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Holger Nehring

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The Era of Non-Violence: 'Terrorism' and the Emergence of Conceptions of Non-Violent Statehood in Western Europe, 1967–1983

Holger Nehring

This article aims to reveal the changing semantics of violence in the three West European societies most affected by 'terrorism' from the late 1960s to the early 1980s: Italy, France and Germany. Specifically, this article traces the emergence, the trajectory and the impact of a coding of debates concerning political legitimacy during this period, which revolved primarily along the binary opposition of violence and non-violence. Its focus is on the dialectic interaction between these interpretive schemes and the occurrence of physical violence. The discourses on violence and non-violence made some forms of actions possible and legitimate. Conversely, violent and non-violent collective action transformed the meaning and structure of the discussions. This article argues that, despite all the bloodshed, this period saw the beginnings of an era of non-violence in the political cultures of the three countries.

Introduction

In the late 1960s, the 1970s and the early 1980s West European governments were faced with a wave of political violence, primarily from left-wing militant groups. 'In the past week', the London *Times* observed in early November 1975, 'there have been at least 31 terrorist bomb explosions in 16 cities and towns around the world . . . There are perhaps signs that the bomb is becoming a casual means of protest.'¹ Most of these groups emerged from the protests of the late 1960s, which had sought to do away with what activists regarded as the 'structural violence of capitalist systems': warfare in the Third World, and at home a technocratic style of government and a corresponding lack of democratic accountability, particularly in educational institutions and factories. However much they disagreed on the specifics, the small minority of left-wing activists who turned to or condoned acts of political violence from the late 1960s

maintained their aims of constructing a 'non-violent' society; they argued, however, that they had to use violent means to achieve this aim.

This article traces the emergence, the trajectory and the impact of this recoding of discourses about political legitimacy along the binary opposition of violence/non-violence. Its focus is on the three West European societies most affected by political violence: Italy, France and West Germany. This essay seeks to reveal the changing semantics of violence during this period, that is: the interpretive schemes used to make sense of political violence as well as the dialectic interaction between these schemes and the occurrence of physical violence.² The discourses on violence and non-violence made some forms of actions possible and legitimate. Conversely, violent and non-violent collective action transformed the meaning and structure of the discussions.³ This article argues that this period saw the emergence of definitions of statehood in which the use of violence and force by states was regarded with growing unease.

The aim here is not to develop a revisionist reading of the decade as one in which physical acts of violence did not matter. Instead, by calling the period an 'era of non-violence' this article seeks to highlight the central importance of discourses on violence and non-violence in the three countries by altering the understanding of links between statehood and violence fundamentally. While explicit endorsements of these aims might have played at a very low level compared with the significance of metaphors of war in party-political, mass media and more general discussions, the period from the mid-1970s saw a fundamental and often implicit re-coding of the debates towards an emphasis on concepts of non-violent statehood. This interpretation is based on the assumption that debates concerning language assumed an importance of their own in all three countries over the course of the 1970s: A 'revolution of a new kind' had occurred, stated the chairman of the West German Christian Democratic Party, Kurt Biedenkopf, at the party's federal convention in 1973: the metaphorical 'occupation of political concepts' had replaced the physical 'occupation of buildings'.⁴

Most historical and sociological research has analysed the simultaneous occurrence of left-wing political violence in national isolation and has singled out specific national features.⁵ Thus, for example, the West German Red Army Faction appears as 'Hitler's children' and, likewise, the Italian Red Brigades as a way of confronting Italy's fascist past.⁶ This article, by contrast, seeks to link the debates on political violence from the late 1960s to the early 1980s to structurally similar West European experiences of extra-parliamentary violence and warfare in the twentieth century. It takes its methodological cues from novel interpretations in the sociology of violence which emphasise that the semantics of violence are central for conceptualising which acts are experienced by political and social actors as 'violence'.⁷ Societies' understanding of violent acts has been shaped by specific cultural assumptions and by memories of previous violent histories. Beyond the act of violence itself, therefore, the actual use of violence is an appeal to political values and norms, and it is through this appeal that violence gains its specific historical meaning.⁸

Political violence, therefore, has fundamental implications for discourses about political and social order, not least because they concern what has been regarded as one

of the key components of modern statehood: the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force and violence to create order.⁹ Encoding political discussions in terms of 'violence' and 'non-violence' has therefore been an extremely powerful means for drawing up boundaries and conjuring up a unity of purpose and coherence, both for the militant activists themselves and for the societies in which they operated.¹⁰ This has been particularly true for so-called 'terrorist' acts. As Ian Kershaw has put it succinctly: 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'.¹¹ Unlike isolated violent acts by governments or by guerrilla fighters, 'terrorism' does not primarily address its immediate victims. Rather, its main aim is to create insecurity and 'terror' in the population as a whole: 'terrorism' is a form of political communication.¹²

This article traces these themes in several chronological and thematic steps. After an overview of 'terrorist' organisations in Italy, France and West Germany, the article shows how the events around '1968' led to, or at least accelerated a reorientation of political debates around the binary coding of violence/non-violence. It then follows the development of this coding during the early and mid-1970s, when left-wing activists first carried out actual acts of violence. The final section shows how these debates led to the gradual emergence of ideas of non-violent statehood in all three countries. Most of these discussions remained focused on the national context. Although the mass media in all three countries referred to 'terrorist acts' in other countries as part of 'international terrorist networks', most of the transnational elements of this discussion remained symbolic.¹³

Political Violence in 1970s Western Europe

In all three countries, the 1970s saw the emergence of groups whose members propagated and carried out acts of political violence against industrialists, bankers, law-enforcement officials and politicians. Most of the activists had already been involved in the wave of extra-parliamentary protests in the late 1960s. In Italy, the history of the most famous left-wing militant group, the *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades, BR), began in Milan, where its future leaders Renato Curcio and Mara Cagol met a number of 'comrades' from Emilia Romagna who had split off from the Italian Communist Party in protest against its increasingly reformist course. Initially, 'violence' remained virtual, as the kidnappings of the Sit-Siemens director in Milan in 1972 and a fascist union organiser in Turin in 1973 ended with the release of the prisoners. Political violence during this period came first and foremost from the political right. Only from 1974 onwards did the scope of BR actions broaden as they now tuned their attention towards 'the agents of the multinationals' imperialist state'. Most famously, on 16 March 1978, the date on which the national-unity government of the Christian Democrats and the Communists was to be presented to parliament, the BR announced that they had kidnapped Aldo Moro, the president of the Christian Democratic Party, in Rome. Five bodyguards were massacred, and Moro was killed on 9 May.¹⁴

In France, organised left-wing groups that systematically planned left-wing political violence entered the scene relatively late, although less formally structured movements which advocated and carried out acts of political violence had existed since the early 1970s. In 1979, *Action Directe* emerged from far-left-wing circles that had operated on the fringes of the French political system since the late 1960s. In 1983, 948 'terrorist' incidents in France resulted in 22 deaths and 234 injuries. In 1984, 908 attacks killed 23 and injured 129. In 1985, 834 plots resulted in 23 deaths and injured 154 people.¹⁵ The years 1980 and 1985 were, with 17 and 18 attacks respectively, peak years for attacks by *Action Directe*. Its main targets were police buildings, government ministries and high-ranking industrialists.¹⁶ From the late 1970s and, in particular during the 1980s, there were important links to the West German Red Army Faction as well as to the Belgian *Cellules Communistes Combattantes*.¹⁷

