the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004, and the Twin Towers on 9/11 in *pied-noir* publications.⁵⁶ She argues that the aim in making connections with other tragedies is to draw the reader's attention to the *pieds-noirs*' place in a competitive hierarchy of suffering: "The suffering of others is acknowledged, but the main purpose is usually to establish the primacy of the trauma endured by the *pieds-noirs*", such that "the international event itself is ultimately less important than the *pied-noir* narrative whose retelling it facilitates."⁵⁷

In each of Eldridge's examples, the transnational comparison drawn is with the *pied-noir* experience of exile. However, the particular status of a massacre, as a specific, time-limited and narratable event, lends itself to comparison, and memories of the rue d'Isly massacre are accompanied by parallels with other massacres. *Pied-noir* activists have taken a selective and strategic approach that includes comparisons with massacres that appear to be diametrically opposed in aims and outcomes, whilst overlooking others which are both well-known and contemporaneous. Their approach bears consideration.

Civic Massacres: Charonne, 17 October, and Bloody Sunday

Analysing the differential distribution of memory, Rigney identifies an event-type, which she calls the "civic massacre", that she argues attracts a disproportionate degree of

remembrance.⁵⁸ Foregrounding the central opposition between active citizens and state terror, the civic massacre combines civic activism, massacre, and melodrama, and is memorable in a way that systemic violence is not.⁵⁹ Following Peter Brooks, Rigney argues that melodrama functions through dramatization, emotivity and polarization to construct a moral conflict in which there are actors for good and evil.⁶⁰ Read within this frame, the civic massacre unfolds between the charged poles of innocence and culpability, with the civic agency of the demonstrators transformed into victimhood and suffering at the hands of state forces. Since this is effectively the *pied-noir* narrative of the war writ small, it is unsurprising that the massacre of the rue d'Isly should have acquired such resonance.

The rue d'Isly was not the only site of civic massacre during the closing months of the war. In Paris, the killing of around two hundred unarmed Algerians by the CRS police during an FLN demonstration on 17 October 1961 was followed by the deaths of nine Parisians at the Charonne metro station on 8 February 1962 during a trade union-led demonstration against OAS violence. The massacres are frequently referenced together, in part because in both cases the police repression was commanded by the Paris Préfet de Police, Maurice Papon. Yet their memorial trajectories have been starkly different. Charonne was immediately acknowledged as a national event, with half a million people turning out for the funerals of the victims in a cortege that wound through Paris to Père-Lachaise cemetery; the anniversary of the massacre continues to be marked annually, particularly by the CGT and the PCF.⁶² Despite its death toll and high public profile, references to Charonne are entirely absent from *pied-noir* discourses and publications, presumably because of its anti-OAS sentiment. However, when the record of *pied-noir* transnational comparisons is examined, it becomes clear that they have made connections with causes and victims much further removed than that of Charonne. One such was the massacre of 17 October 1961.

In contrast with Charonne but common with the massacre of the rue d'Isly, the massacre of 17 October 1961 garnered little public attention, being only briefly reported in the print press before fading from public view. House and MacMaster argue that a private counter-memory of 17 October 1961 was kept alive by 'immigrant communities and by small numbers of French activists', meaning that, as with the rue d'Isly, memories of the violence were invested with meaning and preserved distinct from established histories of the Algerian War.⁶³ However, the work of a range of novelists and historians, most notably Jean-Luc Einaudi, succeeded in bringing to light the details of that night; when the trial of Maurice Papon took place in 1997-98, Einaudi testified against him regarding his role in the massacre.⁶⁴ Consequently, awareness of the massacre increased dramatically such that, as Jim House and Neil MacMaster note, it gradually moved from "the outermost margins of the French political imaginary... to occupy an important if not central role in discussions of post-colonial France."⁶⁵

