
Introduction: A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the Twentieth Century

HOLGER NEHRING AND HELGE PHARO

Abstract

The introduction to this special issue on peace in twentieth-century Europe develops a novel interpretation of twentieth-century European history. Rather than focusing on the question of the impact of war and violence within European societies, it seeks to examine what we can gain from exploring how peace was established and maintained in the wake of wars in various European societies. In particular, it focuses on the manifold ways in which different social and international actors negotiated peace, both literally and symbolically. Taken together, the contributions to this special issue thus present a much more complex picture of twentieth-century Europe than the one of a 'Dark Continent' (Mark Mazower) ravaged by violence or that propagated by European institutions of a peaceful Europe.

I

This special issue comprises a number of articles on the question of negotiating 'peace' in twentieth-century Europe. Examining case studies from northern and southern, eastern and western Europe, from the end of the First World War to the end of the cold war and transcending the boundaries between domestic and international politics, the articles in this issue seek to shed some explanatory light on the ways in which societies, governments and social movements have debated

Holger Nehring, Department of History, University of Sheffield, 387 Glossop Road, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK; h.nehring@sheffield.ac.uk. Helge Pharo, Forum for Contemporary History, Department of Archeology, Conservation and History, University of Oslo, N-0315 Blindern, Norway; helge.pharo@iakh.uio.no. Most of the articles in this issue emerged from 'Imagining Peace in Twentieth-Century Europe', a workshop held at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo, in August 2007. First and foremost, we should like to thank Ilze Gehe for the perfect organisation of the event and all the participants, especially Richard Bessel, Thorsten Barring Olesen, Stein Tønnesson and Jay Winter, for their stimulating contributions as discussants. Not least, we would like to thank our friend Benjamin Ziemann for many thought-provoking and entertaining discussions over the last few years and, in particular, for some crucial pointers that led us to the title of this introduction. Holger Nehring would also like to thank Mark Pittaway for many fruitful conversations over the years.

the making, maintenance and potential breakdown of 'peace'. This introduction sets out the underlying assumptions of this venture and provides readers with an analytical framework. We argue that we need to renegotiate the premises of peace-building in twentieth-century Europe. This renegotiation applies both to scholarly assumptions about the relationship between peace and violence and to the ways in which different political, social and cultural actors operating in different settings quite literally negotiated peace at different historical junctures.

Instead of examining different sites of peace within domestic and international society (such as the labour and peace movements, certain government agencies or international organisations) or causal factors that might have promoted peace in domestic and international society, we suggest that it is more rewarding to analyse government and societal efforts at peace-building as mutually intertwined.¹ We are interested in examining the highly dynamic processes of negotiation and contestation of the historically specific forms, shapes and definitions of 'peace'. We do not a priori define 'peace' as a stable term and a concrete historical form, signifying order and stability in the international and domestic political spheres. Rather, we regard 'peace' as a dynamic equilibrium, in which the semantic content, argumentative context and political and social foundations of 'peace' have been constantly negotiated between different international and domestic actors, between town and countryside, between different religions, between refugees and domestic populations, and between military organisations and civil-society actors. 'Peace' has meant the ending of violent conflict, but has also referred more generally to a state of harmony or a state of tranquillity; moreover, it might refer to (political and social) justice. Some have defined 'peace' even as a non-violent way of life. The precise character and form of historical definitions of 'peace' have always been debated. Therefore 'peace', in these various definitions, never came automatically as a consequence of social or economic structures, or of specific cultural assumptions. People had to make it and, often quite literally, build it on the ruins of war. 'Peace' thus emerges as a key area in which communicative and symbolic debates and contestations about the shape, form and order of the political and the social are negotiated.²

II

Conceptually this approach owes much to Pierre Rosanvallon's idea of 'the political' as a field and as a project, as an 'always contentious process' in which 'the explicit or implicit rules of what [people] can share and accomplish in common ... are elaborated'.³ This concept emphasises mobilisation, and it allows us to highlight

¹ The heuristic aporias of weighing different sites of peace against each other are more than obvious in Christopher Coker's review essay 'Women on the Verge', *Times Literary Supplement*, 17 Nov. 2006, 26.

² Cf. Thomas Mergel, 'Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 28 (2002), 574–606; David Kertzer, *Rituals, Politics and Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

³ Pierre Rosanvallon, 'Antitotalitarianism and After', in Pierre Rosanvallon, *Democracy: Past and Future*, ed. Samuel Moyn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 34.

creativity rather than appeal to essentialised notions of ‘radicalism’.⁴ Thus political and social power is key for negotiations over the precise historical nature, form and content of ‘peace’. Historians working on the history of violence have highlighted the key fact that war and violence are as much social phenomena as they are products of political decisions within small government circles.⁵ Violence resulted in ‘[t]he rearrangement of the triangular relationship between mass participation, institutional domination, and elite formation’ and entailed ‘embattled processes: they involved the densely negotiated rearrangement of power relations throughout society and the state’.⁶ Accordingly, it makes sense to assume that ‘peace’ (in its multiple meanings as utopia, order and security) is negotiated in and between governments, pressure groups, social movements and other political, social and cultural actors within historically specific institutional contexts.⁷ The fact that not only the concepts of ‘peace’ were, at times, contested, but that these contestations took place within and between highly complex and differentiated societies made these negotiations and renegotiations all the more complicated.⁸