Although the Berlin Minister for Justice counted 115 'terrorist' attacks between July 1969 and May 1972 for Berlin alone (with 49 incidences of arson and 16 bomb attacks) the overall level of political violence in West Germany remained lower than in either France or Italy.¹⁸ In spring 1968, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and two other activists set a Frankfurt department store on fire in order to draw attention to the bombing of Vietnam by the American air force.¹⁹ Germany's most prominent left-wing militant group, the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (Red Army Faction, RAF) emerged part and parcel to free from prison the activists who had been found guilty of arson. The RAF was officially created in May 1970 after a group of activists freed Andreas Baader during a fake interview with the left-wing journalist and later RAF ideologue Ulrike Meinhof. From 1971, both militant activists and police were shot in confrontations. The peak of militant activism was seen in 1977. From then onwards, the RAF carried out targeted murders. On 7 April 1977, the Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback was shot, as was the chairman of the board of *Deutsche Bank*, Jürgen Ponto, on 30 July. During the so-called 'German autumn' the chairman of the Federation of German Employers, Hanns Martin Schleyer, was kidnapped on 5 September and later killed. On 13 October, a Palestinian group hijacked a Lufthansa plane on its way to Majorca in order to blackmail the West German government to release imprisoned activists. The plane was freed by German special forces police on 17 October. On the morning of 18 October, the imprisoned activists Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe and Irmgard Möller were found severely injured in their cells and died later.²⁰

'1968' and the Re-coding of Political Debates

While the coding of questions of political legitimacy along the binary opposition of violence/non-violence had been confined to peace and student movement circles, the debates about '1968' created, through the reporting by the mass media, a resonance for this code beyond the protest movements. The interaction between direct or mediated experiences and pre-existing notions of physical violence was key to these developments.

Transnational discussions amongst activists on the nature of violence, most famously through the International Vietnam Conference in Berlin in 1968, but also through the War Resisters' International, played a key role in establishing 'violence' and statehood as the central points of reference for protesters in all three countries.²¹ These discussions engaged with colonial liberation movements around the world and, in particular, the indigenous resistance against the American military intervention in Vietnam. During these discussions, the protesters broadened their definition of what constituted 'violence' to include 'violence implicit in capitalist institutions', or what came to be called 'structural violence'. This broadening of the definition of violence led to broader discussions on the legitimacy of using violence as a means of protest, and it was closely linked it to a redefinition of historical agency.

The answer to 'structural violence' was, the protesters believed, less technocratic and bureaucratic rule and more 'grass-roots democracy' and 'authenticity'. This would not work through parliaments, parties and elections on a national level, but rather through the self-management of affairs by those concerned. While these ideas had circulated amongst extra-parliamentary movements across Europe since the late 1950s and had been particularly attractive to pacifist circles, this position could now command a greater consensus.²²

There were national variations, however. In their debates on 'structural violence', French and Italian protesters initially focused less on abstract concepts of statehood and institutions, but mainly on the concrete problems of overcrowding and regulation at new universities, such as Paris-Nanterre, as well as at workplaces.²³ The French activists advocated *autogestion* as an answer, the self-management of affairs by those concerned, rather than management and control by the state.²⁴ *Autogestion* in France was equivalent to Italian *operaismo*.²⁵ More significantly than their French counterparts, however, Italian activists were inspired by a socially critical Catholic sociology, which took many prompts from Latin American 'theologies of liberation', emphasising the political role of religion and highlighting the structures of violence and injustice that characterised the modern world.²⁶ West German protesters, by contrast, many also influenced by liberation theology, were less successful in developing ways of campaigning together with the workers and discussed 'structural violence' in a more abstract manner.²⁷ For Rudi Dutschke 'desiring peace' was 'a militant desire against the existing order', as the 'military complex' was 'unable to guarantee either peace, or security, or happiness'.²⁸

While protesters had begun to frame questions of political power in terms of 'structural violence' in the mid-1960s, it was only through the national protest events in the late 1960s that these debates began to have practical implications and influenced conceptions of violence/non-violence beyond the confines of the student movements. Describing political events and processes as well as questions of political legitimacy with the coding violent/non-violent gained increasing plausibility. For the protesters and those sympathetic to their cause, the harsh reaction of the police only seemed to confirm their analysis of 'structural violence' within the three countries' political systems.

Moreover, a growing number of activists debated the limited use or the provocation of violence as a strategy of protest. Drawing on ideas that had already been discussed in Situationist circles in the early 1960s, they sought to provoke the police and state authorities to reveal the structural violence within the system by making it manifest.²⁹ What activists observed in former European colonies around the world only seemed to re-confirm their analyses. It showed the brutality and violence of the colonial powers towards the national liberation movements. Their interpretation of South American independence fighters and guerrillas, the *Tupamaros* in Uruguay in particular, seemed to suggest that the only way of overcoming structural and physical violence was by turning to violence themselves. The discussion also engaged with the writings of Herbert Marcuse, Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre.³⁰ Looking at Vietnam, a French anti-authoritarian *gauchist* activist spoke for many, also in Italy and in West Germany, when he argued that ‘for the first time . . . a people had been able not to take power, but to criticise the mechanisms through which power, even if “popular”, ceaselessly escapes those in whose name it is exercised only to be turned against them’.³¹

In France, the key events that triggered the emergence of the binary opposition violent/non-violent for debates about political legitimacy occurred in spring 1968, when the confrontations between students and the university administration at Nanterre escalated after an act of violence and subsequent arrests, which were accompanied by a language of civil war and violence. On 22 March 1968, the French police arrested five students in the wake of fire-bomb attacks on the Chase Manhattan Bank and American Express in Paris. The movement of students at the university of Nanterre condemned the arrests and issued a Bulletin with printed instructions on how to make a Molotov cocktail. More arrests, countered by the students’ occupation of Nanterre, followed. On 2 May 1968, the Dean of Nanterre decided to close the campus and call in the police. This prompted further protests at Nanterre and a solidarity demonstration at the Sorbonne in downtown Paris on 3 May.³²

Further violence and discussions on violence followed after the Sorbonne’s Rector also called in the police. The packed police vans had to force their way through protesting students outside the Sorbonne. They used tear gas and arrested 574 activists.³³ In the following days positions hardened further, gaining influence amongst the activists who argued in favour of a strategy of limited provocation towards the police, risking more violent clashes.³⁴ Solidarity demonstrations occurred at universities and lycées across the country. On the night of 10/11 May, activists dug up paving stones in the streets surrounding the Sorbonne, felled trees and turned over cars in order to construct barricades. On the following days, solidarity movements, particularly amongst younger workers, sprang up across the country, accentuating the theme of violence/non-violence further. At their peak, 7–10 million workers were on strike in France in mid-May 1968 against what they regarded as inhumane working conditions that inhibited their individuality.³⁵

The binary coding of violence and non-violence could only resonate so widely within the three societies because it conjured up otherwise hidden layers of collective memory. In France, protesters described their acts as the final liberation of Paris,

evoking both memories of the Paris Commune of 1870–1871 and the liberation from the ‘fascist yoke’ after the Second World War.³⁶ It also evoked experiences of the protests against the Algerian War that were frequently crushed violently by the police.³⁷ The students also referred to ‘fascist brutality’ when they chanted ‘CRS-SS’ against the riot police.³⁸ ‘Combat in the *maquis* of the factories of France!’ was another famous slogan, evoking the activities of the *Résistance* during the Second World War. As 1968 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the First World War, the protesters also referred to war memories. Graffiti in central Paris denounced the war as a ‘guerre de moutons’ (‘war of sheep’), and posters highlighted the continuity of a war culture in France by portraying sheep to symbolise ‘normal’ society under de Gaulle.³⁹

