

# The Balkanization of Ottoman Rule

## Premodern Origins of the Modern International System in Southeastern Europe

CLEMENS HOFFMANN

---

### ABSTRACT

---

The term 'Balkanization' has found entry in the social sciences vocabulary as a metaphor for diversity at best, social and political instability for the most part, and genocidal war at worst. And yet it is precisely the emergence of a variety of national states and the Ottoman Empire's disintegration that are frequently portrayed as processes of 'modernizing' as well as 'naturalizing' the international system of the Balkans and the Middle East. By offering a historical sociological re-construction of early modern Ottoman history up to the Greek Revolt in 1821, I argue in this article that the national secessions were not synonymous with the creation of a 'modern' international system in southeastern Europe. National independence cannot therefore be understood as a functional derivative of an expanding European Modernity mediated through global capitalism or geopolitical competition. Rather, the various secessions were the result of a series of conservative reactions to the modernization efforts of the Ottoman central administration. National state formation and Ottoman disintegration, on the one hand, and capitalist development and modern sovereignty on the other, have thus to be seen rather as having historically and socially distinct origins than as representing two sides of the same coin of a totalizing form of European international modernity.

**Keywords:** Historical sociology; interstate system; modern sovereignty; nationalism; Ottoman Empire

*'By the beginning of the twentieth century Europe had added to its repertoire of Schimpfwörter, or disparagements, a new one which turned out to be more persistent than others with centuries old traditions. "Balkanization" not only had come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political units but also had become a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian.'*

Maria Todorova, 1997: 3



Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association  
Vol. 43(4): 373–396. © NISA 2008 [www.nisanet.org](http://www.nisanet.org)  
SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore  
[www.sagepublications.com](http://www.sagepublications.com)  
0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836708096881

*'The Ottoman state thus entered the age of political modernization. It could not survive the process of transformation, since empires by their nature can seldom withstand pressure and adapt to the complex conditions necessitated by structural and political changes.'*

Kemal H. Karpat, 1972: 281

*'A world-empire expands to the socio-technical limits of effective political control of the redistributive process, and then either shrinks or disintegrates.'*

Immanuel Wallerstein, 1979: 390

### **Introduction: How *Modern* is the Nation-State System in Southeastern Europe?**

The term 'Balkanization' is found in the social sciences vocabulary as a metaphor for diversity at best, social and political instability for the most part, and genocidal war at worst (Der Derian, 1991; Todorova, 1994, 1997; Bjelić and Savić, 2005). And yet it is precisely the emergence of a variety of sovereign states through a series of national secessions in southeastern Europe that is understood to signify the transformation from an Ottoman backward and brutal regime of exploitation to modern, secular and Enlightened forms of sovereignty. Abou-El-Haj inverts this assumption noting that: '[I]n order to become truly modern, it [the Ottoman Empire] was perceived to having to transform necessarily into a nation-state, or rather a variety of nation-states' (1991: 62). International Relations (IR) theory has departed a long way from the positivist realist assumptions about the transhistorically fixed ontological distinction of social relations *within* from those *with the outside* (Waltz, 1979). Critical theory, especially constructivist (Ruggie, 1993), post-structuralist (Walker, 1993) as well as historical materialist (Rosenberg, 1994) critiques of realism, has convincingly argued that what realism assumes as a timeless given in fact constitutes a historically peculiar, specifically *modern*, form of sovereignty and international order. Having established this shared problem with realism, what is commonly less problematized is an understanding of '*territorial* sovereignty and *national* sovereignty as the distinctively *modern* way of ordering the "international"' (Hall, 1999: 3). The use of 'nation' appears to be synonymous with 'modern', indicating the underlying Wilsonian principle of ethno-linguistic self-determination as the organizing principle of the Westphalian international order, 'which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellner, 1983: 1). Thus, IR theory has long focused on the historically specific nature of the institutions of modern *territorial* sovereignty while at the same time taken its *national* character as a given, relying heavily on theories of nationalism (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990) to understand this social phenomenon. Those theories, in turn, however, have usually been developed outside the main discourses of IR, and have consequently mostly neglected questions of the international as a constitutive element in their own theorizations of the

emergence of nationalism, with James Mayall constituting a noble exception (Mayall, 1990).

This somewhat problematic division of labour between IR theory and theories of nationalism thus leaves national difference as the explanans for multi-stateness, not as what it should be, namely part of the explanandum. This is why, to my mind, the post-Ottoman territorial multitude in south-eastern Europe is often (mis)understood as the natural outcome of a process of 'international socialization' (Halliday, 1992: 460) whereby the international system coerced (through military means, socialization through norms or market and middle class pressure) the Ottoman Empire to disintegrate into its purportedly constituent 'national' parts. This process of disintegration is thus understood to be in accordance with the establishment of modern sovereignty in the form of an 'arrogation of the means of violence by multiple sovereigns and the concomitant establishment of bounded territoriality' (Teschke, 2003: 3).

What I try to defend in the course of this article is a challenge to this conventional wisdom: In consequence, I argue that, thus far, the modern nature of Ottoman rule and the Ottoman reform efforts from 1789 onwards have been underrated in the same way that the modern character of the post-Ottoman nationalist secessions has been overrated (Kostis, 2005). Conventional historical sociological explanations for the multiplicity of sovereign states have not convincingly theorized this process of imperial disintegration and nation-state formation in the Balkans. In particular, I argue that the specific territorial shape of the post-Ottoman *international* order was neither the result of the logic of geopolitical competition that 'out-selects a militarily/geopolitically inefficient state' (Tilly, 1990; Mann, 1993; Spruyt, 1994a, b) nor the direct result of an expansion of capitalism and an enlargement of the world economy into the region (Keyder, 1976; Wallerstein, 1979; Kasaba, 1988), but the regionally specific outcome of social struggles between situated pre-capitalist provincial power-holders who successfully mobilized a nationalist project to defend their interests against a modernizing/centralizing Ottoman centre. It is the sharpening of this conflict that leads to the disintegration and break up of the Ottoman Empire along specific territorial lines. This, finally, leads me to utilize the Ottoman example as a means by which to reveal the continuously volatile nature of territorially defined relations of domination as a generic problem for a static and ahistorical understanding of contemporary IR.

I first set out the theoretical context within the historical sociology of IR and compare and contrast neo-Weberian, world systems and political Marxist approaches. I then continue to interrogate these theories in the light of the Ottoman example. The central focus of the following empirical part is the emergence of regional power centres in a state which is conventionally characterized by its high level of centralization (see, e.g., Wittfogel, 1954). I first briefly outline the original provincial order of the Empire produced by its mode of 'soft' conquest, its mode of reproduction, and contextualize the process of 'internal' social change preceding the emergence of nationalism within the wider geopolitical context, with specific reference to the Greek example. This demonstrates that the historical/social manifestation

of the post-Ottoman national polities, as well as their national character, is the result of essentially premodern and pre-capitalist social struggles and cannot be understood as a direct or functional derivative of geopolitical or capitalist totalizing 'logics' universalizing the European Westphalian System.

### **Ottoman Decline and Historical Sociology of International Relations**

As has been shown, there is widespread concern within both IR theory and historical sociology about re-constructing, rather than taking as a given, the inter-stateness of modern IR. Historical sociology of IR supplies the theoretical toolkit to supply the groundwork required to understand the social transformations that led to a post-Ottoman states system. In the following section I look at the two most prominent strands within the historical sociology of state formation, i.e. the geopolitical competition model and world system theory, before arriving at a 'third way' of historicizing the emergence of modern sovereignty, political Marxism, which will be, with reservations, endorsed as the most promising approach to re-conceptualizing Ottoman decline.