Given their ethnicity, religion and political sympathies, Papon's Muslim victims may appear to have little in common with the *pieds-noirs*. However, they shared a certain marginality that allowed their experience of violence to be easily forgotten by metropolitan civil society. Although the Muslim victims were French subjects resident in Paris, they occupied the capital's margins both symbolically, by virtue of origins and ethnicity that connected them to the opposing side in the war, and through their physical location in its *bidonvilles*. For many metropolitans, the *pieds-noirs* occupied a similarly marginal position far from the imperial center, meaning that the victims of the rue d'Isly, although of European origin, were not universally considered to be fully French. Moreover, both groups of demonstrators had been also protesting against their treatment at the hands of the French authorities. What distinguished the two massacres, and drove *pied-noir* interest in drawing the comparison, was the perceived greater degree of recognition afforded by the French state to

the victims of 17 October 1961. In 2001 the Mairie of Paris inaugurated a memorial plaque on the Pont Saint-Michel and the process of recognition reached its zenith when, during the fiftieth anniversary commemorations of independence, President François Hollande formally acknowledged the victims of the 17 October 1961, although his statement notably failed to assign responsibility for the killings.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, for the victims of the rue d'Isly it marked an important precedent, and one which they demanded be applied also to the 26 March 1962, arguing that those killed on the rue d'Isly were entitled to recognition because, while the Algerian demonstrators in Paris were calling for Algerian independence, the European in Algeria were waving French flags and singing the Marseillaise.⁶⁷

It might have been expected that the AFVA's success in inscribing the victims of the massacre on the Quai Branly memorial and so (re)locating the *pieds-noirs* at the heart of the nation would have brought some closure to the bereaved families. It signified what Michael Rowlands calls a shift from the personal remembrance of the memorial to the collective commemoration of the monument, thereby signaling the successful completion of the mourning process.⁶⁸ However, as the letter to Hollande demonstrates, this has not been the case: the AFVA's campaign for public recognition and acceptance has continued, with demands for an official public enquiry presented via an unexpected appeal to international history.

Scholars of settler colonialism have drawn parallels between the settler populations in colonial Algeria and in Ireland, both of which saw the transplantation of large numbers of incomers distinguished from the native population in part by religious difference. Although taking place over different timescales, both provinces saw long and violent civil struggles as the nationalists' campaign for independence was countered by army operations, and then paramilitary violence on both sides. If the parallel itself is well established, the reading offered by the AFVA is less so. Its website introduces its largely *pied-noir* audience to the

Derry massacre of Bloody Sunday, in which on 13 January 1972 the ‘armée anglaise’ [sic] opened fire, killing 13 civilians. In the thirty years of the ‘Troubles’, Bloody Sunday is arguably the most notorious single incident.⁶⁹ For the AFVA, the parallel with the rue d’Isly is absolute – “En France, des faits identiques s’étaient produits, 10 ans auparavant” – and the French response should be modelled on the British official apology.⁷⁰ The approach produces a jarring conflation of IRA and OAS supporters.

There are indeed similarities: the banning of both demonstrations; the participation of unarmed civilians; and the involvement of the respective British and French armies as part of a long-running civil conflict between the state and the armed groups fighting for independence. Nonetheless, a rudimentary knowledge of the two conflicts highlights dramatic differences in the identity and status of the victims. In the archetypal colonial struggle, the IRA’s nationalist campaign against the British colonizer casts it in a position comparable to that of the FLN, fighting for Irish independence just as the FLN had earlier fought for an *Algérie algérienne*. In historical terms, the victims of Bloody Sunday have more in common with the unarmed Muslims who died in Paris on 17 October 1961, since both groups comprised individuals who belonged to the indigenous groups fighting for national autonomy. Both events were part of a pattern of systemic colonial violence, minimized by the authorities and for many years occulted from the dominant history of the period. Moreover, both have become the focus of recent political and legal attention. In the UK, the changed political landscape brought about by the Good Friday Agreement led to the establishment of a public enquiry into Bloody Sunday, twenty-six years after the massacre. Finally published twelve years later at a cost of £195 million, the Saville Report was unequivocal in its condemnation of the army’s conduct, and its conclusions produced a formal apology from Prime Minister David Cameron, supported by the head of the army, General Sir David Richards. The high public profile of Bloody Sunday and the outcome of the long-running official enquiry make it

a model for *pied-noir* activists seeking public acknowledgement of their cause, despite the victims belonging to the nationalist side of the Irish conflict.