The key event that established the coding violence/non-violence in Italy was the ‘Battle of the Valle Giulia’ in Rome on 20 March 1968, with a similar ‘battle’ after the lock-out of students at the Catholic University in Milan on 25 March.⁴⁰ The activists and their supporters highlighted the brutality of the Italian police and linked it to the heritage of fascist and right-wing violence as well as the lack of democratic traditions in Italy.⁴¹ Italian activists pronounced pacifism dead, and the idea of violent and armed struggle appeared in the movement’s songs and slogans, most famously in the protest song *Violenza*, which celebrated the clashes with the police.⁴² Other slogans demanded ‘violence in return for violence’ and transferred Vietnam to Rome’s Valle Giulia: ‘two, three, many Vietnams—two, three, many Valle Giulias’.⁴³ Students at the Catholic University in Milan injected their interpretations of a socially and politically conscious Catholicism into their interpretations of the Italian political and social reality as ‘structurally violent’. It was here that an emphasis on ‘anti-authoritarian’ modes of action and ‘democratic self-government’ was especially strong.⁴⁴

Unlike in France and West Germany, ‘violence’ had remained endemic to Italian politics after the end of Fascism well into the post-Second World War period, particularly in Sicily, in Emilia Romagna and in Alto Adige. This placed their violence in Italian extra-parliamentary protest actions in a different sociopolitical context. Brigantism in particular formed an important historical reference point. Before the emergence of the BR, discussions on violence had regained salience in the form of neo-fascist attacks (‘black terrorism’) from 1969 onwards, linked to NATO’s stay-behind armies and directed against labour movement institutions.⁴⁵ Unlike in West Germany, Italian protest politics extended well into the 1970s, with a second wave of protests in 1977. They also remained characterised by a high level of localism and remained concentrated on northern Italy and the capital, Rome.⁴⁶

In West Germany, the event which sparked the process of recoding of discussions on violence and non-violence began a year earlier, with the accidental shooting by a policeman of Benno Ohnesorg at a demonstration in Berlin against the Shah of Iran’s visit on 2 June 1967. For many protesters, this event was a manifestation of the ‘structural violence’ within the West German political and social system. The wounding of Rudi Dutschke by a mentally troubled man at the heavily policed 1968 Easter demonstrations in Berlin as well as the heavy-handed policing at another demonstration later that year, which culminated in the Battle of the Tegeler Weg

in autumn 1968, accentuated the West German debates further.⁴⁷ These events led the West German protesters to question their previous assumptions regarding the use of violence much more emphatically than their French and Italian counterparts. West German protesters were much more at pains to justify their reactions to what they experienced as police brutality by introducing new and largely symbolic differentiations between kinds of violence.⁴⁸

Yet, in West Germany, the dialectic between the changing semantics and events gave rise not only to very frequent use of the terminology of 'structural violence' amongst the student protesters, but also to the coining of a new symbolic differentiation between 'violence against things' and 'violence against people'. Many activists deemed 'violence against things' morally acceptable and in accordance with their generally anti-militarist and non-violent aims as it allowed them to provoke state and police power. In line with the arguments advanced by Herbert Marcuse earlier in the 1960s, many regarded this kind of violence as 'progressive' and as the only way of overcoming what the sociologist had interpreted as the 'repressive tolerance' within advanced consumer societies, with their technocratic governments and their pressures towards conformity.⁴⁹ A small minority of activists went even further and began to advocate the direct use of physical violence as a campaign strategy. As the later militant activist and former pacifist Ulrike Meinhof argued after the Ohnesorg shooting: 'the time of the good old Easter Marches was now over'.⁵⁰ As Gandhi and Martin Luther King had been killed, Meinhof regarded non-violent strategies as essentially bankrupt. Protest had to turn into 'resistance'.⁵¹

While such ideas never commanded consensus within the student movement, the vigorous debate about them helped to establish violence/non-violence as the dominant code in political debates, first within the movement but later in the three societies as a whole. Probably the most famous critique came from the Frankfurt School philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who had previously supported the protesters but now called such strategies a form of 'left-wing fascism'. While he accepted that there existed a 'sublime violence' within institutions, he called attempts to provoke the manifestation of this violence 'masochistic' and potentially 'fascist' since it was based on the very similar assumptions of social change through violence that had characterised Mussolini's early movement.⁵²

The resonance of these symbolic differentiations in the West German context reveals deep layers of German historical experience. Unlike in France and Italy, West German activists could not draw on historical examples when justifying political violence. For them, the 'liberation' of 1945 was not a positive event that spurred them to action. Instead, further accentuated in confrontations with the police, they increasingly interpreted the West German democracy as a new form of 'fascism', characterised by a lack of accountability and high levels of 'structural violence'. Hence, they drew on cases of anti-imperialist struggles elsewhere when they looked for examples of violent action. In the process, therefore, some West German protesters such as Dutschke, as well as the later 'terrorists' Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof, pointed out that violence (both structural and physical) could only be abolished through violence.⁵³

The ways in which the violent confrontations resonated with historical experiences created the conditions for the emergence of the binary code 'violence/non-violence' in discussions concerning political legitimacy more generally. At first, interpretations dominated in pro-governmental publications that criticised the violence of the students and workers by portraying them as ordinary criminals and lawless thugs, thus tapping earlier discussions regarding youth and public order.⁵⁴ Significantly, some West German politicians and the conservative mass media already used the word 'terror' to describe the student protests in 1967 and 1968 and thus created an extraordinarily powerful resonance by claiming that the protests mattered for society as a whole beyond their local manifestations: 'This is terror . . . Whoever produces terror must reckon with toughness'.⁵⁵ And the right-wing *Bild* newspaper wrote: 'Noise is no longer enough for them. They must see blood . . . they wave the red flag, and they mean the red flag'.⁵⁶ Thus, governments, observers and protesters came to communicate with the same code, yet with different connotations. While the protests symbolised the assertion of democracy for the activists, less sympathetic observers in the government framed the events as an attack on the fundamental tenets of democracy and conjured up images of an impending 'civil war' and a return to the extra-parliamentary violence of the 1920s and 1930s.⁵⁷

The Actualisation of Violence and the Emergence of 'Terrorism' in France, Italy and West Germany

It was against this background that extra-parliamentary violence could turn into 'terrorism' and that the coding violent/non-violent came to dominate discourses concerning political legitimacy in France, Italy and West Germany. This entailed a twofold process. First, a certain number of activists had to switch their codes for political communication around and argue in favour of the use of violent means to create a non-violent society. During this process, a small number of activists who had discussed the use of violence now actualised this violence. They all regarded themselves as part of a global anti-imperialist struggle in the metropolises, although they emphasised different aspects of this struggle. In France, Italy and West Germany, militant left-wing activism emerged, as a minority of protesters began to advocate a strategy of political violence in response to governmental actions. Second, governments and observers came to interpret the violent acts of the militant activists as 'terrorism', rather than as politically motivated acts of violence, or as elements of ordinary criminal behaviour. Only the definitions of acts of political violence as parts of a larger whole and as a constant everyday threat created the conditions for the resonance of these issues in society as a whole, rather than its sub-systems.