#### *Geopolitical Competition as Agent of Social Change*

As far as a historicization of the interstate system goes, the theoretical strand within historical sociology which is most closely related to realism has its roots in the Weberian focus on the institutional capabilities of the modern bureaucratic state: neo-Weberian historical sociology (WHS) (Tilly, 1990; Mann, 1993; Hobson, 1997) puts the emphasis on physical rather than material coercion: nation-states are the result of a competitive process of various state formations. Hendrik Spruyt's approach serves here as a representative of this camp. The basic assumption is that Empires<sup>1</sup> cannot ensure the viability, coherence, revenue and, by extension, military competitiveness to survive in typically 'modern' international relations:

The system selected out those types of units that were, competitively speaking, less efficient. In other words, the competitive nature of the system determined the nature of the constitutive units. (...) Actors intentionally created a system of sovereign, territorial states. They preferred a system that divided the sphere of cultural and economic interaction into territorial parcels with clear hierarchical authorities. (Spruyt, 1994: 180)

This new institutional base is the most competitive one because it produces the revenue and by extension the most forceful military apparatus capable of withstanding the geopolitical pressures emanating from simultaneously modernizing 'units'. This happens by solving the discrepancy between 'emerging translocal markets and existing political arrangements' (Spruyt, 1994b: 529). Inherent in this 'weakness' in Empire is the high degree of diversity, which is thought of as being identical with diverging interests and inherent inter-ethnic conflict that weakens polities in international

struggles. The institutional streamlining of domestic socio-political structures thus also involves homogenization of the subject people:

In one of their more self-conscious attempts to engineer state power, rulers frequently sought to homogenize their populations in the course of installing direct rule. (...) But homogeneity had many compensating advantages: within a homogeneous population, ordinary people were more likely to identify with their rulers, communication could run more efficiently, and an administrative innovation that worked in one segment was likely to work elsewhere as well. People who sensed a common origin, furthermore, were more likely to unite against external threats. (Tilly, 1990: 106 f.)

According to this theory, it was the importance of ethno-cultural homogeneity itself, loosely linked to fiscal-administrative efficiency, that earmarked the Ottoman Empire for 'outselection' within this semi-Darwinistic process. The geopolitical competition model, therefore, cannot but interpret 'the last centuries of the existence [of the Ottoman Empire] unidirectionally as a history of decline' (Reinowski, 2006). Looking at the historical course of Ottoman disintegration, then, the case appears to be convincingly argued by the geopolitical competition model: With increased geopolitical pressure exercised mostly by Austria and Russia (Venice earlier) from the seventeenth century onwards, the Ottoman Empire shifts from a position of territorial stagnation after the failed siege of Vienna 1683 to one of retreat, when the first territorial losses in the Balkans were internationally sanctioned by the Peace treaties of Karlowitz with Austria in 1699 and later at Passarowitz with Austria and Venice in 1718 (Abou-El-Haj, 1969). Thus, the result of increased geopolitical pressure was indeed — as neo-Weberian historical sociology predicts — a consolidation of political power in the centre through the creation of a modern standing army built on the sound fiscal basis necessary for it. Neo-Weberian historical sociology can, thus, tell us *why* states centralize and modernize, it cannot tell us *which* states do or will. It does not offer a theory of national above and beyond centralized and modernized rule. What this static and deterministic view of national sovereignty constitutes, however, is nothing but a re-affirmation of the static and positivist non-explanation of the geopolitical multitude of states. Thus, as John M. Hobson has convincingly argued, 'while neo-Weberianism *promises* to go beyond neorealism, much of it in fact perfectly replicates neorealism (...) that Weberian historical sociology represents a form of "sociological realism"' (Hobson, 2002: 64). What this overlooks historically, on the other hand, is that the agents of this modernizing response to the geopolitical pressure were not nationally divided rational bureaucrats of incipient modern states, but first and foremost the Ottoman Imperial administration itself. Their modernizing agency is what created an escalating conflict between the periphery and a centralizing Sultanate regime from Selim III onwards which culminated in the Tanzimat and the Young Turk revolution. The social struggle over the sources of revenue that followed is central for explaining the emergence of a multitude of states in Southeastern Europe. Theoretically, the neo-Weberian approach cannot account for these struggles,

which means a vital part of the explanation remains unobserved by this kind of Realist black-box thinking, which focuses merely on the selective capacity of the international system and a variety of functionally similar, competing and ultimately mutually out-selecting modernizing strategies.

*The 'Commercialization' Model: the Ottomans' Changing Place  
in the World Economy as the Engine of Social Change*

With this fundamentally important, yet somewhat reductionist, understanding of the international context, neo-Weberian historical sociology is by no means alone. Many historical materialist explanations about the decline of the Ottoman Empire follow a similar, linear outside-in conceptualization of history. These highly influential arguments emanating from Immanuel Wallerstein's work on world systems theory (Karpas, 1972; Keyder, 1976; İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977; Wallerstein, 1979; Kasaba, 1988) are not necessarily based on the Porte's inability to physically control territory, however. The ontological focus of this literature lies with the changing location of the society in question within the world economy. According to this theory, Ottoman social relations are determined by their position within the world economy, which itself consists in shifting relations of global exchange and the international division of labour. The Ottoman Empire thus entered the capitalist world economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when 'Ottoman trade with the outside ... ceased to be transit trade and became increasingly less administered and increasingly more an economic process of exchange of Ottoman primary goods for manufactured European products' (Sunar, 1979: 396) — thereby shifting the Ottoman Empire into the 'periphery' of the world economy. These altering relations of exchange created the conditions not only for changes in the Ottoman economy but social change in general, as the socio-political structures are merely seen as a 'superstructural' derivative:

All our states have been creations of the modern world, even if some could make a plausible claim to cultural linkage with pre-modern political entities. And least of all, has the interstate system always been there. The interstate system is the political superstructure of the capitalist world-economy and was a deliberate invention of the modern world. (Wallerstein, 1995: 141)

The process of incorporation into the world economy therefore causes a change in the form of political rule as well:

Incorporation into the world-economy means necessarily the insertion of the political structures into the interstate system. This means that the 'states' which already exist in these areas must either transform themselves into 'states within the interstate system' or be replaced by new political structures which take this form or be absorbed by other states already within the interstate system. (Wallerstein, 1989: 170)

Kasaba and Wallerstein apply this theory to the social transformation of the Ottoman society, whereby:

... incorporation involves a restructuring of the production processes and political system of an area such that the incorporated area becomes an integrated part of the axial division of labor of the capitalist world-economy and a functioning part of the interstate system. (1983: 336)

Thus, separatist movements and territorial division are seen as outflows of the global division of labour which determines political organization functionally as well as spatially. World system historiography elevates the gradual evolution of exchange relations within and outside the Ottoman Empire to a generic explanatory device, rather than understanding these relations as part of a specific historical development that requires explanation. Observing historical shifts in the commercial relations and the way in which they impacted on the Ottoman Empire indeed helps understanding the financial crisis through which the Empire went during the period of decline. This applies, in particular, to the price revolution in the sixteenth century (Barkan, 1975; Pamuk, 2001) and the financial and commercial penetration by British capital from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.<sup>2</sup>

However, these structural Marxist interpretations with their emphasis on economically determined social change fail to recognize the historic specificities involved in this process. They, as Theda Skocpol puts it, attempt 'to treat state forms and "strength" (e.g. centralization and bureaucratization) as simple functions of societies' class structures and positions in the world-capitalist economic division of labour' (1973: 31). Furthermore, within this structuralist account, there seems to be no explicit mention of the agents of social change. However, the emphasis on the shifts in the global capitalist economy implicitly assigns agency to a mercantile bourgeoisie which is thought to constitute the reforming and/or revolutionary class (Staniovich, 1960; Göçek, 1996). This is highly problematic, for in many cases these social strata were either not coherent and homogeneous, not existing, or to the extent that they did exist had no political stake in the state due to their naturally transnational orientation. In fact, it is very difficult to discern their interest in a national revolt.