From around 1800, ‘peace’ no longer meant a stable order that could be represented visually by reference to images of a perfectly structured landscape of government and textually by pointing to stable and static utopias of perfect and moral government.⁹ Instead, ‘peace’ became a highly dynamic concept that structured negotiations between two ideal-typical and diametrically opposed positions. On the one hand, it stood for the state of domestic and international affairs resulting from control and regulation. On the other hand, ‘peace’ meant the critical reflection of this very order. Accordingly, ‘peace’ has served as a device for processes of political legitimation in two main ways: the concept has been used to refer to civilising processes that could be achieved through political measures, some of which might even involve the use of physical force. The opposite position, by contrast, has stressed the plurality of interests

⁴ Our thinking has been inspired by reading two rather different literatures: first, the arguments by Michael J. Braddick with regard to early modern England in his ‘Mobilisation, anxiety and creativity in England during the 1640s’, in John Morrow and Jonathan Scott, eds., *Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600–1900* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming 2008); second, by William Sewell, ‘Three Temporalities: Towards an Eventful Sociology’, in Terence J. MacDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 245–80.

⁵ Michael Geyer, ‘Krieg als Gesellschaftspolitik. Anmerkungen zu neueren Arbeiten über das Dritte Reich im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 26 (1986), 557–601.

⁶ Michael Geyer, ‘ Militarization in Europe, 1914–1945’, in John R. Gillis, ed., *The Militarization of the Western World* (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 65–102, here 76.

⁷ For case studies on institutional contexts see Jose Harris, Robert Gerwarth and Holger Nehring, ‘Introduction’, *Journal of Modern European History* (theme issue, ‘Constitutions, Civility and Violence’), 6, 1 (2008), 30–6.

⁸ Cf. the remarks in Carl Levy, ‘1918–1945–1989: The Making and Unmaking of Stable Societies in Western Europe’, in Carl Levy and Mark Roseman, eds., *Three Postwar Eras in Comparison: Western Europe 1918–1945–1989* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 1–38, here 31.

⁹ See Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576–1585* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Thomas Kater and Albert Kummel, eds., *Der verweigerte Friede. Der Verlust der Friedensbildlichkeit in der Moderne* (Bremen: Donat, 2003).

by viewing political and social order as a morally and politically neutral room for negotiations.¹⁰

Our call for renegotiating the premises of peace-building in twentieth-century Europe may face two principal objections. On the one hand, for the period after 1945 this analysis appears so obvious as not to merit further discussion. Not only has there been no major war in Europe since 1945, but the peaceful character of Europe has been one of the main tenets of European integration. It has not only dominated public political justifications of the 'European project'. In a speech to the European Parliament in 1995, the French president François Mitterrand, together with the German federal chancellor Helmut Kohl, one of the main proponents of this view, framed this problem by counterposing the 'grief, the pain of separation, the presence of death' inflicted by the nationalist rivalries during the years 1939–45 to 'peace and conciliation' that European integration had brought after 1945.¹¹ In this interpretation the post-1945 period emerges as the 'quiet and lovable normality of the present tense', whereas '*history* . . . was to be found in the spectacle and turbulence that came before'.¹² This political and experiential interpretation has percolated into most of the earlier as well as some of the more recent academic discussions, especially on the continent, about European integration.¹³ It occurs in other guises in those interpretations that highlight the impact of US efforts at the stabilisation of European politics, societies and economies after the Second World War that is contrasted to rather haphazard and ineffective US proposals for European reconstruction after the First World War.¹⁴ Unwittingly, the American neo-conservative Robert Kagan replicated this explanation in a highly gendered comparison of the European goddess of Venus to the American Mars, the powerful and armed ancient god of war.¹⁵ More recently, the American historian James Sheehan has, from a different perspective and in a highly original argument, sought to explore the historical foundations of this interpretation by linking the emergence of a specifically European culture of peace after 1945 to the unique experience of mass violence in the first half of the century.¹⁶ Likewise, Jay Winter, in his engaging essay *Dreams of Peace and Freedom*, has reminded

¹⁰ Cf. Thorsten Bonacker, 'Frieden in der globalisierten Moderne. Neue und alte Antinomien', *Mittelweg* 36, 15, 1 (2006), 49–60, here 52–3 and Karl Holl, 'Pazifismus', in Otto Brunner, et al., eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 4: *Mi-Pre* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978), 767–87.

¹¹ Cited in Tom Buchanan, *Europe's Troubled Peace* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 1.