In France, the group *Gauche Prolétarienne* (Proletarian Left, GP) and its newspaper *La Cause du Peuple* carried discussions amongst *gauchist* protesters into the 1970s. By stressing the 'legitimacy' of the revolutionary cause over the 'legality' of the means of creating a new society, they focused on the direct expression of emotions and feelings and emphasised the importance of making marginal voices heard.⁵⁸ They regarded

themselves as 'the seed of a wartime resistance movement, in a universe wherein the State and its repressive forces represented the Nazis, and the Communist Party and the trade unions are the collaborators'.⁵⁹ Rather than do away with the structural and physical violence within societies and violence as a means of foreign and defence policy, successive governments had, they believed, neglected the revolutionary aims of the Resistance in favour of stabilising capitalist power structures.⁶⁰

Accordingly, the GP carried out actions against 'management terrorism' in the factories (culminating in Pierre Overney's murder in the early 1970s), against economic discrimination (for example by distributing free Paris metro tickets to workers) and racial discrimination (by pillaging the luxury food store Fauchon in the name of immigrant workers in shanty towns).⁶¹ The violence increased further when the GP created the *Nouvelle Résistance Populaire* (NRP) in July 1971 in order to carry out guerrilla-style acts, such as the kidnapping of the National Assembly deputy Michel de Grailly on 26 November 1970, or the Renault executive Robert Nogrette on 8 March 1972.⁶²

A similar process of re-coding could be observed in Italy, where some advocates of workers' self-management turned to violence to achieve what they regarded as a non-violent society. After the events of the Valle Giulia and given the presence of neo-fascist violence and the fears of a right-wing putsch in Italy, the activists turned, in a drawn-out and long-winded process, to violent political struggle as a means to create a non-violent society. This happened first within the Milan Metropolitan Political Collective and then in the underground *Sinistra Proletaria*, the equivalent of the French *Gauche Prolétarienne*. Throughout, war abounded in the language of the BR.⁶³ It was out of the deep-rooted but controlled violence endemic to labour unrest in this period that activists, now gathered in several militant groups, most famously the *Brigate Rosse* (BR, Red Brigades), took their first steps and began to turn around the code of violence/non-violence by arguing that a society free of 'structural violence' could only be created through violent acts. BR activists sought to generate alternative forms of political power in the factories, if not working-class neighbourhoods, by means of what they called 'armed propaganda'. In the agitated world of the labour struggles of the early 1970s and against the background of the growing reformist stance of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), these activists were, however, able to enter the agitated milieu of the factories and find backing there much more easily than their French counterparts.⁶⁴ It was in 1977 and 1978 that the discourse concerning political violence/non-violence reached its peak: the BR now switched its emphasis from violence as armed propaganda to speaking about itself in terms of an armed party that engaged in a 'revolutionary civil war'.⁶⁵ The simultaneity of neo-fascist violence, which conspiracy theories connected to government actions, gave the BR activists added backing.⁶⁶ The positive memory of the often violent resistance only strengthened this resonance.⁶⁷ It meant that, even in symbolic terms, transnational links played a less important role in Italy than in either France or West Germany.⁶⁸

In the Federal Republic, by contrast, left-wing militant groups emerged not out of an engagement with the revolutionary traditions of the labour movement. More than

in the other countries, 'terrorism' was created and kept alive by the government.⁶⁹ In this sense, West German left-wing 'terrorism' was much less related to specifically German traditions of political violence than its Italian and French counterparts. It is, therefore, not surprising that references to German history are entirely absent from the RAF's founding document. In it, the group—which now called itself the Red Army Faction—declared war on the Federal Republic and pledged to build up an 'urban guerrilla movement' in order to support the anti-imperialist struggles in Vietnam.⁷⁰

Accordingly, more than in the other countries, the semantics of West German 'terrorism' amongst the terrorists and non-violent radical activists relied on evoking individuality and personhood. The RAF members showed what Bernd Weisbrod has called 'a desperate drive to secure the vital sources of self' and a 'new poetic language of redemption'.⁷¹ With the hardening of the government's attitude, this was accentuated further: 'There is only one liberation ... only one healing ... that is violence against the pigs ...'.⁷² From within this kind of thinking, the imprisoned activists turned to a radical subjectivity that focused on their physical being, their bodies. As a consequence, they came to regard suicide as a possibility to realise their humanity within a totally alien and crushing system: 'their death is the expression of the rebellion of the crushed subjects against their crushing, not a thing, but a human being'.⁷³ Andreas Baader in particular thus opposed the 'law of war of the body' against the 'criminal law of the state'.⁷⁴ Interestingly, those who advocated non-violent civil disobedience at the time used the same symbolism in their renderings of the theme of violence/non-violence, by pointing to the control of their bodies as the last weapon against the state.⁷⁵

The actualisation of violence by militant activists could only gain political and social resonance because the governments and the mass media in each country began to define political violence as 'terrorism'. This had implications for the political system as a whole, which everyone, and not merely the groups of victims, had to fear. In West Germany and Italy, moreover, metaphors of war and warfare played an important role in structuring political debates. Some student protesters and the conservative press in both countries already classified the unrest in 1967 and 1968 by using war metaphors. Thus, Ulrike Meinhof discussed the Vietnam War as a 'new kind of world war', and the Italian and West German activists who condoned violence sought to interpret domestic politics as a civil war by propagating the tactics of an 'urban guerrilla', or a 'continued battle' ('lotta continua').⁷⁶ In both countries, the conservative press took up these metaphors, with the Berlin *Bild Zeitung* calling the Easter demonstrations in Berlin in 1968 'the worst street battles that Berlin has experienced since the end of World War Two'.⁷⁷ Yet it was only in the early 1970s that the metaphor of war and warfare achieved greater salience in West German and Italian debates and peaked in the later 1970s, in West Germany during the 'hot autumn' and in Italy during Aldo Moro's kidnapping and eventual murder.⁷⁸ Given the war experiences in West Germany and Italy, such rhetoric had a resonance and achieved a symbolic power that it could not achieve in France.⁷⁹

Throughout, the Red Brigades interpreted themselves quite successfully as the re-emergence of a socialist and anti-fascist resistance and, thus, in continuity with a national war of liberation. They regarded themselves as those who helped fulfil the postwar dream of a united, socialist and peaceful Italy.⁸⁰ With the emergence of the 'historical compromise' between Christian Democrats (CD) and Communists (PCI) in Italy in the mid-1970s, however, this clear boundary collapsed. With the murder of Aldo Moro on the same day as the vote of confidence for the new CD-PCI government took place, this theme lost its resonance—and so did the discourses concerning 'terrorism' and war. Especially with the election, against the candidate of the far left, and of the resistance hero Sandro Pertini as president of Italy, government appeared to have been re-defined in terms of non-violent crisis management of the state and the economy.⁸¹

These national specificities did not escape the political activists: Valerio Morucci, one of Moro's kidnappers, observed in a 1996 interview how obsessed the RAF was with the nationally motivated international fight against American imperialism and occupation in Germany.⁸² RAF activist Stefan Wisniewski admitted as much when he pointed out: 'Had we lived in Italy, we would have rather followed the concept of the Brigade . . . Yet here [in Germany] we have nothing to which we can link up.'⁸³ For West German activists and the public, the 'war' that seemed to take place at the time was, therefore, a world war, with its centre in the Federal Republic.⁸⁴ West German society was, in Golo Mann's word, embroiled in a 'new kind of civil war', waged by 'international terrorism' against the entirely innocent Federal Republic.⁸⁵ Yet this conjuring up of 'war' in the Federal Republic was almost as frequently met by calls for moderation (both real and linguistic) and peace, perhaps most famously by the West German writer Heinrich Böll in an article in the weekly *Der Spiegel* in which he sought to show how absurd the RAF's declaration of war and the government's reaction to it were.⁸⁶

While the governments in all three countries reacted equally strongly in trying to tackle what they regarded as a violent threat to their authority, this re-definition of political violence by a minority of activists as 'terrorism' was inversely related to the actual levels of violence. While the level of violence was most significant in Italy, it was here, due to the persistence of political violence in the post-Second World War period, that definitions of BR violence as 'terrorism' took to emerging within political discussions.⁸⁷ In France, 'law and order' were central elements in the various election campaigns for both the presidency and the prime ministership, particularly in Jacques Chirac's campaign for the prime ministership and in his government's legislative programme in the period 1986–1988.⁸⁸ The debates reflected the gradual decline of political violence in French political culture, which had been under way since the end of the Second World War, giving explicitly non-violent extra-parliamentary movements a greater voice. Although the activists in May 1968 sought to revive the barricades as a specifically French form of protest, they already no longer carried the meaning of a fight by 'man against man' and, significantly, their action did not result in collective violence as in the Paris *Commune* in 1870–1871.⁸⁹ In West Germany, the

comparatively few violent acts by a small number of political activists resulted in the almost immediate definition of these acts as 'terrorism'.