*'One Logic or Two?' Political Marxism on Capitalism  
and the Interstate System*

As has been shown above, the social engine of this transformation from Empire to a multiplicity of nation-states is, at least according to many historical materialist accounts, causally related to uneven capitalist development. We cannot, however, take this definition of capitalism in world system terms as the expansion of a world economy which is characterized mainly by transnational trade links and unequal exchange relations as a given. It is therefore hardly surprising that a debate about the relationship between the interstate system and capitalism is still ongoing and vibrant, especially, but not only, within historical materialist IR theory.<sup>3</sup> One prominent strand



within this debate is political Marxism (Brenner, 1985; Rosenberg, 1994; Wood, 2002; Teschke, 2003), which, as opposed to the world systems approach discussed above, understands capitalism not only as a mode of exchange relations or production, but also as a set of social relations peculiar to modernity: Economic activity is depoliticized and mediated through the relations of exchange in an abstract market, whereas political rule is depersonalized in an abstract state apparatus ruled by a meritocratic bureaucracy and governed by the rule of law. Materially, this means that the appropriation of surpluses by a ruling class is no longer carried out through extra-economic means of coercion and is, instead, transferred to an inherently transnational market economy where all factors of production, most importantly waged labour, are commodified and their price is determined by the global market mechanism. Surplus appropriation, therefore, no longer takes place by disposing politically constituted means of violence, but through the depersonalized coercion of the market. Capitalist social relations including international relations become, as Justin Rosenberg put it, a socio-economic system within which 'any aspects of social life which are mediated by relations of exchange in principle no longer receive a political definition' (Rosenberg, 1994: 129). The fact that surplus extraction is no longer carried out through direct coercion by politically constituted, extra-economic means of violence means that the entire process of economic reproduction and an increase in income is no longer bound to control over territory. According to Justin Rosenberg, it was this transition from premodern 'Imperial'/'Feudal' social relations to modern inter-'national' relations that institutionalized the functional similarity, or billiard-ball character, of internally hierarchically organized modern states whose external interactions naturally re-produce the balance of power under the conditions of anarchy structural realism describes (Rosenberg, 1994: ch. 5). While political Marxists have said little about nationalism themselves, this could potentially provide the long-awaited nexus between modern sovereignty and nationalism: Once political affairs are de-personalized, 'the individual (...), with the help of self-discovered, self-imposed norms, determines himself as a free and moral-being' (Kedourie, 1993: 17). The process of de-personalization of social relations and political rule in modern societies therefore triggers a process of alienation within the modern political subject which can only be overcome by supporting the latter with a framework of reference capable of establishing reality and, consequently, social cohesion within the modern nation. Nevertheless, even scholars from within this tradition appear mostly to continue to underestimate the problem outlined above and maintain that 'one aspect of this transformation was the tendency for the borders of the state and the boundaries of nations to become more congruent, whether through movements of national secession or unification' (Lacher, 2006: 131). With regard to the Ottoman Empire, this transformation thus implied a shift from the fused political and economic power of the Sultan to a separation of the two and the depersonalization of political rule in the modern national state. Secession is therefore understood as the nascent moment of the abstract, de-personalized state, the separation of the private from the public and the economic from the political, in short *modern* sovereignty.



This notion of modern capitalist international relations, applied to south-eastern Europe in the nineteenth century, leaves us with a seemingly paradoxical situation that invokes similar problems as the world systems approach: As far as there is such a thing as a spatial 'logic' of early capitalism, i.e. a totalizing drive towards a political infrastructure for the regulatory needs of a globalizing capitalist economy, what could be expected *logically* would be the enlargement and fusion of territorial rule for the purpose of easing trade, not the disintegration of polities, comprising a larger, more promising market than the national, usually protectionist units that followed (e.g. Robinson, 2004). Yet what was observable *historically* was an increase in the fragmentation of political rule simultaneously with a quantitative growth in transnational exchange relations. The problem, therefore, poses itself the way Hannes Lacher put it:

If the relations of exploitation under capitalism are inherently global(izing), then why are the capitalist relations of domination not corresponding to their spatial extension, to the capitalist world market and global social relations? (2000: 251)

Applied regionally we can ask: Why does southeastern Europe see the disappearance of a polity comprising a large internal market which had initiated a process of political modernization and partly established a depersonalized Weberian bureaucracy? This conundrum is especially (if not only) a problem for Marxist IR theory, because if the bourgeoisie 'creates a world after its own image', why do the transnational market and the national state not follow the same totalizing logic of global capital?

As the following historical re-construction of Ottoman decline demonstrates, it was not a/the bourgeoisie that created a world after its own image, because there were no social strata that would fit this Marxist ideal-type. The absence of a capitalist/nationalist agency, however, does not mean that capitalism was not created 'from above' by a state-class, after independent states had been created, because, as Ellen Wood put it, 'capitalism, in some ways more than any other social form, needs politically organized and legally defined stability, regularity, and predictability' (Wood, 2002: 178). And those 'goods' are normally still provided for by the modern nation-state. It does not, however, provide at the same time any answers as to why the geopolitical layout of the Balkans became fractured, and these revolutions from above were successful only when carried out by multiple, nationally differentiated state classes instead of the technologically and arguably intellectually most advanced, Ottoman, one. The geopolitical multitude in the Balkans is, as will be shown, not the result of a series of national liberation struggles against the anachronistic Turkish overlord. Secession was the result of social struggles, which, as Sugar put it:

... result from the dissatisfaction of those who have no share in the political and economic decision-making process. (...) Those who fought each other [in the Ottoman Empire] were all members of the ruling group, with the great difference that one faction belonged to it by virtue of its position and power while the other simply claimed the right to be part of the ruling elite. (1977: 235)

## Ottoman Decline and the Emergence of Modern National Sovereignties

*'Unity of the Diverse': the Ottoman Polity as the Proto-Cosmopolitan State*

In order to understand the emergence of regional power centres in a state conventionally characterized by its high level of centralization, I first briefly outline the original provincial order of the Empire and its mode of 'soft' conquest. The following section, therefore, provides an overview of the Ottoman social formation and its mode of reproduction. This reveals that, contrary to the view of the 'despotic other' or the big anomaly illegitimately superimposing an 'Asiatic Mode of Production' on a naturally 'dynamic' European societies, the trajectory of the late Ottoman Empire was a social formation that had many similarities with European development (Berktaş, 1992).