¹² Geoff Eley, 'Europe after 1945', *History Workshop Journal*, 65 (2008), 195–212, here 195.

¹³ Cf. the review essay by Mark Gilbert, 'Delusions of Grandeur: New Perspectives on the History of the European Community', *Contemporary European History*, 16 (2007), 545–53.

¹⁴ Cf. Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Volker R. Berghahn, *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945–1973* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

¹⁵ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

¹⁶ James J. Sheehan, *Where have all the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008).

us of the ways in which, on the level of the history of ideas, utopias of peace were related to the experience of wars that preceded them.¹⁷

On the other hand it is precisely this binary, if not dialectic framework of interpretation from a pronouncedly *west* European perspective that may raise many eyebrows. It simply opposes the ‘age of catastrophe’ of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940 to a glorious and affluent ‘golden age’ that lasted from the late 1950s well into the 1970s.¹⁸ In this Hegelian interpretation, violence obtains a redemptive quality, as the question of the survival of humanity out of man-made mass death was Hegel’s key motivation behind a philosophy of history, as the continuity of humanity had to be maintained.¹⁹ Unlike Sheehan and Winter, most historians have preferred to conceptualise twentieth-century European history in terms of the political, social and cultural experiences of violence and genocide, because, they would claim, experiences and histories of violence have simply been more important than the altogether rather feeble and unsustainable attempts at building peace. The European twentieth century has come to symbolise the utmost moral atrocity, if not a break in civilization. The Oxford philosopher Isaiah Berlin called it ‘the worst century there has ever been’.²⁰ At the European level, Tony Judt and Mark Mazower have replicated these national stories of violence, loss and social disintegration in their magisterial overviews in order to critique what Judt has called ‘the Master Narrative of the Twentieth Century’ that had rested on ‘a widely shared understanding of Europe’s recent past’ that ‘blended the memory of Depression, the struggle between Democracy and Fascism, the moral legitimacy of the welfare state and – for many on both sides of the Iron Curtain – the expectation of social progress’.²¹ But within Judt’s interpretation, the historical agency of those affected by and opposed to this development is almost absent. In Judt’s account, ‘peace’ is defined by its remoteness for most people, and much of his narrative about peace negotiations remains restricted to the interaction between domestic political elites and the great powers.²²

Over the last few years, historians of a variety of post-Second World War European societies, both east and west, have therefore made arguments of a seamless transition into the post-war era more difficult to maintain. Instead, research has tended to

¹⁷ See Jay M. Winter, *Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) and his ‘Forum’ essay in this issue.

¹⁸ The terms are from Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1993), but the structure of argument can be found in a variety of national and transnational histories of European countries. Cf., for example, Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Transformation in Britain, France, Italy and the United States, c. 1958–c. 1974* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Dominik Geppert, ed., *The Postwar Challenge: Cultural, Social, and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945–58* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹⁹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 35–6.

²⁰ Cited by Michael Ignatieff, *Isaiah Berlin: A Life* (New York: Owl Books, 1998), 301.

²¹ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London: Penguin, 2005); Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998).

²² See Judt, *Postwar*, especially 13–164 and his chapter on the 1960s, as well as James E. Cronin, *The World the Cold War Made: Order, Chaos and the Return of History* (New York and London: Routledge, 1996).

highlight the complexities and ambiguities of peace-making after the First World War and has stressed the manifold ways in which the heritage of violence and warfare became key for the constitution of post-Second World War European societies.²³ Yet very little conceptual work has been done that might supplement or even replace the almost exclusive focus on the history of violence. Apart from a number of impressive studies on the history of peace treaties and institutions of collective security,²⁴ historians have looked for sites of peace and heroes of peacemaking in courageous social-movement activism. They have often confused the history of peace with the history of theories and concepts of peace, and have rarely paid attention to the practices of peacemaking.²⁵

Most sociologists and political scientists have approached this theme primarily from perspectives that are heavily indebted to the intellectual framework of the peacemakers active during this period. Many of these explanations operate within the Wilsonian framework of peace-building through developing 'democratic' institutions and of free-market economies, based on rational-choice theory, whose emergence was itself part of the story that is told in this issue, and that came to be intricately linked to the political cultures of the European cold war.²⁶ This is especially true of the many studies that make use of functionalist theories of European integration, even if they transcend the straitjacket of the original framework.²⁷ Conversely, those who belong to the 'Realist' school of international relations, or its English variant, are

²³ Conceptually the key text is Peter Fritzsche, 'Did Weimar Fail?', *Journal of Modern History*, 68 (1996), 629–56. Empirically Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser, eds., *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Robert Gerwarth, ed., *Twisted Paths: Europe 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), offer the most useful overviews. For post-Second World War Europe cf. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, eds., *Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) with a variety of examples from European settings; Pieter Lagrou, *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

²⁴ See Jörg Fisch, *Krieg und Frieden in Friedensvertrag: Eine universalgeschichtliche Studie über Grundlagen und Formelemente des Friedensschlusses* (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1979), and Zara Steiner's magisterial *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 602–3, 609; Georges-Henri Soutou, 'Was there a European Order in the Twentieth Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War', *Contemporary European History*, 9 (2000), 329–53.