Here, political violence had been stigmatised in public political debates from 1945 due to its links with the demise of the Weimar Republic, the rise of National Socialism in the early 1930s and the experiences of mass violence during the Second World War as well as the connection of violence with Communism in cold war Germany.⁹⁰ Moreover, unlike the French and Italian political systems, the creators of the West German constitution had, through the principle of a 'streitbare Demokratie' ('belligerent democracy'), constructed the Federal Republic as an entity willing to take on its enemies, by force if necessary.⁹¹

Hence, rather than identifying the problem of 'terrorism' merely as one of public order, it further bolstered its interpretation of violent acts, already created in the debates on violent crimes in the late 1960s, as one of 'domestic' or 'internal security' ('innere Sicherheit').⁹² This came with a far more inclusive definition than in Italy and France of who was to be the target of these policies. While 'internal enemies' in the 1950s and early 1960s had been defined primarily as 'communists' who could be clearly identified through specific party-political affiliations and whose funding came from outside the country, this image had become obsolescent with the beginning of superpower and German–German détente. This created the conditions for the re-configuration of the 'enemies of the state' in societal terms. Now everyone who was seen to 'sympathise' by expressing an understanding of the 'terrorists' aims (yet not their violent means) could be regarded as potentially dangerous.⁹³

Despite structural similarities in the evocation of war in the West German and Italian debates (and to a much lesser extent in France), the discussions concerning 'terrorism' in the 1970s and early 1980s thus had a far greater impact on discourses within the Federal Republic than elsewhere. Paradoxically, the reason for this lay not only in the stigma that had been attached to discussions of violence before the 1970s, but also in the very strength of the attempts by the Social-Democratic/Liberal coalition to reform West German society thoroughly and to establish the societal conditions that enabled German citizens 'to dare', in chancellor Willy Brandt's words, 'more democracy'. While Christian Democrats sought to strengthen the role of the state through their measures,⁹⁴ Social-Democratic and Liberal politicians were primarily concerned with using the anti-terrorist measures to reform 'society': they treated 'terrorism' as a social disease that they sought to excise from the body politic. More than in France and Italy, violence thus was a way to evoke the identity of society as a whole and to overcome the complexities of political discussions.⁹⁵

This could be seen especially well in the West German discussions on political violence committed by foreign groups, often with support by West German activists. Most notable among these were the shootings of two Israeli sportsmen by members of the Palestinian group 'Black September' on 5 September 1972 during the Olympic Games in Munich. While activists interpreted the attacks as part of their violent struggle for non-violence, mainstream newspapers and the West German government regarded it as yet another piece of evidence of an international 'terrorist front'.⁹⁶

A similar discussion emerged after Palestinians and German activists hijacked an Air France plane on its way from Tel Aviv to Paris on 27 June 1976 and flew it to the Ugandan town of Entebbe in order to demand the immediate release of what they called 'political prisoners' in Israel and the Federal Republic. The same was true of the discussions over the hijacking of a Lufthansa plane to Mogadishu during the 'hot autumn' of October 1977, which was merely interpreted as another manifestation of an international terrorist network zeroing in on the Federal Republic.⁹⁷ Yet, on the whole, these international terrorism events received far less attention, especially in the left-wing milieu, than home-grown 'terrorism'.⁹⁸ Only one left-wing paper ironised the abundance of war metaphors and National Socialist language on both sides.⁹⁹

The Gradual Emergence of Non-Violent Definitions of Statehood

In the short term, the definition of left-wing political violence as 'terrorism' and the legislative measures connected to this process brought a curtailment of civil liberties, the strengthening of governmental power and a limitation of the boundaries of the discourses regarding social reform and 'structural violence', as they placed almost all extra-parliamentary actors under the general suspicion of being terrorist sympathisers. In the medium and long term, however, the resonance that the discourse of 'terrorism' engendered led to a strengthening of non-violent extra-parliamentary political actors, the emergence of definitions of 'civil society' that saw the state mainly as a mediator in social conflicts and, as a result, the emergence of definitions of statehood which were based on non-violence in both domestic and foreign affairs as the fundamental criterion for governmental legitimacy. This was fed by a growing emphasis on subjectivity and individuality as well as an interest in psychotherapy, which went far beyond the circles of social-movement activists.¹⁰⁰

The memory of the National Socialist genocide endowed the West German debates with specific characteristics. Yet the processes that exposed a relationship between the birth of the postwar democracies and warfare and thus highlighted key problems of social and political order were remarkably similar. The attempts on the extra-parliamentary left to establish *Eigen-Sinn* and social autonomy as political concepts thus appear as direct inversions of previous nationalist programmes to achieve national unity, particularly through warfare.¹⁰¹

Across Western Europe, various social movements for 'peace', women's rights and environmental protection took up the theme of 'structural violence' and what they regarded as individual and societal self-determination.¹⁰² By criticising affluence and consumption they offered a radical critique of the model of social cohesion that had dominated the post-World War era in the three West European societies. They thus redefined statehood as a medium in order to reactivate 'civil society' in all its plurality.¹⁰³

While their non-violent protests led to occasional violent clashes with the police, non-violence became the predominant feature of extra-parliamentary protests over the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹⁰⁴ So-called 'citizens' initiatives', which

dealt with local environmental problems, as well as the foundation of the Green Party, mushroomed out of these non-violent campaigns, a process which was particularly pronounced in West Germany.¹⁰⁵ The significant rise in conscientious objection and the intensive debate surrounding it, and also changing notions of democracy at the workplace, are other clear indications for this.¹⁰⁶

Some former activists reflected these changes when, in their retrospective reflections, they sought to separate non-violent activists from the violence of '1968'.¹⁰⁷ They sought to cordon off the violence that occurred then as the domain of a minority within the movement, just as the historian François Furet came to separate increasingly clearly the French revolutionary terror from the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁰⁸ Many West German activists gave up the symbolic distinction between 'violence against things' and 'violence against persons'. Thus, in 1976, the Frankfurt anti-authoritarian activist Joschka Fischer expressed his horror at a possible 'escalation of violence and counter-violence', which would lead only to further government repression.¹⁰⁹

The self-restraint on the part of the activists circumscribed the legitimacy of government and statehood far more narrowly than had been the case before.¹¹⁰ It was now measured against the yardstick of non-violence, both in domestic and in foreign affairs. This process was fuelled by and led to parallel gradual changes in protest policing.¹¹¹ Over the course of the 1970s, politicians, non-violent activists and the mass media in Italy, France and the Federal Republic came to classify violence increasingly as a social, rather than a political problem. Violence thus came to be seen as the corollary of actions of marginal groups and was frequently described through a psycho-pathological vocabulary. In line with this psychotherapeutic definition of violence as a social problem was the individualist interpretation of terrorists' motivations that went with it.¹¹²

As a consequence, discussions within the Italian, French and West German left-wing milieux began to focus less on declarations of sympathy for the activists' aims and more on their role as citizens in controlling violence and thus in helping to establish conceptions of non-violent statehood. This happened first within the media of the New Left sub-culture, but increasingly was taken up by the mass media in the three countries as well, albeit with different political connotations.¹¹³