The general Ottoman political structure was binary and divided into two central organs: small landholdings, *timars*, and administrative districts, *sanjaks*, protected by a local governor, or *bey*. The *Re'aya* (direct producers) were not tied to the land in the same way that they were in Europe, as 'it was, in fine, the Sultan's will alone that decided a man's status in society' (İnalçık, 1964: 44). Equally, all ownership of land lay with the sultan, and consequently land-use was granted at most for the lifetime to the quasi-lord, the *timariot*. On top of the rent payable in kind, the *timar*-holder had to provide military service to the Sultan. 'As a rule *sipâhis* (cavalrymen) who composed the main force of the Ottoman army were given *timars* in the villages throughout the newly conquered country' (İnalçık, 1954: 107). Property could neither be accumulated nor inherited, which ensured the unchallenged power-base of the Sultan. The maintenance of this power-base was the main responsibility of the local *bey* administrators, who were only answerable to the Sultan directly. They had to control and enforce a strictly regulated tax regime which tightly fixed the level of surplus extraction from the peasants in order to prevent the accumulation of property by potential contenders for power. At the same time, their task was to uphold a precarious balance of power between direct producers and the (temporary) overlords. Thus, even though there were several categories of land-ownership, which also provided the *ulema* (the clergy, consisting of medrese teachers, kadi judges and imams) with holdings, the Sultan retained a divine, not just political, but also economic authority onto which the whole socio-political fabric was based and which eventually also lay the foundation for the defence of his empire. It provided social as well as fiscal stability and the *sipâhi* cavalry who, together with the infamous Janissary slave soldiers, constituted the backbone of Ottoman military might. This socio-economic structure prevented the constitution of a hereditary semi-feudal local ruling class with a power-base independent of the centre, as 'the *askeri* [ruling class] were not an aristocratic class with historically established rights, but membership of it was contingent upon the will of the sultan' (İnalçık, 1954: 112).

However, *timars* could also be obtained by newly conquered local rulers, subject to appropriate bribes to Ottoman officials:

The Ottomans preserved to a great extent the land-holding rights of these [conquered] people in the form of *timar* or *bashtina*. Thus, the great families of the Balkans, for example, (*seigneurs*, *voyvods*) frequently retained the greater part of their patrimonies as great Ottoman *timar*-holders, and when they adopted Islam they took the title of *bey* and were eligible for attaining the highest administrative posts. (İnalcık, 1954: 112)

Thus, Ottoman rule in the conquered, culturally 'different', parts left the social structures, if not untouched, at least intact. For these local leaders, on the other hand, 'the *timar* system did not necessarily mean a revolutionary change in the former social and economic order [of the newly acquired territories]'. What the Ottomans had achieved 'was in fact a conservative reconciliation of local conditions and classes with Ottoman institutions which aimed at gradual assimilation' (İnalcık, 1954: 103). This form of soft conquest provided the Ottomans with a very efficient and cost-effective system of governance in the periphery, while the existing Balkan landlords could see 'that their position and lands were effectively guaranteed by the strong Ottoman administration' (İnalcık, 1954: 115).

The Ottoman social formation, far from constituting the famously discussed Oriental Despotism (Wittfogel, 1954), provided for a comparatively *laissez-faire* regime of 'soft' and gradual assimilation after the outright physical occupation, i.e. assimilation which allowed for a harmonious cohabitation of culturally diverse people. Stavrianos sums up the sophistication of the Ottoman land regime:

Indeed, its outstanding feature was strict control of the *sipâhis* so that they could neither exploit the *re'ayas* [primary producers] nor defy the state. During the early years of Ottoman rule, when this *timar* system was in its prime, the *re'ayas* enjoyed security and justice. But by the end of the sixteenth century the system began to break down. ... (1953: 139)

### *Ottoman Decline, Secessions and Modernization: Historical Conjunction in the Eighteenth Century*

The limitation of its territorial expansion after the famously failed second siege of Vienna in 1683 is, as we have seen, frequently described as the 'death sentence' of the Empire. Indeed, it was followed by a period of internal crises and external challenges. It saw 'population growth, the spread of handguns, the influx of foreign silver, and the aggressive trading practices of European merchants all combined, in varying degrees' (Abou-El-Haj, 1991: 21). As there was no professional fiscal or budgetary policy which could have reacted to the inflation that followed with a currency devaluation<sup>4</sup> or similarly targeted measures, this crisis culminated in a stagnation of imperial income due to the end of territorial enlargement combined with demographic growth. The

greatest geopolitical challenge throughout the Empire's history remained Russia though. From the late seventeenth century onwards, the hostilities between the Ottomans and the Tsar were almost uninterrupted until the Empire's surrender by the end of the First World War. During this period of intensified geopolitical pressure from Russia, as well as from Austria, 'the obsolescence of the Ottoman military apparatus became apparent' (Kasaba, 1988: 15 f.). Owing to this desperate situation in matters of defence, the old forms of Ottoman rule in the periphery started to become equally dysfunctional and the need to reform the old system became increasingly evident:

At the same time that the central state was losing its ability to reward retainers with land, it underwent a long decline in its ability to maintain revenue levels (...) To solve this problem, the state turned to tax farming which ultimately resulted in the quasiprivatization of imperial land. (Wallerstein, 1989: 172)

Thus, in order to meet the short-term rise in demand for soldiers as a result of military defeats, the Porte could no longer rely solely on the cavalry of the *timar*-holders, the slave army of Janissaries and 'ordered the provincial administrators to form mercenary units equipped with firearms' (Kasaba and Wallerstein, 1983: 344), so-called *sekbân* troops. As the maintenance of these *sekbân* troops was merely the responsibility of the local elites, this led to the emergence of what Sadat calls 'the most significant innovations of the late eighteenth century, (...) the rise to power of a group of urban notables known as *Âyân*' (Sadat, 1972: 346). These novel landlords enjoyed unprecedented independence compared to their *timariot* predecessors, as they were able to accumulate property freely, set levels of taxation themselves and establish trade links independently of the central administration as a reward for their increased military services. This resulted in a loss of central authority and facilitated the creation of large land-holdings, so-called *çiftlik*s, which not only differed in size, but, more importantly, in the degree of autonomy enjoyed. From a strict *shari'a* point of view, *çiftlik*s were illegal forms of factually private property formed after state land (*miri*) was appropriated by the *Âyân*. This involved a 'shift from taxation in kind to taxation in cash' (Abou-El-Haj, 1991: 15), thereby increasing the autonomy of the newly risen landed class.

This left the central government with a dilemma between the increasingly challenging power from within and the need to defend the Empire from external enemies. Thus:

[W]hile the central bureaucrats could keep their representatives under some semblance of control through frequent rotation and by playing different officials against each other, there was little they could do to curb the expanding power and influence of the *Âyân*. (Kasaba, 1988: 15)

As a result of these developments, the Sultanate of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries found itself in a similar position towards the *Âyân* as Goethe's sorcerer's apprentice towards his broom: '*Die ich rief, die Geister, Werd ich nun nicht los*'.<sup>5</sup>

*Neo-Absolutist Restoration or Modernization?*

The central government started to react to the increased external as well as to the internal threat under Selim III, who was enthroned in the year of the French Revolution. His most important achievement was the creation of a new, modern, standing army called '*Nizam-i Cedid*' (new order) (Shaw, 1965: 292). This, however, as well as other modern bureaucratic reforms, cannot be seen as the de-personalization of political rule and the implementation of modern sovereignty: Selim III, as Peter Sugar describes:

... was not a 'westernizer' in the sense of accepting western values. (...) He realized (...) that (...) the Ottoman Empire would be unable to resist Russian and Austrian encroachment because of its relative technical, and in particular military, backwardness. This realization made the Sultan a limited technological 'modernizer'. (1977: 245)

Consequently, both Sultan Selim III (1789–1807), who fell victim to a coup d'état by an unsurprisingly rebellious coalition of Jannisaries and Âyâns, and later Mahmut II (1808–39)<sup>6</sup> followed the agenda of restoring their personal power — not establishing *raison d'état*! However, patrimonial rule was eventually compromised in the *hatt-i-sherif* rescript of Gülhane, which inaugurated the *Tanzimat* era in 1839. This more radically modernizing agenda emerges on the political scene together with a consolidated land registry in 1847, the citizenship law of 1856, which turned the Sultan's subjects into Ottoman citizens, and finally, and possibly most importantly, the new land code in 1858, which for the first time legally institutionalized private property.