²⁵ For an exception cf. Jon Lawrence, 'Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in Post-First World War Britain', *Journal of Modern History*, 75 (2003), 557–89, here 558–61.

²⁶ Michael Doyle, 'On the Democratic Peace', *International Security*, 19 (1995), 180–4; Cf. the plea for a revised Wilsonianism: Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Mats Berdal, 'Consolidating Peace in the Aftermath of War: Reflections on "Post-Conflict Peace-Building" from Bosnia to Iraq', *Oslo Files*, 4 (2007), 104–30. On the background to the emergence of rational choice theory as a Cold War concept see S. M. Amadae, *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War and the Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

²⁷ Cf. Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–57* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

heavily reliant on the positions that were defined in reaction to the alleged dewy-eyed ‘idealism’ of the liberal internationalism of a Wilsonian ilk that first emerged in the 1920s and 1930s.²⁸ Elements of these interpretations have also percolated into studies that approach the topic from the angle of institution- and state-building.²⁹ Even many constructivist approaches within international relations scholarship assume rather stable and fixed identities and do not attempt to contextualise their material in more detail within specific power relations.³⁰

III

Negotiations about the definition, form and context of ‘peace’ in and across twentieth-century Europe took place at a variety of interconnected levels: the nature of governance within the framework of mass democracy and the shifting boundaries between state power and international authority, as well as the implications this had for the role of the nation-state within international relations and in the international economy. Not least, these discussions also involved discussions about the geographical scope of Europe’s peace. In our description of geographical location, we shall, therefore, by and large, follow contemporary usage, in particular with regard for the period of the cold war, where we use ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ Europe, while always stressing the discursive construction of these boundaries. Twentieth-century European debates about ‘peace’ not only had different geographies, they also followed multiple temporalities. In contrast to J. H. Plumb’s analysis of political stability in early modern England – that it ‘happens to a society quite quickly, as suddenly as water becomes ice’ – ‘peace’ did not emerge suddenly in twentieth-century Europe; and it was never clear-cut when war ended and peace began.³¹

The fundamental level on which Europeans negotiated ‘peace’ in the twentieth century was governance.³² The First World War, and the debates leading up to it, brought the decline and fall of two of the most enduring beliefs about war and peace in Europe that had guided enlightened thinking since the eighteenth century: first, that nation-states could live in peace with each other, once the nation-state had been firmly established as the key unit of international politics in Europe; and, second, that people are peaceful, whereas princes and rulers are belligerent. Both principles were linked by identifying popular sovereignty, however defined, with

²⁸ David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., *Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).

²⁹ Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

³⁰ Cf. Emanuel Adler, ‘Condition(s) of Peace’, *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998), 165–92; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997) and the critique by Andrew Moravcsik, “‘Is something rotten in the state of Denmark?’ Constructivism and European Integration”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 (1999), 669–81.

³¹ John H. Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725* (London: Macmillan, 1967), xvi.

³² Geoff Eley, ‘War and the Twentieth Century State’, *Daedalus*, 124 (1995), 155–74.

peace.³³ Mass mobilisation during the First World War had a significant impact on the ways in which ‘peace’ could be created. No historical events illustrate this more clearly than the two opposing ‘peace plans’, devised by the US president Woodrow Wilson and the Russian revolutionary V. I. Lenin, as they became reference points for the debates on domestic and international peace in the coming years.³⁴ On 26 October 1917, Lenin called for peace without annexations or indemnities, a peace that would entail a programme of social reform, if not revolution.³⁵ Wilson, by contrast, in his ‘Fourteen Points’ of 8 January 1918, held out prospects of new political and economic international order that would preserve the future peace – a focal point for discussions about a better world when war was still going on.³⁶

Both peace plans became reference points in the civil wars that developed in many parts of Europe and in which the precise shape of the peace was fought out between different ethnic, religious, social and political groups. Soviet Russia saw a continuum of war, revolution and civil war. Wars and skirmishes along the Russian border did not end until the conclusion of peace with the newly created Poland in the Treaty of Riga in March 1921.³⁷ Peacemaking in east-central and eastern Europe also followed in the wake of more or less developed civil wars, many of which followed from the German occupation regime during the First World War.³⁸ In many places in eastern and western Europe, peace came at a high price, as it was accompanied by forced migrations on a large scale that came to be seen as humanitarian, politico-social and international problems and thus challenges for European ‘civility’.³⁹ In the late Ottoman Empire, before and during the war still regarded as part of ‘Europe’, the nationalisation of political differences led to the Armenian genocide and to the emergence of a peace in the region, namely in Greece and in Turkey, that was built on massive population displacements.⁴⁰

³³ For these ideas cf. Martin Ceadel, *Thinking about Peace and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), and Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, new edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

³⁴ Arno J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-Revolution at Versailles, 1918–19* (New York, 1967), even regards the Versailles settlement as the first act of ‘containment’.