Another instance of this line of argument is Klaus Theweleit's book *Male Phantasies*, a massive and meandering account of the psychological and emotional origins of National Socialism, which appeared at the height of the West German debates in 1977–1978. Theweleit pointed out that 'the state, secret agents, and the pigs' batons could achieve much—but not as much as people who were your "comrades" until nine p.m. last night, but who from half past eleven and this morning regard you as one of those best cared for on a rope . . .'.¹¹⁴ Likewise, the author of the infamous Mescalero Letter, who confessed 'clandestine joy' over the murder by the Red Army Faction of federal prosecutor Heinrich Buback, also expressed his misgivings over a 'strategy of liquidation', as it would ultimately destroy the humanitarian motives it sought to establish in society.¹¹⁵ In particular Heinrich Böll's

writings during this period, most notably his *Lost Honour of Katharina Blum*, first published in 1974, have to be interpreted in this context of linguistic and semantic demilitarisation, understood by Böll as the establishment of rational discussion over emotional speculation.¹¹⁶ Discussions within the left-wing milieu thus focused increasingly on the transnational issue of human rights and torture, rather than the question of state violence as such.¹¹⁷ Activists portrayed themselves increasingly as citizens who, precisely because of their criticism of certain governmental measures, were loyal to the state and realised the Federal Republic's mission; they appropriated the originally conservative concept of 'constitutional patriotism' from the left.¹¹⁸ This was accompanied, however, by growing criticism, even amongst previous supporters, of police intervention and surveillance as well as the stigmatisation of much of the left-wing milieu.¹¹⁹

The re-coding of debates on political legitimacy with the binary opposition of violence/non-violence was unique in addressing problems of government and social cohesion during a period of severe economic crisis, labour unrest and the perception of a fundamental crisis of governmental power amongst politicians in Italy, France and West Germany. Political parties and public intellectuals began to interpret these economic changes as a crisis in modern government and in political legitimacy. The state appeared to have lost its grip over the population, and 'alienation' became one of the catchwords of the decade.

The political implications of this reformation differed remarkably in all three countries, however. In West Germany, the breakthrough of non-violent conceptions of statehood occurred, quite ironically, under Christian-Democratic auspices, symbolised by the formation of a Christian Democratic–Liberal coalition government in 1982: some consensus was preserved, yet within a mood swing away from the progressive hopes of the 1960s and early 1970s.¹²⁰

France witnessed similar processes, yet under socialist auspices, with the installation of a socialist government under François Mitterand in 1981. Yet even there, communist counter-culture was almost dismantled by the mid-1980s. In 1984, Mitterand had his prime minister abandon ambitious welfare proposals. The continuation of an anti-totalitarian consensus of exclusion of the far left from the mainstream political discourse had very similar consequences to what took place in the Federal Republic: it undermined the left-wing narrative of the twentieth century, which held that attacks against communism were synonymous with attacks on all socialist aims.¹²¹ In Italy, by contrast, it took much longer for such a consensus of non-violent statehood to emerge. The economic and social problems that the Italian polity faced were far greater than those of either Italy or France, and they were deeply anchored in a historically grown discourse about Italian statehood and government.¹²² Hence, the contestations continued much longer here than in either the Federal Republic or France, not least because the debate over social and economic policies was so closely tied to the discourse concerning the meanings of the *Resistenza*.¹²³

Conclusions

What constituted for contemporaries 'the years of lead' and the loss of democracy and modern government appears, with hindsight, as a period embracing the much more successful mastery of key political and social problems. Not least, despite the renewal of superpower tensions in the wake of NATO's double-track decision, it saw the formation of an era of non-violence.

While national specificities cannot and should not be denied, we find that the debates surrounding 'terrorism' and violence in the 1970s led to a revival of a discourse concerning the meanings of statehood, which had lain dormant since the end of the Second World War. It was, therefore, over the course of the 1970s (and not, as James Sheehan has recently argued, in direct response to the Second World War) that the meaning of statehood came to be defined in explicitly non-violent terms.¹²⁴

These debates helped establish conceptions of statehood in Italian, German and French political cultures that could not be found beyond continental Western Europe. Citizens of these countries came to accept their government's legitimacy only under the condition that they acted in a non-violent manner both in the domestic and in the international arena. Statehood was thus at once strengthened and weakened. It was slowly strengthened as it regained a degree of legitimacy amongst broad sections of the population after the discussions of 'governmentality' (and the lack thereof) in the 1970s. But this legitimacy was now more narrowly circumscribed than ever before.

While the United States and Britain also experienced violent left-wing militancy during the late 1960s and 1970s, this never achieved the resonance it did in continental Western Europe. As both countries' territories had been left virtually unscathed during the Second World War, their populations had not experienced mass violence at home in the ways in which France, Italy and particularly Germany had. They could also look back on fundamentally different experiences with extra-parliamentary and social violence in the interwar years.¹²⁵ This meant that assumptions regarding the use of violence by states and governments within the political cultures of Italy, France and West Germany began to diverge significantly from those in the United States and Great Britain. While the debates over 'terrorism' in 1970s Western Europe might have, at the time, resembled *danses macabres*, in which governments and 'terrorists' sought to outbid each other in violent actions,¹²⁶ in the long run they have led to the establishment of 'non-violence' as a key factor in West European conceptions of political legitimacy and, thus, to the emergence of an era of non-violence in continental Western Europe.

Notes

[1] Parker, "31 terrorist blasts in a week".

[2] On the methodological assumptions cf. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 109–12.

[3] On the relationship between events and frames cf. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action", 70.

- [4] Biedenkopf, "Politik und Sprache [1973]", 189–97. For an Italian perspective cf. Rigotti, *Metafore della politica*. On a theoretical level cf. Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*.
- [5] Cf. Weinbauer, "Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik der Siebzigerjahre", esp. 233–34.
- [6] Fritzsche, "Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: Legacy of the '68 Movement or 'Burden of Fascism'?" and Becker, *Hitler's Children*; cf., however, della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State* and now: Tolomelli, *Terrorismo e società*.
- [7] Musolff, *Krieg gegen die Öffentlichkeit. Terrorismus und politischer Sprachgebrauch*.
- [8] Cf. the suggestions in Bonacker, "Zuschreibungen der Gewalt. Zur Sinnförmigkeit interaktiver, organisierter und gesellschaftlicher Gewalt".
- [9] Cf. Treiber, "Die gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem Terrorismus: Die Inszenierung 'symbolischer Kreuzzüge' zur Darstellung von Bedrohungen der normativen Ordnung von Gesellschaft und Staat", 323–24.
- [10] Cf. Luhmann, *Die Politik der Gesellschaft*, 358–59; Baecker, "Gewalt im System".
- [11] Kershaw, "War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe", 122; Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*.
- [12] Cf. Schmid and de Graaf, *Violence as Communication. Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*; Münkler, "Guerillakrieg und Terrorismus", 317–20.
- [13] Daase, Christopher. "Die RAF und der internationale Terrorismus. Zur transnationalen Kooperation klandestiner Organisationen".
- [14] Cf. Sciascia, *The Moro Affair*; Galli, *Piombo rosso. La storia completa della lotta armata in Italia dal 1970 a oggi*.
- [15] Hermant and Bigo, "Analyse Statistique du Terrorisme en France".
- [16] Dartnell, *Action Directe*, 182, Appendix 5.2.
- [17] Cf. Francq, "Les Cellules Communistes Combattantes: Les Deux Figures D'Une Inversion"; Offergeld and Souris, *Euro-Terrorisme: Le Belgique Étranglée*.
- [18] "Berlin: 115 Terror-Anschläge seit Juli 1969." *Bild*, 31 May 1972: 1.
- [19] On the resonance with Germany's past cf. Koenen, *Vesper, Ensslin, Baader*.
- [20] Cf. Davis, "Activism from Starbuck to Starbucks, or Terror: What's in a Name?"
- [21] Cf. Gilcher-Holtey, Ingrid. "Der Transfer zwischen den Studentenbewegungen von 1968 und die Entstehung einer transnationalen Gegenöffentlichkeit".
- [22] Cf. Nehring, "National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War".
- [23] Cf. for an early diagnosis Morin, *L'Esprit Du Temps*, 205–21.
- [24] Cf. Rosanvallon, *L'Âge de l'Autogestion*.
- [25] Cf. Horn, "The Changing Nature of the European Working", 351–71; Tolomelli, "Repressiv getrennt" oder "organisch verbündet". *Studenten und Arbeiter 1968 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Italien*.
- [26] Cf. Di Giuseppe and Vecchio, "Die Friedensbewegungen in Italien"; Beretta, *Il Lungo Autunno*. On the influence on later BR activists cf. Peci, *Io, l'Infame*.
- [27] Cf. Schmidtke, *Der Aufbruch der jungen Intelligenz*.
- [28] *Kursbuch*, 14 October 1967, quoted from Dutschke, *Mein langer Marsch*, 14.
- [29] Cf. Ohrt, *Phantom Avantgarde*, 24; Tolomelli, "Repressiv getrennt" oder "organisch verbündet".
- [30] Geismar, *L'Engrenage Terroriste*, 42.
- [31] Liniers, "Objections contre une Prise d'Armes", 171.
- [32] Cf. Gilcher-Holtey, "Die Phantasie an die Macht". *Mai 68 in Frankreich*, 115–38.
- [33] "Mai 68: Les Archives Secrètes de la Police." *L'Express* 19 March 1998: 47.
- [34] "Deux Témoignages sur les Heurts de Vendredi." *Le Monde* 7 May 1968: 10; "Against the Police State we must continue to fight." In Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet, *The French Student Uprising November 1967–June 1968*, document 61: 194–96.