Territorial fragmentation and national secession are not, therefore, necessary to pursue a 'pre-emptive state formation in a pro-Western fashion' (Bromley, 1994: 104). The continuous reform efforts had created a new class of state officials who acted increasingly independently of the Sultan. According to I. E. Petrosyan, it was the emulation of Western statecraft by this new class that ultimately led to subordination of the divine legitimacy of the Caliphate<sup>7</sup> under the secular legitimacy of the newly crafted *Ottoman* nationalism (Trimberger, 1978; Petrosyan, I. E., 1980; Adanir, 1997: 112–16). Yet, do these reform efforts constitute sufficient evidence to legitimately pre-date the process of political modernization and with it the separation of the political from the economic to the pre-nationalist/Ottomanist period? The answer must be negative, since until 1858 the Sultan retained, legalistically, all land rights. The phase of intensified modernization was used to re-appropriate property rights from the semi-aristocratic local elites. Thus, what seems to be *raison d'état* on the surface remained *raison de prince* or rather *raison de sultan* applying new modern methods. However, this does not imply any assumptions about the modern character of post-Ottoman nation-states, as the following will show.

*Backwardness and National Secession*

As we have seen, local nobles 'owed most of their wealth and influence to the fiscal and administrative anarchy that reigned in the Ottoman Empire'

(Kasaba, 1988: 85). This created an unprecedented rate of peasant exploitation, which would later become an important revolutionary potential. The nobles' resistance to the centralizing efforts of the Porte hardly surprises either. 'What the "dynasties" wanted, in fact, was precisely to assure themselves of a degree of autonomy incompatible with [any] centralist and progressive government' (İnalçık, 1964: 53). It was not until the social power-base, as well as substantial sources of income of these local groups, was to be threatened by the centre's modernizing efforts that nationalist tendencies with a clear political agenda of secession emerged:

In 1812 (...) immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Russia, Mahmud began to suppress the principal *Âyân* in the provinces. (...) But in 1821 Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, the most powerful among the pashas of *Âyân* origin, raised truly massive resistance. The Greek insurrection followed his revolt. (İnalçık, 1964: 53–4)

This centre-periphery conflict (Mardin, 1973; Heper, 1980; Faroqui, 2002) for which Ali Pasha's revolt constitutes the example par excellence, has more than merely a coincidental relationship to the nationalist revolt that follows. It is, indeed, central to understanding the origin of the Greek Revolt.

The Revolution of 1821 occurred in two parts of the Empire that were not only geographically but also socially distinct from each other: While the Principalities were plunged into revolt by a coalition of diaspora Greek nobles under Alexander Ypsilantis who were mostly in the Tsar's services, the revolt in the Peloponnesus was more genuine, or 'from below', and involved lower classes. The former were organized in the so-called secret 'Philiki Etaria' (Friendly Society), which had promoted a general Balkan uprising from the remote Black Sea port of Odessa since 1815, while the latter were only loosely linked to the etarist conspiracy. Here, the famous Greek bandits, so-called Klefts, enter the picture. Owing to the shifts in the Ottoman land regime and the increased rate of exploitation described above, many landless peasants had fled to join the bandits in the mountains, living off raids on the villages in the plains. For those groups, centralization of rule constituted an eminent and evident threat to their vested interests, which were based on the effective absence of state control. To them, the Ottoman campaign against Ali Pasha meant the advent of a modern territorial state. Their ultimate aim was to thwart any form of state control, leave alone a centralizing Ottoman regime and continue in their semi-autonomous status in the same way the geography of the region had previously guaranteed. After an attempt to be recruited into the Tsar's service failed in 1817, these unemployed military men thus started to constitute a revolutionary potential in and of themselves, if not necessarily a nationalist one.

It was thus left to the large-scale incursion of Ottoman forces brought in to curb Ali Pasha of Janina in 1820 that the Kleft/Peasant revolutionary potential was increasingly released, but not by Greek Nationalist design. Rather, it was Ali Pasha who decided to exploit their discontent for his own ends, once he 'realized that in late 1819 and early 1820 it was Ottoman policy to reduce him at all costs' (Skiotis, 1976: 99) even though it has to be



mentioned that playing the Greek card, and with it the somewhat associated Russian card, was Ali's last resort. In other words: '[H]ad the Ottomans purposely set out to raise allies for Ali, they could scarcely have acted as efficaciously' (Skiotis, 1976: 105). Ironically, thus, it is precisely through the attempt to re-appropriate effective control from Ali Pasha that the Ottoman central administration set the ground for the Greek Revolt which grew out of this decidedly non-national conflict between a centralizing Porte and autonomy-seeking peripheral elite. The peasants who had not fled the land seemed to participate spuriously at best. Greek Revolutionary leaders and the Etaria in particular overrated the extent to which 'News and ideas [which] were spread by small traders, drovers, builders and sailors (...) from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards' (Dakin, 1973: 26) could actually have a significant impact on the social fabric of the thus far highly fractured and particularized and, above all, mostly illiterate Greek peasant community. The fact that 'Greeks' fought on both Ali's and the Sultan's sides as mercenaries at the initial stages of the conflict goes to show that the social origin of their struggle was not so much the result of their natural nationalist inclination but rather the conscious decision to opt for the more reliable sources of (military) employment and revenue, which at this point Greek autonomy seemed to offer. Thus:

[T]here was indeed the need to bridge the gap between the conspiracy that existed for the most part on paper and the full mobilization of resources once the day of reckoning came. Hence it is not surprising that some have questioned the importance of the Eteria particularly since, once the revolution had begun, it seems to have exercised little or no influence on events. (Dakin, 1973: 46)

This form of 'peripheral nationalism' (Hechter, 2000: 74) lends itself to Sandra Halperin's argument about the 'nineteenth-century European nation-states [which] inaugurated the rule of the traditional nobility'. For her, nationalism was neither a 'liberal' mass movement nor the project of a rising bourgeoisie; it was not a professional bureaucratic state-class, but one of the old semi-feudal landed nobility as a reaction 'to a growing autonomy of absolutist states and to monarchical attempts to rationalize and liberalize state structures' (Halperin, 1997: 53) as a result of externally conditioned pressures to reform. This also explains why the Balkan provinces, rather than any form(s) of Arab statehood broke away first. It was not the higher degree of an underlying cultural and linguistic difference but rather the economically and politically central provinces onto which the Porte initially concentrated its modernization efforts. Arab nationalism only followed later, even though according to a similar logic: 'In some ways indeed the influence of the notables was even strengthened in the first phase of the Tanzimat ... for altogether', as Albert Hourani contends, '... the long tradition of leadership by the local a'yan and 'ulama was too strong to be broken ...' by a modernizing, increasingly confrontational, bureaucracy (Hourani, 1968: 62).