³⁵ Cf. www.firstworldwar.com/source/decreeonpeace.htm (last visited 8 March 2008).

³⁶ Woodrow Wilson, ‘Speech to Joint Session of Congress, 8 January 1918’, in Woodrow Wilson, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Arthur Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), XLV, 534–9.

³⁷ Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Risto Alapuro, *State and Revolution in Finland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

³⁸ Paul Hanebrink, ‘Transnational Culture War: Christianity, Nation, and the Judeo-Bolshevik Myth in Hungary, 1890–1920’, *Journal of Modern History*, 80 (2008), 55–80.

³⁹ Cf. Philipp Ther, ‘A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of “Ethnic Cleansing”’, in Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds., *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 44–7. For case studies cf. Peter Gattrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War One* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Carl Emil Vogt, *Nansens Kamp mot hungersnöden i Russland 1921–23* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2007); Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁴⁰ Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), esp. ch. 2; Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger:*

Not only across the European continent but also within European societies were negotiations about peace in the face of the challenges of governance far from straightforward. In western Europe the defeated Germany and the victorious United Kingdom are often regarded as lying at the opposite ends of the spectrum. While many historians have regarded Germany's defeat as the more or less direct precursor to a political culture of violence and the rise to power of the National Socialists,⁴¹ Britain or England (which, in much of the literature, usually serve as ciphers for the United Kingdom) is seen to be the incarnation of a 'peaceable kingdom'.⁴² Yet in the wake of the armistice in November 1918 there was nothing that might have led contemporaries to predict these different outcomes.⁴³ More recent research has shown that negative concepts of an enemy were quite alien to the significant number of German soldiers who hailed from rural areas. Rather than fighting for something, they merely fought in order to end their physical and emotional pains. Support for the Social Democratic Party, the most ardent supporter of peace during the war, rose significantly in the rural areas of Bavaria, while the traditionally strong Catholic Centre Party lost its hegemonic power.⁴⁴ It was only from the mid-1920s onwards, in the wake of inflation and the French occupation of the Rhineland due to a dispute over reparations payments, that war and violence, rather than peace, became the focus of German political debates, although critical voices continued to be heard. Increasingly the Treaty of Versailles emerged as 'violence against the defeated'.⁴⁵ The imagery of violence and warfare debated in the right-wing literature even percolated into the social-democratic and pacifist milieux as different social, political and religious groups sought to reconceptualise their political identities in the light of the experiences of war and defeat.⁴⁶

In Britain, peace remained equally precarious. There was widespread looting and disorder on Peace Day, 19 July 1919, in a number of British towns and cities, such as Coventry, Luton, Liverpool and Cardiff, and violence, in line with

Mass Expulsions that Forged Modern Greece and Turkey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

⁴¹ Ian Kershaw, 'Political Violence in Twentieth Century Europe', *Contemporary European History*, 14 (2005), 107–23.

⁴² Brian Harrison, *Peaceable Kingdom: Stability and Change in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

⁴³ Wilhelm Ribhegge, *Frieden für Europa: Die Politik der deutschen Reichstagsmehrheit, 1917–18* (Essen: Reimar Hobbing, 1988).

⁴⁴ Benjamin Ziemann, *War Experiences in Rural Germany 1914–1923* (Oxford: Berg, 2007), 153. For the background and the political implications cf. Robert W. Moeller, *German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914–1924: The Rhineland and Westphalia* (Chapel Hill and London: North Carolina University Press, 1986).

⁴⁵ Michael Geyer, 'Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a *Leève en Masse* in October 1918', *Journal of Modern History*, 73 (2001), 459–527, here 513; Gerald D. Feldman, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–24* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁴⁶ Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), ch. 9; Benjamin Ziemann, 'Republikanische Kriegserinnerung in einer polarisierten Öffentlichkeit. Das Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold als Veteranenverband der sozialistischen Arbeiterschaft', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 267 (1998), 357–98; For differences with France cf. Omer Bartov, *Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chs. 1 and 2.

nineteenth-century practices, remained an important feature of British popular politics in the early 1920s. Only the debates and negotiations that accompanied the brutal British involvement in the civil war in Ulster and in other colonial settings led to the redefinition of British politics as essentially peaceful, although political violence was not entirely absent from the British mainland either.⁴⁷ It led to a reconfiguration of British popular politics that came to be grounded on the populace as an individualised entity, rather than as an active and demonstrative body.⁴⁸

The ultimate outcome of such negotiations in most European states was 'peace' defined as stabilisation in the form of 'interest intermediation' between employers, government and the labour movement, as well as between city and the countryside.⁴⁹ But the question of the representation of interests in peacemaking went beyond the negotiation of pre-existing class or gender identities.⁵⁰ It involved entirely new definitions of what counted as 'political'. Welfare policies gained a special relevance in the context of the economic and financial hardship that accompanied the transition from war to peace.⁵¹ This also involved negotiating the peace between the sexes. Military forms of identification had become key markers of masculinity. This even affected states which had remained neutral over the course of the conflict.⁵² Gender images thus became one of the key markers for peace in the post-war period.⁵³ Likewise the political geographies of European politics changed dramatically. As the

⁴⁷ For this argument see Lawrence, 'Peaceable Kingdom'.