While the AFVA draws parallels between the *pieds-noirs* and Irish Nationalists, in their support for French Algeria the *pieds-noirs* had more in common with the Ulster loyalists, whose paramilitaries fought to defend the Union with tactics not dissimilar to those of the OAS. The tendentious parallel is made possible because *pied-noir* memorial practice “pleats” or “folds” history such that the political causes that led directly to the deaths of scores of civilians are obscured, leaving only the human story of individual suffering. In the attempt to bolster the *pied-noir* narrative through an appeal to Ireland, the messy and complex realities of history come second to the pain of the civilian victims faced with the weapons of the state. The approach is controversial: Bloody Sunday’s notoriety has obscured other, related atrocities, such as the Ballymurphy massacre of 1971 in which soldiers shot dead ten civilians in Belfast. Moreover, there is little to suggest that the UK model would deliver what the rue d’Isly families hope for. Despite the length and cost of the Saville Report, forty-seven years after the massacre and to the dismay of families the announcement was made in 2019 that only one soldier would be prosecuted for his part in Bloody Sunday. Despite the legal process, little closure has been achieved and the campaign for justice continues.

The transnational parallel drawn by the AFVA throws once again into stark relief the unstable nature of the categories of postcolonial perpetrators and victims. The persistent characterization of the *pieds-noirs* essentially as perpetrators – colonizers who benefited from the exploitation of the indigenous populations – simplifies and overlooks the complexities of the settler colonial situation and the desperation of its end. Indeed, the persistence of that discourse has fed into the *pied-noir* sense of injustice, which has calcified into a narrative of victimhood.

The campaigning work of the AFVA is admirable in its commitment to obtaining justice for the dead. It does nonetheless exhibit a tendency to elide the complexities of history, replacing a reductive version of settler experience (colonialists, oppressors) with an equally reified narrative of victimhood. The French state's reluctance to publicly acknowledge the deaths of the rue d'Isly has had the effect of forcing a dehistoricized *pied-noir* narrative down a road in which the settler population is always and only a victim of French state policies. While activists may feel that there is no alternative, the development of a fixed paradigm is ultimately detrimental to the development of the community's understanding of its historical role in Algeria, and to the evolution of a non-competitive, holistic memory of the Algerian War. Just as importantly, the victim/perpetrator dichotomy restricts the potential for the metropolitan French population to engage with the issues, and to explore how it is implicated in the memories and legacies of colonialism which circulate, shift and intersect within contemporary society.

If there are lessons to be drawn from Northern Ireland, they come perhaps less from Bloody Sunday, which did not bring closure or justice for its victims' families, but from the treaty which eventually brought peace to the province. The Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998. Unlike the Evian Accords, its principles have been respected and the populations concerned remain living together. Whilst the *pied-noir* context is striated by fixed identities, at the core of the Good Friday Agreement is an insistence on plurality, in the statement that people born in Northern Ireland have an absolute right to be "Irish or British or both as they may so choose." Whereas the Evian Accords gave the settlers of Algeria three years in which to decide definitively on their citizenship, the Good Friday Agreement embedded in an international treaty a notion of identity, not as based on territory or genetics, but as chosen and multiple. This approach fosters an openness to the complex practices of belonging that characterize lived experience. By contrast, the *pied-noir* appeal to Bloody

Sunday reinforces an investment in fixed identities and fictive notions of purity that serves the struggle to have suffering and losses acknowledged but blocks progress in moving beyond the categories of victim and perpetrator. The challenge remains to make the work of remembering 26 March 1962 less competitive and more multidirectional.

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Notes

¹ Film of the demonstration, entitled ‘Algérie : les événements du 26 mars 1962’ is available on the INA website: <https://www.ina.fr/video/CAF90005855/algerie-les-evenements-du-lundi-26-mars-1962-video.html> . Photographs of the massacre were published in *Paris-Match* No. 677.

² For fictional texts treating the massacre of the rue d’Isly, see Maurice Edelman, *The Fratricides* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963), published in French by Presses de la Cité in 1964; Gabriel Conesa, *Bab-el-Oued: notre paradis perdu* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1970); Maurice Attia, *Alger la noire* (Paris: Actes Sud, 2006). For historical works, see Jean Monneret, *Une ténébreuse affaire: la fusillade du 26 mars 1962 à Alger* (Paris: Édition l’Harmattan, 2009) ; Francine Dessaigne et Marie-Jeanne Rey, *Un crime sans assassin* (Paris : Éditions Confrérie-Castille, 1994) ; Véritas (ed.), *Alger, le 26 mars 1962. Nouveau livre blanc sur un crime d’État* (Paris: Véritas, 2007). A documentary directed by Christophe Weber, *Le massacre de la rue d’Isly*, was screened by France 3 on 12 September 2008. In February 2017 an oil painting by Jean-François Galéa entitled ‘Fusillade du 26 mars 1962 Rue d’Isly à

Alger' was exhibited at the Grand Palais in Paris. It has been widely reproduced by *pied-noir* publications.