Given the now identified social origins of Greek nationalism, post-Ottoman Greek society mostly aimed at the reformulation of landed power



into a form of authoritarian rule, which, instead of 'liberating' the respective societies from the 'yoke of Ottoman domination', created at least equally authoritarian and intolerant and anachronistic regimes. As Elie Kedourie put it: '[I]n fact, it is these countries which most clearly show that nationalism and liberalism far from being twins are really antagonistic principles' (1993: 104). This is illustrated by the question of the so-called 'National Estates' in post-independence Greece. These were the landed possessions of the expelled 'Turkish'/Muslim landlords which had become vacant and which were thought to constitute the backbone of a modern egalitarian state. However, as McGrew observes, now the problem that from the outset 'the revolt possessed no readily identifiable social ideology' (McGrew, 1976: 111) became virulent. Post-independence re-distribution of Ottoman lands was not easily achievable, if not impossible. Any peasant freeholds on former 'Turkish' possessions would immediately threaten a reaction not only of established Christian landlords keen on the land, but also of those peasants working on the existing Christian/Orthodox holdings:

Hence, the frozen status of the 'national estates' and the continuing tenant status of their cultivators served as a barrier against force which, once set in motion, could have resulted in a fundamental reordering of the entire land-holding regime and the social order based on it. (McGrew, 1976: 126)

Consequently, a more wide-scale and effective re-distribution and with it social change did not occur until the 1870s (McGrew, 1985). This goes to show that nationalist state-building projects follow equally, if not even more so, archaic tendencies as, perceivedly, the Sultanate itself and that 'the standard evaluations of Ottoman "backwardness" are exaggerated when applied to the end of the eighteenth century' (Sugar, 1977: 282) in the same measure as the novel nationalisms' backwardness is commonly downplayed (Kitromilides, 1993; Kostis, 2005).

But what does this mean for questions of modernity and nationalist sovereignty? In the Greek case it is difficult to confirm the separation of abstract political relations of domination and privatized relations of exploitation within an impersonalized market sphere, as the marker of modern sovereignty. Landlord rule persisted throughout the initial years of the kingdom. This was also not changed by the internationally sanctioned import of a Western monarch, the Wittelsbach Prince Otto. Predictably, the reform and centralization effort introduced by his enlightened Bavarian bureaucracy triggered similar reactions as the Ottoman reforms, so that after 32 years of unpopular reign, King Otto, of Greece faced a popular revolt and was forced to leave for his home country in 1862. Equally, the change that did take place, i.e. independence from the Porte's central administration, initially meant the loss of an 'autocratic Enlightenment' which had produced indigeneous elites capable of comprehending the necessity of modernization (Chambers, 1964). Yet, despite these new methods of rule, the Empire did not lose its character 'of politically constituted property within the state and the proprietary character of the state itself' (Lacher, 2006: 88). This form of institutional bureaucratic modernization, with the state continuing to exist only as the politically constituted personal property of a central dynast,

mirrors Western forms of enlightened Absolutism. However, as has been shown, the Ottoman Empire, post-Revolutionary Greece as well as Western European nineteenth-century dynasties very much resembled each other in this respect.

**Conclusion: Explaining the Emergence of the 'Modern' Post-Ottoman States System: Capitalism as the 'causa causans' or 'Historical Heritage'?**

As we have seen, this 'domestic' centre-periphery conflict (Mardin, 1973), which started with the formation of *Çiftliks*, had its origin in intensified geopolitical competition between the Sultan and his neighbours from the sixteenth century onwards. However, emphasis solely on the modernizing dynamic mediated through geopolitical pressures emanating from Western Europe cannot accommodate local, regional and 'national' developments. Rather than being the result of an almost mechanical process of homogenizing rule into national forms through capitalist commercial penetration and/or modern warfare, the new interstate system that replaced the Sultan's rule over his former domains was determined in strong measure by a complex variety of Ottoman intra-ruling class conflicts. As Benno Teschke points out:

While the initial impetus towards state modernization and capitalist transformation was [indeed] geopolitical, state [or pre-state, local] responses to this pressure were refracted through respective class relations in 'national' contexts, including class resistance. (2003: 266)

We can therefore accept Abou-El-Haj's critique of Perry Anderson's famous explanation for the decline of the Ottoman Empire in 'The House of Islam' (Anderson, 1979: 361-97) on the grounds that 'he reduces Ottoman state and society to a kind of backdrop to the unfolding drama of world history, which in his view is equated with the history of the principal European states' (Abou-El-Haj, 1991: 4). The homogenizing pressures of the international were thus mediated through a protracted social struggle between a landed quasi-aristocracy, the central, modernizing bureaucracy and the private interests of the Sultan and his court. This dialectical interplay between historically as well as socially peculiar social struggles and the geopolitically mediated impact of capitalism in the West through the international system is then best reconciled by a historical materialist argument which emphasizes the material, yet pre-capitalist nature of the above-mentioned centre-periphery conflict, while contextualizing this struggle within a wider geopolitical context strongly characterized by the rise of capitalism in Europe.

For the case of the Ottoman Empire, it is equally not the existence of a primordial 'internal' ethno-linguistic diversity *per se* that is central to understanding the disintegration process, defying the notion that, as Ernest Gellner put it, nationalism 'determines the norm for the legitimacy of political units' (1983: 49). 'Difference' was, as modernist theories of nationalism rightly point out, 'imagined' and politically willed. Nationalism was used as a vehicle in the struggle over revenue and political power in the light of the modernizing and centralizing agenda of the Sultanate, who, under geopolitical pressure, tried to restore its fiscal base and overcome local power

challenges. The nineteenth-century project of Ottoman nationalism (Mardin, 1962), on the other hand, didn't fail because of a lack of 'cohesive power' of the concept of Ottomanism (as opposed to Turkism, Greek nationalism, Arabism, etc.), but because the central government from where it originated had started re-appropriating surpluses and political power to a degree it hadn't long before, thereby antagonizing peripheral ruling strata, which eventually opted out of the social contract with the Sultanate. Neither can nationalism be seen as a liberal ideology consolidating a revolutionary 'collective agency' of the disenfranchized 'sans-culottes' (Arab/Christian) direct producer class rising against the ancient (foreign, Turkish) exploitative regime. The social origins of nationalism, the material foundation and the means of its perpetuation are all locatable within the Ottoman ruling strata themselves, rather than an emancipatory revolutionary project 'from below': First in the central elite's attempt to pursue an Ottoman form of nationalism — and later in the seigneurial reaction in the countryside propelling a variety of counter-nationalisms. It therefore comes as no surprise that the post-Ottoman national regimes were at least initially unsuccessful in establishing a large-scale alteration of the existing social property relation once independence was established.