⁴⁸ Jon Lawrence, 'The Transformation of British Public Politics after the First World War,' *Past and Present*, 190 (2006), 186–216; Christopher Nottingham, 'Recasting Bourgeois Britain? The British State in the Years which followed the First World War', *International Review of Social History*, 31 (1986), 227–47, here 244.

⁴⁹ Charles S. Maier, 'Inflation and Stabilization in the Wake of the Two World Wars: Comparative Strategies', in Gerald D. Feldman et al., eds., *Die Erfahrung der Inflation im internationalen Zusammenhang und Vergleich* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984), 106–29; Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I*, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁵⁰ Cf. the important chapter by Bernd Weisbrod, 'Die Politik der Repräsentation. Das Erbe des Ersten Weltkrieges und der Formwandel der Politik in Europa', in Hans Mommsen, ed., *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung. Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik* (Cologne etc.: Böhlau, 2000), 13–41.

⁵¹ Michael Geyer, 'Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Die Kriegsofferversorgung in Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 9 (1983), 245–58. See, more generally, Charles S. Maier, ed., *Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance between State and Society, Public and Private in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

⁵² Geyer, 'Militarization', 70; Mary Vincent, 'Introduction', *Contemporary European History*, 10 (2001), 345–51; Luc Capdevila, 'The Quest for Masculinity in a Defeated France, 1940–1945', *Contemporary European History*, 10 (2001), 423–45. This process occurred later in the Soviet Union. Cf. Amir Weiner, 'The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the Construction of Political Identities within the Soviet Polity', *Russian Review*, 55 (1996), 638–60, here 653.

⁵³ Susan Pedersen, 'Gender, Welfare, and Citizenship in Britain during the Great War', *American Historical Review*, 95 (1990), 983–1006; Susan Pedersen, *Family Dependence and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France 1914–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Ute Daniel, *The War from Within: German Working Class Women in the First World War* (Oxford: Berg, 1997); Susan Kingsley Kent, 'The Politics of Sexual Difference: World War I and the Demise of British Feminism', *Journal of British Studies*, 27 (1988), 232–53.

countryside became the main site of mobilisation, rural landscapes moved from the margins to the centre of politics.⁵⁴ Such successful processes of peacemaking were not restricted to western Europe, as Martin Zückert shows in his perceptive overview of the ways in which peace was created in Czechoslovakia in this issue. Although the country showed a number of ethnic, religious and political divides, it nevertheless managed to negotiate the peace remarkably well, casting itself (and being cast by others) as an island of peace in a world of violence and war. Yet the peace that was created remained highly fragile. It came at the cost of destabilising the border regions, and it was built on the integrating powers of an army that found its recruits through universal military conscription.⁵⁵

Such negotiations about the shape of the politics of peace had an impact, too, on the interactions between domestic and international politics. Many of the traditional modes of diplomacy remained in place, but new techniques and institutions had to deal with the vast post-war problems. The very notion of a 'European system of international relations' had been shattered. On the one hand, due to the anti-communist fears connected with the Russian Revolution, Russia no longer counted as part of 'Europe', since it came to be connected with the breakdown of civilisation, a discourse that was frequently characterised by its Christian and racist undertones. Thus the states which succeeded the Ottoman Empire also came to lie outside the remit of Europe.⁵⁶ One definition of 'peace' now included 'civilisation'. On the other hand, due to US participation in the war, 'Europe' had been significantly broadened.⁵⁷ Making the peace in international relations now involved more than concluding peace treaties, although these were certainly the most disputed elements.⁵⁸

Peace came to be endowed with an institutional setting in the form of the League of Nations, an international organisation of 'collective security' that Wilson had already alluded to in his Fourteen Points. Our perspective on processes helps to move the focus of discussions away from the rather unproductive debates about the success or failure of the League. As Susan Pedersen has highlighted and as Øyvind Tønnesson and Karen Gram Skjoldager show in their article on the Scandinavian countries in this issue, the League of Nations system was a system that generated publicity and norms for negotiating peace, rather than providing a system of governance.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Jean-Jacques Becker, *The Great War and the French People* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Ziemann, *War Experiences*, 191–3; Joshua Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War and Mass Politics, 1905–1925* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2002).

⁵⁵ See the article by Martin Zückert in this issue and his *Zwischen Nationsidee und staatlicher Realität. Die tschechoslowakische Armee und ihre Nationalitätenpolitik 1918–1938* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2006).