³ Debarati Sanyal, *Memory and Complicity: Migrations of Holocaust Remembrance* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 6.

⁴ Marianne Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 206.

⁵ Ann Rigney, 'Differential Memorability and Transnational Activism: Bloody Sunday, 1887-2016', *Australian Humanities Review* 59 (April/May 2016), 77-95.

⁶ Astrid Erll, 'Travelling Memory', *Parallax* 17,4 (2011), 4-18.

⁷ Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

⁸ Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney (eds.), *Transnational Memory: Circulation, Articulation, Scales* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 5.

¹⁰ Rigney, 'Differential Memorability and Transnational Activism'; Jim House and Neil Macmaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

¹¹ Yves Courrière, *Les feux du désespoir*, vol. 4 of *La Guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Editions Fayard, 1971) ; Rémi Kauffer, 'OAS : la guerre franco-française d'Algérie' in *La Guerre d'Algérie. 1954-2004. La fin de l'amnésie* dirigé par Mohamed Harbi et Benjamin Stora (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2004), 451-76; Alain Ruscio, *Nostalgie : L'interminable histoire de l'OAS* (Paris: La Découverte, 2015).

¹² Courrière, *Les feux du désespoir*, 561–570.

¹³ Général Raoul Salan, 'Instruction numéro 29', *OAS parle* (Paris: éditions Julliard, collection Archives, 1964), <Histoirecoloniale.net/la-feuille-de-route-de-l-OAS-par.html>, accessed 1 October 2018.

¹⁴ Ruscio, *Nostalgie*, 106.

¹⁵ *Le Monde*, 28 March 1962, 2.

¹⁶ See Marie Elbe, *A l'heure de notre mort* (Paris : Albin Michel, 1992 [1963]), 15 ; and <http://manifpn2012.canalblog.com/archives/2012/03/26/23860203.html> (accessed 12 December 2018). Of uncertain origin, the latter is reproduced on numerous *pied-noir* websites.

¹⁷ Courrière, *Les feux du désespoir*, 580-81.

¹⁸ Cécile Mercier, *Les pieds-noirs et l'exode de 1962 à travers la presse française* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2003), 48.

²⁰ Francine Dessaigne, *Le Journal d'une mère de famille pied-noir* (Paris: L'Esprit Nouveau, 1962), 166.

²¹ Dessaigne, *Le Journal*, 168 (italics added).

²² Jan Assman, 'Collective memory and cultural identity', *New German Critique* 65 (1995), 125-133 (130).

²³ 'Lundi 26 mars 1962: un assassinat collectif de l'Etat – le grand silence', <http://www.alger26mars1962.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=151:2-1-la-tuerie-dite-de-la-rue-d-isly-le-grand-silence&catid=42&Itemid=135&showall=&limitstart=>> , accessed 13 September 2018.

²⁴ *La Lettre de Véritas*, Jan-Mars 2018, 1. Under the headline 'La justice et la vengeance divine poursuivant un criminel d'Etat' the front page depicts two angels above a fallen male figure, with a military *képi* in a pool of blood, and the subhead, 'Un sanglant matricide: L'assassinat des Français d'Algérie par un dictateur fou!'

²⁵ Ruscio, *Nostalgie*, 192.

²⁶ Georges Bosc, 'L'Appel du 26 mars', *L'Algérieniste*, March 1992, 3.

²⁷ Successive governments rejected 19 March as a national day of remembrance because it marked the end not of a war in Algeria, but of ‘opérations de maintien de l’ordre’. It became the national day of remembrance of the Algerian War in November 2012, after months of controversy. The vote in the Assemblée nationale was opposed by the centre and right-wing parties which, following the *pieds-noirs*’ argument, saw it as a divisive measure.

²⁸ Claude Liauzu, ‘Ministère de l’hostilité’, *Le Monde diplomatique*, July 2007, 28.

²⁹

<<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000000444898&categorieLien=id>>, accessed 17 September 2018.

³⁰ Annette Wieviorka, *L’Ère du témoin* (Paris: Plon, 1998)..