Coming back to the more theoretical question about the relationship of nationalism, modern sovereignty and capitalist development, it has been shown that identification of a plurality of states with effective capitalist or other forms of modernization cannot be sustained. Capitalism, as a way of organizing economic relations, does not require or presuppose the 'national' organization of the interstate system, even though it might be intrinsically compatible with the interstate system. Contrary to the view of a 'structural' or 'logical' link between capitalism and the nation-state, Hannes Lacher and Benno Teschke argue that 'the inter-stateness of capitalist political space cannot be explained by reference to the nature of capitalism or the "laws" or "logic" of capital' (Lacher, 2002: 148). This argument is supported by the findings of the preceding historical enquiry. It was shown that the disintegration of a so-called multinational Empire is not owed to the appearance of a specifically capitalist or modern way of ordering political rule along 'national' lines. This is why the Ottoman Empire was not the big anomaly, the 'Islamic Alien' in Europe, which it is frequently portrayed as. While its historical, nomadic origins lie in a process of geopolitical accumulation (Teschke, 2003: 95f) this remained nevertheless a historically specific strategy of reproduction which did not survive into 'modern' interstate relations, and at the time of the secessions Sultanic power was comparable with his enlightened Absolutist contemporary dynasts in Europe. Therefore, the emergence of 'national' sovereignty does not indicate the de-personalization of political rule either. Exploitation was still carried out through extra-economic means even within the new national politics. This is not to say, however, that theories of nationalism are wrong in portraying the historical uniqueness of nationalism as a distinctively modern form of political and social organization. It can serve as:

... a political project of the containerisation of social relations [whose] purpose was to supplant the imagined community of a transnational class striving to

overcome the territoriality of political authority, and ultimately even statehood as such, with the imagined community of the nation. (Lacher, 2003: 533)

Neither modernity nor capitalism, however, can serve as an explanation for the initial emergence of a multiplicity of nationalisms (Lacher, 2005; Teschke, 2005; Teschke and Lacher, 2007). It is thus the premodern social origins of the post-Ottoman nationalisms that are capable of illustrating that the prevailing modernist-Marxist 'capitalist reductionism' as an explanation for the specifically national character of state-formation needs to be reconsidered. The historical specificity and social complexity of the emergence of these national movements, which were deeply entrenched in the various premodern and pre-capitalist social constellations and conflicts, do not lend themselves to notions of functional, automatized universalizations of Western models of popular or national sovereignty. This is not to say, however, that this process occurred in isolation and strictly according to 'internal' dynamics. However, it is to say that national insurrection is not intelligible without developing an understanding of 'the determinate long-term consequence of centuries of social conflicts over rights of domination and appropriation over land and people amongst pre-capitalist classes' (Teschke and Lacher, 2007: 570).

It is important at the same time to avoid a replacement of this unreflected modernist functionalism with a primordial essentialism (e.g. Smith, 1991). As Ray Kiely put it:

Recognizing difference here should not be confused with an uncritical celebration of cultural particularism, or what often amounts to the universal indifference of difference. Rather, it is based on the recognition — denied above all by Hardt and Negri [2000] — that capitalism has not 'created a world after its own image'. (2005: 148)

The roots of this 'difference', however, are to be seen as the outcome of regionally and locally peculiar historical trajectories that enter into a dialectical relationship with the broader, macro-level and world-historical transformations:

The destiny of man is accomplished, and his freedom realized by absorption within the state, because only through the state does he attain coherence and acquire reality. It might, then, seem logical to conclude that such a state should embrace the whole of humanity. But this would be, nonetheless, erroneous, for it would conflict with another, essential feature of this metaphysic, namely, that self-realization and absorption into the whole is not a smooth, uneventful process, but the outcome of strife and struggle. (Kedourie, 1993: 43)

Territorial delimitation of rule, not only in the Balkans, is thus continuously re-configured under a dialectical interplay of various forms of external penetration — one of them being what many people understand to be the totality of a capitalist 'Empire' and internal social struggles over the appropriation and control of these developments. The open-endedness of these social struggles is best illustrated by the continuous political instability within the newly formed Greek polity which peaked in the Regime of the

Colonels from 1967 to 1974 and can still be observed to this day throughout the region.

### Notes

This article was first presented at the Research in Progress seminar series at the University of Sussex in February 2007. Participants at the seminar helped to develop and sharpen some of my arguments during a fruitful and challenging debate. In particular, I am indebted to my discussant, Justin Rosenberg, for his thorough and useful comments. I also thank Benno Teschke, Jeppe Strandsbjerg, Kamran Matin, Zdenek Kavan, Sam Knafo and Kees van der Pijl for their criticism and encouragement.

1. In the sense of a so-called 'multinational territorial State', rather than a Colonial Empire in the sense of the British Empire.

2. The Anglo-Turkish 'Baltalimani' trade convention was signed in 1838.

3. See especially the contributions by Callinicos (2007), 'Does Capitalism Need the State System?'; Hobson (2007), 'Back to the Future of "One Logic or Two?"': Forward to the Past of "Anarchy Versus Racist Hierarchy?"; Van der Pijl (2007), 'Capital and the State System: A Class Act'; and Lacher and Teschke (2007), 'The Changing "Logics" of Capitalist Competition', all in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20, no. 4.

4. The influx of foreign silver was mostly due to discoveries in the Americas. For a discussion of the relevance of this event, see Pamuk (2001), 'The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33: 69–89.

5. Spirits that I've cited/My commands ignore.

6. Mustafa IV (1807–8) had been brought in after a *coup d'état* by a coalition of dissenting Jannisaries and âyâns as an interim solution but was later replaced by the equally reform-oriented Mahmut II.

7. The spiritual institution of the Caliphate has its origin in *Realpolitik* even prior to the reform movement: Abdülhamid I had only started assuming the title of the Caliph to counter a provision in the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. The victorious Catherine the Great had claimed spiritual authority over all Orthodox Christian subjects within the Ottoman Empire. The title of the Caliph theoretically entailed a similar claim with regard to the Tsar's Muslim subjects.

### References

- Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at 'Ali (1969) 'The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699–1703', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 89: 467–75.
- Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at 'Ali (1991) *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Adanir, Fikret (1997) 'Das Osmanische Reich', in Alexander Demandt (ed.) *Das Ende der Weltreiche: Von den Persern bis zur Sowjetunion*. Munich: C. H. Beck.
- Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, Perry (1979) *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: Verso.
- Barkan, Ömer Lütfi (1975) 'The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century', *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 6: 3–28.
- Berktaş, Halil (1992) 'The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography', in H. Berktaş and S. Faroqhi (eds) *New Approaches to*

- the State and Peasant in Ottoman History (Journal of Peasant Studies)*. London: Routledge.
- Bjelić, Dušan I. and Savić, Obrad (eds) (2005) *Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Brenner, Robert (1985) 'Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe', in T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philipin (eds) *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bromley, Simon (1994) *Rethinking Middle East Politics*. London: Verso.
- Callinicos, A. (2007) 'Does Capitalism Need the State System?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20: 533–49.
- Chambers, L. (1964) 'The Civil Bureaucracy — Turkey', in Ward and Rustow (eds) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dakin, Douglas (1973) *The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821–1833*. London: Batsford.
- Der Derian, J. (1991) 'S/N: International Theory, Balkanization and the New World Order', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20: 485–506.
- Faroghi, S. (2002) 'Coping with the Central State, Coping with Local Power: Ottoman Regions and Notables from the Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century', in F. Adanir and S. Faroghi (eds): *The Ottomans and the Balkans – A Discussion in Historiography*. Leiden: Brill.
- Gellner, Ernest (1983) *Nations and Nationalisms*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge (1996) *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hall, Rodney Bruce (1999) *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Relations*. New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press.
- Halliday, Fred (1992) 'International Society as Homogeneity: Burke, Marx, Fukuyama', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 21: 435–61.
- Halperin, Sandra (1997) *In the Mirror of the Third World: Capitalist Development in Modern Europe*. London and Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2000) *Empire*. London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hechter, Michael (2000) *Containing Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heper, Metin (1980) 'Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire — With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century', *International Political Science Review* 1: 81–105.
- Hobsbawm Eric (1990) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hobson, John M. (1997) *The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, John M. (2002) 'The Two Waves of Weberian Historical Sociology in International Relations', in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds) *Historical Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, John M. (2007) 'Back to the Future of "One Logic or Two"?: Forward to the Past of "Anarchy versus Racist Hierarchy"?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20: 581–97.
- Hourani, A. (1968) 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds) *Beginnings of Modernisation in the Middle East — The Nineteenth Century*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- İnalçık, Halil (1954) 'Ottoman Methods of Conquest', *Studia Islamica* 2: 103–30.