⁵⁶ Ute Frevert, 'Europeanizing Germany's Twentieth Century', *History & Memory*, 17 (2005), 87–116, here 96–97; Martin Zückert, 'Der Erste Weltkrieg in der tschechischen Geschichtsschreibung 1918–1938', in Christiane Brenner et al., eds., *Geschichtsschreibung zu den böhmischen Ländern im 20. Jahrhundert. Wissenschaftstraditionen – Institutionen – Diskurse* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2006), 61–75.

⁵⁷ For nineteenth-century notions cf. Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁵⁸ Cf. Margaret Macmillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War* (London: John Murray, 2003).

⁵⁹ Susan Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', *American Historical Review*, 112 (2007), 1091–1117, here 1099 with further readings; and Susan Pedersen, 'The Meaning of the Mandates System: An

This becomes especially clear when one considers the so-called technical sections of the League that dealt with the questions of international co-operation with regard to transnational problems (such as migration and health, as well as economy and finance). As Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels have shown in a path-breaking article, the economic, social and financial ideas discussed by civil servants in the League's economic and financial committee played a major role for framing debates on economic foundations of peace in domestic settings, not only during the League's existence, but well beyond the Second World War.⁶⁰

Nation-states continued to be the main actors in international politics, and it was over the course of the early 1920s that nation-states emerged as 'containers' that guaranteed peace, defined as security, by introducing passports, more rigorous border controls and often racist systems of national classification.⁶¹ Tønnesson and Gram Skjoldager show in their detailed and thought-provoking essay on Scandinavian countries' policies towards and within the newly created League of Nations how policies driven by national interest eventually converged around the norms of the League of Nations. The image of 'Scandinavia' as an 'island of peace' was the product of a complex set of negotiations between international and domestic actors that this involved, while differences between the foreign policies of Denmark, Sweden and Norway remained important. Thus, especially with regard to disarmament, it proved increasingly difficult to bridge the gap between internationalist ideals and demands for national security. While few had questioned the appropriateness of a conference to mark the 'final liquidation of war', at the disarmament conference at The Hague in August 1929 talk of a future war had become common currency.⁶² Even the Nordic states began to dissociate themselves from the League from the mid-1930s onwards, as the rise of National Socialist Germany appeared to make multilateral

Argument', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 32 (2006), 560–82; Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁶⁰ Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, 'Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of its Economic and Financial Organization', *Contemporary European History*, 14 (2005), 465–92. For examples cf. David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943); recast in liberal institutionalism: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 23; Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁶¹ For case studies cf. Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); David Shearer, 'Elements Near and Alien: Passportization, Policing and Identity in the Stalinist State, 1932–52', *Journal of Modern History*, 76 (2004), 835–81; Tara Zahra, 'The "Minority Problem" and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands', *Contemporary European History*, 17 (2008), 137–65.

⁶² Cf. Andrew Webster, 'From Versailles to Geneva: The Many Forms of Interwar Disarmament', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29 (2006), 225–46; Andrew Webster, 'The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations' Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920–1938', *Contemporary European History*, 14 (2005), 493–518; Michael Geyer, *Aufrüstung und Sicherheit: Die Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik, 1924–1936* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980).

security arrangements less and less feasible, so that the Scandinavian ‘island of peace’ remained highly fragile.⁶³ The heightened popular attention that the League system had given to foreign-policy issues did as much to undermine the stability it was intended to promote as it did to preserve it.⁶⁴ It was precisely the process of peace as norm creation that failed in face of a host of international problems that culminated in the symbolic banking crisis of 1931 and led to a systemic crisis of unexpected depth and severity.⁶⁵

The different positions about the precise shape of domestic and international governance and the forms and definitions of ‘peace’ after 1918–19 continued into the Second World War, as the National Socialist regime attempted to create a European empire based on its own antisemitic and racist logics of annihilation, not least through a perverse appropriation of notions of social peace in creating a racial social and economic order across Europe.⁶⁶ The Second World War in Europe was a maelstrom of multiple and overlapping civil wars, as the National Socialist policies and the politics of the advancing German troops overlapped, set free or exacerbated social, political and ethnic divisions that all related back to the question of representing a peaceful order under the conditions of mass democracy that had emerged during and immediately after the First World War. Similar processes occurred when, from around 1942–3, the Soviet Union managed to push German forces westwards and set up its own types of regime.⁶⁷ Many of these civil wars carried the challenges of peaceful governance into the cold war era, as they lasted beyond the official endings of the Second World War.

The emergence of what, from today’s vantage point, might well appear as a ‘long peace’ in international and domestic politics since the endings of the Second World

⁶³ Olav Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations: A History* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005), 111–37; Helge Pharo, ‘Den norske fredstradisjonen – et forskningsprosjekt’, *Historisk tidsskrift*, 84 (2005), 239–55.

⁶⁴ Jane Cowan, ‘Who’s Afraid of Violent Language? Honour, Sovereignty and Claims-Making in the League of Nations’, *Anthropological Theory*, 33 (2003), 271–91.