- [35] Cf. Gilcher-Holtey, *Phantasie*, ch. 5.
- [36] Cf. Touraine, *Le Communisme Utopique*, 38.
- [37] Cf. House and MacMaster, *Paris 1961*.
- [38] Kedward, *La Vie en Bleu*, 423.
- [39] Quoted in Ross, *May '68 and its Afterlives*, 81.
- [40] Viale, *Il Sessantotto*.
- [41] *Paese Sera*, 2 March 1968: 4; Hilwig, "The Revolt against the Establishment".
- [42] Cf. Viale, *Il Sessantotto*, 49.
- [43] *L'Espresso*, 15 December 1968: 5; Marchetti, Aldo. "Un Teatro Troppo Serio." *Classe 13* (June 1982): 3–7 and the account by Groppo, Bruno. "1968 en Italie et le Problème de la Violence".
- [44] Cf. Balestrini, and Moroni, *L'Orda d'Oro 1968–1977*, 241–53; Tomasi, *La Contestazione Religiosa Giovanile in Italia (1968–78)*.
- [45] Cf. Dickie, *Cosa Nostra*; Bedeschi, *Malefatte della rossa Emilia*; Davis, *Conflict and Control*; Acquaviva, *Guerriglia e Guerra Rivoluzionaria in Italia*. On the stay behind armies cf. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*.
- [46] Passerini, "Das Jahr 1968 in Italien"; Weinberg and Enbank, "Neo Fascist and Far Left Terrorists in Italy: Some Biographical Observations".
- [47] Cf. Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany. A Social History of Dissent and Democracy*, ch. 9.
- [48] Speech at the Congress "Hochschule und Demokratie—Bedingungen und Organisation des Widerstandes" (9 June 1967). In *Bedingungen und Organisation des Widerstandes. Der Kongreß in Hannover*. Berlin: AStA FU Berlin, 1967: 42–48.
- [49] Marcuse, "Das Problem der Gewalt in der Opposition".
- [50] Rühmkorf, *Die Jahre die Ihr kennt*, 216.
- [51] Meinhof, "Vom Protest zum Widerstand".
- [52] 9 June 1967, printed in Habermas, *Protestbewegung und Hochschulreform*, 137–52.
- [53] Salvatore and Dutschke, "Introduction".
- [54] Cf., for example, *La Croix* 25/26 May 1968: 7, cols 3–4; *Il Tempo* 2 March 1968: 3; Parlamento della Repubblica, Camera dei Deputati, *Resoconto delle Sedute Plenarie*, 1 March 1968: 567; Piccone Stella, "Rebels without a Cause"; Weinbauer, "Eliten, Generationen, Jugenddelinquenz und Innere Sicherheit. Die 1960er und frühen 1970er Jahre in der Bundesrepublik".
- [55] *Berliner Zeitung* 3 June 1967: 1.
- [56] *Bild* (Berlin) 3 June 1967: 1.
- [57] Cf. D'Orsi, Angelo. *Il Potere Repressivo. La Polizia. La Forze dell'ordine Italiano*. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1973: 312–13.
- [58] Morin, "Mais (1978)".
- [59] Geismar, *L'Engrenage*, 53.
- [60] Cf. Plenel, "La Terrorisme à Vocation Révolutionnaire".
- [61] Cf. Geismar, July and Morane, 256; Le Goff, ch. 9: "Vers la Guerre Civile?".
- [62] "Illégalisme et Guerre: Texte fondateur de la Nouvelle Résistance Populaire." In: Geismar, *L'Engrenage*, 159–79.
- [63] Cavallini, *Il Terrorismo in Fabbrica*.
- [64] Moretti, *Brigate Rosse*, 11–12 and 47.
- [65] Dalla Chiesa, Nando. "Il terrorismo di sinistra".
- [66] Balestrini and Moroni, *L'Ordo*, 405–08.
- [67] Cf. Focardi and Klinkhammer, 251–90; Cooke, 161–73.
- [68] Cf. Karmon, Ely. "The Red Brigades—Cooperation with the Palestinian Terrorist Organizations (1970–1990)". Available from <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=365> (accessed 18 May 2007).
- [69] Cf. the account in Aust, *Der Baader Meinhof Komplex*.

- [70] Cf. "Die Rote Armee aufbauen" [5 June 1970]. In *Rote Armee Fraktion*, 24–26.
- [71] Weisbrod, "Fundamentalist Violence: Political Violence and Political Religion in Modern Conflict", 502.
- [72] Bakker Schut, *das info. Briefe von Gefangenen aus der RAF 1973–1977. Dokumente*, 24.
- [73] *Ibid.*, 24.
- [74] Cf. the quote in Hauser, *Baader und Herold. Beschreibung eines Kampfes*.
- [75] Cf. Ebert, *Gewaltfreier Aufstand—Alternative zum Bürgerkrieg*.
- [76] Cf., for example, Pohrt et al., *Die alte Straßenverkehrsordnung*, 43–45; *L'Espresso* 14, no. 4 (16 June 1968). For conservative and governmental voices cf. Kallscheuer, Otto, and Michael Sontheimer, eds. *Einschüsse. Besichtigungen eines Frontverlaufs. Zehn Jahre nach dem deutschen Herbst*. Berlin: Rotbuch, 1987.
- [77] *Bild* (Berlin), 13 April 1968: 1; Tarrow, Sidney G. "The Crisis of the late 60s in Italy and France".
- [78] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 April 1977: 7; *Die Welt*, 7 September 1977: 8; Augstein, Rudolf. "Weltbürgerkrieg à la Bonn." *Der Spiegel* no. 41 (1977): 13–14; Guzzanti, P. "La difesa di Moro." *La Repubblica*, 10 March 1977: 8; Pavone, Claudio. "Sparo dunque sono. Il nodo della violenza." *Il Manifesto* 6 May 1982: 3–12.
- [79] Cf. for the West German case: Musolff, Andreas. "Terrorismus im öffentlichen Diskurs der BRD: Seine Deutung als Kriegsgeschehen und die Folgen".
- [80] Moretti, *Brigate Rosse*, 1996: 73. On the background cf. Klinkhammer, "Die italienische Gesellschaft 1943–1945 zwischen Widerstand und Kollaboration".
- [81] Cf. Rusconi, "Die italienische Resistenza auf dem Prüfstand".
- [82] "Die RAF und wir—feindliche Konkurrenten. Ein Interview mit Valerio Morucci." *Der Spiegel* no. 31 (1996): 110.
- [83] Wisniewski, *Wir waren so unheimlich konsequent*; "Wir werden in den Durststreik treten." *Spiegel Fragen an Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin und Jan-Carl Raspe.* *Der Spiegel* 20 January 1975: 52–57.
- [84] *Die Welt*, 15 October 1977: 6.
- [85] *Die Welt*, 7 September 1977: 7.
- [86] Böll, Heinrich. "Will Ulrike Gnade oder freies Geleit?".
- [87] Cf. Galli, Giorgio. "La Politica Italiana"; Lumley and Schlesinger. "The Press, the State and its Enemies: The Italian Case"; Evans, "Terrorism and Subversion of the State: Italian Legal Responses".
- [88] Cf. Quadrupanni, *L'Anti-Terrorisme en France*; Berstein and Milza, *Histoire de la France au XXe Siècle*, vol. 5: *De 1974 à Nos Jours*, ch. 2.
- [89] Corbin and Mayeur, *La Barricade*, 27; Tartakowsky, *Le Pouvoir est dans la Rue*.
- [90] Cf. Geyer, Michael. "Das Stigma der Gewalt und das Problem der nationalen Identität in Deutschland".
- [91] Cf. Jesse, *Streitbare Demokratie*; Moses, "The State and the Student Movement in West Germany, 1967–77".
- [92] On these developments cf. Funk and Werkentin, "Die siebziger Jahre: Das Jahrzehnt innerer Sicherheit?".
- [93] Cf. Balz, "Der Sympathisanten'—Diskurs im Deutschen Herbst"; Noelle-Neumann, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1968–73*.
- [94] Cf., for example, Böhm, Anton. "Die Saat der Gewalt." *Die Welt* 10 August 1972: 7; Bilstein and Binder, *Innere Sicherheit*; on the general context cf. Schildt, "Die Kräfte der Gegenreform sind auf breiter Front angetreten." Zur konservativen Tendenzwende in den Siebzigerjahren".
- [95] Cf. the contributions by Duve, Böll and Staack in *Briefe zur Verteidigung der Republik*; Cobler, Sebastian. *Law, Order and Politics in West Germany*.
- [96] Cf. Kraushaar, "Antizionismus als trojanisches Pferd", esp. 689–93.