- İnalçık, Halil (1964) 'The Nature of Traditional Society', in R. E. Ward and A. R. Dankwart (eds) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- İnalçık, Halil (1992) 'Comments on "Sultanism": Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity', *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies* 1: 49–72.
- İslamoğlu, H. and Keyder, C (1977) 'Agenda for Ottoman History', *Review* I: 31–55.
- Karpat, Kemal H. (1972) 'The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*: 243–81.
- Kasaba, Reşat (1988) *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy — The Nineteenth Century*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Kasaba, R. and Wallerstein, I. (1983) 'Incorporation into the World-Economy: Change in the Structure of the Ottoman Empire, 1750–1839', in J. Bacqué and P. Dumont (eds) *Économie et Sociétés dans L'Empire Ottoman*. Paris: Éditions du CNRS.
- Kedourie, Elie (1993) *Nationalism*, 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Keyder, Caglar (1976) 'The Dissolution of the Asiatic Mode of Production', *Economy and Society* 5: 178–96.
- Kiely, Ray (2005) 'Capitalist Expansion and the Imperialism–Globalisation Debate: Contemporary Marxist Explanations', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 8: 27–56.
- Kitromilides, Paschalis M. (1993) 'Modernization as an Ideological Dilemma in South-Eastern Europe: From National Revival to Liberal Reconstruction', *Southeast European Yearbook 1992*. Athens: ELIAMEP.
- Kostis, Kostas P. (2005) 'The Formation of the State in Greece, 1830–1914', in Faruk Birtok and Thalia Dragonas (eds) *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Lacher, Hannes Peter (2000) *Historicising the Global: Capitalism, Territoriality, and the International Relations of Modernity* (PhD Thesis). London: University of London (LSE).
- Lacher, Hannes (2002) 'Making Sense of the International System: the Promises and Pitfalls of Contemporary Marxist Theories of International Relations', in Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (eds) *Historical Materialism and Globalisation*. London: Routledge.
- Lacher, Hannes (2003) 'Putting the State in its Place: The Critique of State-Centrism and its Limits', *Review of International Studies* 29: 521–41.
- Lacher, Hannes (2005) 'International Transformation and the Persistence of Territoriality: Toward a New Political Geography of Capitalism', *Review of International Political Economy* 12: 26–52.
- Lacher, Hannes (2006) *Beyond Globalization — Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity*. London: Routledge/RIPE.
- McGrew, William W. (1976) 'The Land Issue in the Greek War of Independence', in N. P. Diamandouros, John P. Anton, John A. Petropoulos and Peter Topping (eds) *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821–1830): Continuity and Change*. Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies.
- McGrew, William W. (1985) *Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800–1881*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Mann, Michael (1993) *The Sources of Social Power. V.2, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mardin, Şerif (1962) *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mardin, Şerif (1973) 'Center–Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?' *Daedalus* 102: 169–90.
- Mayall, James (1990) *Nationalism and International Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



- Pamuk, Şevket (2001) 'The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33: 69–89.
- Petrosyan, I. E. (1980) 'On the Motive Forces of the Reformist and Constitutionalist Movement in the Ottoman Empire', in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Paul Dumont (eds) *Économie et Sociétés dans l'Empire Ottoman*. Paris: Éditions du CNRS.
- Reinowski, Markus (2006) 'Das Osmanische Reich – ein antikoloniales Imperium?', in *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, online issue, 3 H. 1. Available at: <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Reinkowski-1-2006>; accessed on 3 August 2008.
- Robinson, Williams (2004) *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rosenberg, Justin (1994) *The Empire of Civil Society — A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*. London: Verso.
- Ruggie, John Gerard (1993) 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization* 47: 139–74.
- Sadat, Deena R. (1972) 'Rumeli Ayanları: The Eighteenth Century', *Journal of Modern History* 44: 346–63.
- Shaw, Stanford J. (1965) 'The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-I Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III', *Journal of Modern History* 37: 291–306.
- Skotiis, Dennis N. (1976) 'The Greek Revolution: Ali Pasha's Last Gamble', in N. P. Diamandouros, John P. Anton, John A. Petropoulos and Peter Topping (eds) *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821–1830): Continuity and Change*. Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies.
- Skocpol, Theda (1973) 'A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy', *Politics and Society* 4: 1–34.
- Smith, Anthony (1991) *National Identity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Spruyt, Hendrik (1994a) *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Spruyt, Hendrik (1994b) 'Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order', *International Organisation* 48: 527–57.
- Staniovič, T. (1960) 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', *Journal of Economic History* 20: 234–313.
- Stavrianos, L. S. (1953) *The Balkans Since 1453*. Austin: Holt.
- Sugar, Peter F. (1977) *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.
- Sunar, İlkey (1979) 'The Political Rationality of Ottoman Economics: Formation and Transformation', in S. Mardin and W. I. Zartman (eds) *Polity, Economy and Society in Ottoman Turkey and North Africa*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 14, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research', *Review* II: 389–98.
- Teschke, Benno (2003) *The Myth of 1648*. London: Verso.
- Teschke, Benno (2005) 'Bourgeois Revolution, State-Formation and the Absence of the International', *Historical Materialism* 13: 3–26.
- Teschke, Benno (2006) 'Debating "The Myth of 1648": State Formation, the Interstate System and the Emergence of Capitalism in Europe — A Rejoinder', *International Politics* 43: 531–73.
- Teschke, B. and Lacher, H. (2007) 'The Changing "Logics" of Capitalist Competition', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20: 565–80.
- Tilly, Charles (1990) *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*. Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Todorova, Maria (1994) 'The Balkans — From Discovery to Invention', *Slavic Review* 53: 453–82.

- Todorova, Maria (1997) *Imagining the Balkans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Trimberger, E. K. (1978) *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Van der Pijl, Kees (2007) 'Capital and the State System: A Class Act', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20: 619–37.
- Walker, Rob (1993) *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979) 'The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research', *Review* II: 389–98.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1989) *The Modern World-System. III. The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1995) *Historical Capitalism, with Capitalist Civilization*. London: Verso.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. London and New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Wittfogel, Karl (1954) *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*. Yale, CT: Yale University Press.
- Wood, Ellen (2002) *The Origin of Capitalism — The Longer View*. London: Verso.

CLEMENS M. HOFFMANN is a D.Phil. candidate and Associate Tutor at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex. His doctoral research on the emergence of the post-Ottoman international order speaks to questions of critical and historical International Relations Theory and aims to problematize the conceptual relationship between geopolitics, capitalism, nationalism and the evolution of the interstate system.

Address: Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9SN, United Kingdom. [email: c.m.hoffmann@sussex.ac.uk]