³² Examples include *Les Pieds-noirs: Histoire d’une blessure* (dir. Gilles Perez, 2006) ; *La Valise ou le cercueil* (dir. Charly Cassan, 2011) ; *Paroles de pieds-noirs* (dir. Jean-Pierre Carlon, 2009) ; *L’Amère patrie* (dir, Frédéric Biamonti, 2012).

³³ Daniel J. Sherman, *The Construction of Memory in Interwar France* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999); Alison Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

³⁴ See Fiona Barclay, ‘Reporting on 1962: the evolution of *pied-noir* identity across 50 years of print media’, *Modern & Contemporary France*, 23, 2 (2015), 197-211.

³⁶ Barclay, ‘Reporting on 1962’.

³⁷ Claire Eldridge, *From Empire to Exile: History and Memory Within the Pied-noir and Harki Communities, 1962-2012* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

³⁸ Anne Roche, ‘Pieds-noirs: Le <<retour>>’, *Modern & Contemporary France*, 2.2 (1994), 151-164 (156).

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- ³⁹ Jean-Jacques Jordi, 'The Creation of the *pieds-noirs*: Arrival and Settlement in Marseille, 1962', in *Europe's Invisible Migrants*, ed. Andrea L. Smith (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003), 61-74 (63); Claire Eldridge, 'Returning to the "return"', *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 29, 3 (2013), 121-140 (127).
- ⁴⁰ De Cesari and Rigney, *Transnational memory*, 5-6.
- ⁴¹ 'Les années dramatiques', *Les Pieds-noirs : Histoire d'une blessure* (dir. Gilles Perez, 2006).
- ⁴² 'Massacre des Français dans la rue d'Isly à Alger le 26 mars 1962 par la France', http://www.babelouedstory.com/thema_les/26_mars/1673/1673.html (accessed July 26 2019).
- ⁴³ Francis Cornu, 'Le massacre de la rue d'Isly', *Le Monde*, 5 September 2008. In it, one of the victims of the rue d'Isly argues that the massacre was a deliberate attempt by the French authorities to break the *pieds-noirs*, giving them no option but to leave: 'Je pense qu'ils ont fait ça parce qu'ils voulaient en terminer avec les pieds-noirs et qu'ils ont fait ça – je dis – pour museler. La preuve c'est que, après, tout le monde s'est sauvé.'
- ⁴⁴ Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 212-13.
- ⁴⁵ Paul-Marie de la Gorce, 'Alger: l'histoire de la trêve', *France-Observateur* 631, 7 June 1962, 6-10 (8).
- ⁴⁶ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 320.
- ⁴⁷ Mercier, *Les pieds-noirs et l'exode de 1962*, 48.
- ⁴⁸ Rémi Kauffer, 'OAS, la guerre franco-française d'Algérie', in *La Guerre d'Algérie. 1954-2004. La fin de l'amnésie*, ed. Mohammed Harbi et Benjamin Stora (Paris: Robert Laffont 2004), 456.
- ⁴⁹ Marc-Olivier Gavois, 'Le bilan de la fusillade du 24 janvier 1960 genèse d'un mythe ?', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 87, 328-329 (2000), 267-276 (274).

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- ⁵¹ Khalili, Laleh, 'Massacres and Battles: Commemorating Contentious Moments in the Refugee Camps of Lebanon', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 51, 11 (2008) 1562-1574 (1572).
- ⁵² See George Orwell, *The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius* (London: Searchlight, 1941).
- ⁵³ Gavois, 'Le bilan', 275.
- ⁵⁴ Ruscio, *Nostalgie*, 86.
- ⁵⁶ Eldridge, 'Returning to the "return"', 132.
- ⁵⁷ Eldridge, 'Returning to the "return"', 132.
- ⁵⁸ Rigney, 'Differential Memorability and Transnational Activism', 81.
- ⁵⁹ Rigney, 'Differential Memorability and Transnational Activism', 90.
- ⁶⁰ Peter Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).
- ⁶² For analysis of the Charonne massacre, see Alain Dewerpe, *Charonne, 8 février 1962 : anthropologie historique d'un massacre d'État* (Paris, Gallimard, 2006).
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⁶⁹ Rigney, 'Differential Memorability and Transnational Activism'.

⁷⁰ Nicole Ferrandis, 'Le 26 mars 1962 à Alger et le Bloody Sunday', March 2014,

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