- [97] Cf., for example, *Die Welt*, 15 October 1977: 7. On the background cf. Schreiber and Wolffsohn, *Nahost*.
- [98] Schueler, Hans. "Terror ohne Ende. Die Entebbe-Aktion war ein Glücksfall." *Die Zeit* 9 July 1976: 1; "Bonn: 'Härte bedeutet Massaker.'" *Der Spiegel*, 5 July 1976: 21–25, especially 22. On the background cf. Vowinkel, "Der kurze Weg nach Entebbe oder die Verlängerung der deutschen Geschichte in den Nahen Osten".
- [99] Guggemos, Carl L. "Nie so pingelig." *konkret* no. 8 (1976): 24–25.
- [100] Malinowski and Sedlmaier, "'1968' als Katalysator der Konsumgesellschaft. Performative Regelverstöße, kommerzielle Adaptionen und ihre gegenseitige Durchdringung" 67; Siegfried, "Ästhetik des Anderseins: Subkulturen zwischen Hedonismus und Militanz 1965 und 1970".
- [101] Negt, "Sozialistische Politik und Terrorismus".
- [102] Roth and Rucht, *Neue Soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*; Kriesi et al., *New Social Movements in Western Europe*.
- [103] For the above argument with regard to Germany cf. Geyer, "Krieg, Staat und Nationalismus im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts".
- [104] Kedward, *Vie en Bleu*: 497–505; della Porta, "Social Movements and Non-Violence in Italy"; Aust, *Brokdorf*.
- [105] For an overview cf. Davis, Belinda. "Jenseits von Terror und Rückzug: Die Suche nach politischem Spielraum und Strategien im Westdeutschland der siebziger Jahre"; Pekelder, Jacco. "Het geweld der kameraden. Peter Brückner, het terrorisme en de linkse identiteit".
- [106] Cf. Albesano, *Storia dell'Obiezione di Coscienza in Italia*; Bernhard, Patrick. *Zivildienst zwischen Reform und Revolte*, 196–218.
- [107] Cf. Touraine, *La Société Post-Industrielle*, 9; Scivoletto, *Giorgio La Pira*; Lumley, *States of Emergency*, 273–78.
- [108] Cf. Ross, *May '68*: 138–58; on Furet cf. Khilnani, *Arguing Revolution*, chs 5 and 6.
- [109] Frankfurter Spontis. "Uns treibt der Hunger nach Liebe, Zärtlichkeit und Freiheit..." *Links* no. 8 (July/August 1976): 11.
- [110] Cf. Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder*.
- [111] Cf. Della Porta, Fillieule and Reiter, "Policing Protest in France and Italy: From Intimidation to Cooperation?"; della Porta and Reiter, *Policing Protest*; Weinbauer, "Zwischen 'Partisanenkampf' und 'Kommissar Computer': Polizei und Linksterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik bis Anfang der 1980er Jahre" as well as the essay by Herbert Reiter and Klaus Weinbauer in this issue.
- [112] Cf. Sack, Fritz. "Die Reaktion von Gesellschaft, Politik und Staat auf die Studentenbewegung." In *Protest*, edited by idem: 105–226, here 141; Reinand Schön, "Problem Setting in Policy Research", 241–42.
- [113] Cf., for example, the *Spiegel* series "Mord beginnt beim bösen Wort", 3 October 1977.
- [114] Brock, Bazon. "Frauen, Fluten, Körper." *Die Zeit* 25 November 1977: 11; quote from: Theweleit, *Buch der Könige*, vol. 1: *Orpheus (und) Eurydike*. On the background cf. Reichardt, "Klaus Theweleits 'Männerphantasien'—ein Erfolgsbuch der 1970er-Jahre".
- [115] *Göttinger Nachrichten* 25 April 1977: 10–12. Reprinted in: Brückner, *Mescalero-Affäre*. For other examples cf. Dutschke, Rudi. "Kein Mench ist austauschbar" (28 September 1977), in *Langer Marsch*, 105–06. On the broader intellectual background in a West European context cf. Dirke, Sabine von. "All Power to the Imagination!", 78–93.
- [116] Böll, *Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum oder Wie Gewalt entstehen und wohin sie führen kann*, 74.
- [117] Teuns, "Isolation/ Sensorische Deprivation: die Programmierte Folter".
- [118] Kraushaar, Wolfgang. "Die Schleyer-Entführung. 44 Tage ohne Opposition", 169; and the various contributions in Duve et al., *Briefe zur Verteidigung der Republik*. On the background

- cf. Kunz, *Der Sicherheitsdiskurs*. On “constitutional patriotism” cf. Müller, Jan-Werner. “On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism”.
- [119] Cf. Weinbauer, “Staat zeigen”.
- [120] Habermas, *Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit*; Dahrendorf, *Lebenschancen*, 147–66; Maier, “A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy and Denial”.
- [121] Cf. Judt, *Postwar*, 561; Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left*; Grémion, *Modernisation et progressisme*.
- [122] Cf. Di Nucci and Galli della Loggia, *Due nazioni*.
- [123] Cf. Negri, *Books for Burning*; Crainz, *Il Paese Mancato*.
- [124] Sheehan, James. “What it means to be a State: States and Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe”. On the continued importance of violence for statehood in a global perspective cf. Mazower, “Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century”.
- [125] On the USA cf. Hofstadter, *American Violence*. On Britain cf. Edgerton, David. *Warfare State*; Lawrence, Jon. “Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence and the Fear of Brutalisation in Post-First World War Britain”. On US ‘terrorism’ cf. Varon, *Bringing the War Home*.
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Notes on Contributor

Holger Nehring is Lecturer in Contemporary European History at the University of Sheffield. He has published widely on the history of West European peace and social movements, on transnational history and on the social history of the cold war, most recently “National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957–1964.” *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 4 (2005): 559–82.