⁶⁵ Cf. Barry Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1929–1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Julian Jackson, *The Politics of Depression France, 1932–1936* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Harold James, *The German Slump, Politics and Economics, 1924–1936* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Alice Teichova, *Kleinststaaten im Spannungsfeld der Großmächte: Wirtschaft und Politik in Mittel- und Südosteuropa in der Zwischenkriegszeit* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1988); Ger van Roon, *Small States in Years of Depression: The Oslo Alliance 1930–1940* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1989).

⁶⁶ Cf., polemically, Götz Aly, *Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2005) and the more nuanced interpretation in Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Penguin, 2006), 135–99.

⁶⁷ Cf. generally Jan T. Gross, ‘Themes for a Social History of War Experience and Collaboration’, in István Deák, Jan T. Gross and Tony Judt, eds., *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15–35; Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), esp. ch. 3; Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Ulrich Herbert, ed., *National-Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies* (New York: Berghahn, 2000); Robert Gildea, *Marianne in Chains* (London: Macmillan, 2002).

War, was, for contemporaries, far from self-evident.⁶⁸ After the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, negotiations of peace were now global in scope and took place with direct involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union. The newly created United Nations that succeeded the League of Nations was pronouncedly less European in shape than its predecessor. And the fears of nuclear annihilation made war so unthinkable that even those with the power to launch nuclear weapons preferred the word ‘conflict’ to the term ‘war’.⁶⁹ Unlike after the First World War, the end of the Second World War did not see a final and contractual European settlement. Five peace treaties were signed in Paris on 10 February 1947 – with Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and Italy – but there was no peace treaty with Germany.

Across Europe a peculiar peace settlement – characterised by an emphasis on security, the resurgence of nation-states, the importance of bureaucracies and planning, and the welfare state, all within a Europe clearly divided between a capitalist west and a socialist east – nevertheless developed in a process of complex and often violent negotiations that drew actively on the experiences of the period after the First World War.⁷⁰ Living conditions were not much different from those in the 1920s and 1930s: Europe was still predominantly rural. Economies of wood, coal and steel still dominated; mass consumption had not yet reached the countryside; many areas still lacked electrification.⁷¹ It is not sufficient to point to the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in European politics after 1945 to explain the emergence of peace in Europe, especially because such involvement had existed in different forms before.⁷² Nor can Europe’s post-war peace be explained simply by referring to stabilising properties of an emerging anti-communist consensus in the west and a ‘normalisation’ of socialist rule in the east. Both these explanations neglect the contestations and losses that were involved in creating the European settlement.

The civil war in Greece shows that the establishment of peace did not happen automatically. Violent conflicts between partisans and supporters of the German occupation governments that overlapped with conflicts between urban and rural parts of the population lasted well into the post-war period and formed the basis for the creation of a very restricted form of democracy in the early cold war and the rise

⁶⁸ John L. Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System’, *International Security*, 10 (1986), 99–142.

⁶⁹ Jost Dülffer, ‘Frieden nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg? Der Friedensschluss im Zeichen des Kalten Krieges’, in Jost Dülffer, *Frieden Stiften. Deeskalations- und Friedenspolitik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne etc.: Böhlau, 2008), 198–219, here 200; Soutou, ‘Was There a European Order’, 329–53.

⁷⁰ Martin Conway, ‘Democracy in Postwar Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model’, *European History Quarterly*, 32 (2002), 59–84; Martin Conway, ‘The Rise and Fall of Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945–1973’, *Contemporary European History*, 13 (2004), 67–88.

⁷¹ Cf. the fascinating studies by Lawrence Wylie, *Village in the Vauluse*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); Geert Mak, *Jonverd: The Death of the Village in Late Twentieth-Century Europe* (London: Harvill Press, 1996), 57–70.

⁷² See, e.g., Melvyn Leffler, *The Elusive Quest: America’s Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).

of an authoritarian regime in the 1960s.⁷³ In Italy and France, gradual redefinitions of the war by all parties as fair and just and as removed from the main theatre of German domination helped to prevent the outbreak of a civil war, although the creation of peace went hand in hand with the symbolic cleansing of the body politic, as was the case with the shearing of French women who were accused of collaboration with the National Socialists. Similar patterns of negotiating peace in the wake of violence took place in eastern Europe, usually with the direct involvement of the Soviet Army.⁷⁴ There, the use of retribution for National Socialist crimes, usually through mass killings and expulsions to cleanse the nation-state, served as a device of legitimisation that allowed a seamless transition from more or less active involvement in the National Socialist war effort to the creation of victimhood as a key marker of peace in the post-war world.⁷⁵ Retribution and victimisation became foundations for peace, as European societies externalised the violence of war by attributing it to Germany. Paradoxically, the predominant discourse of victimisation even found its way into German society. Germany, divided and occupied by US, British, French, Soviet and a few Canadian, Polish, Danish and Norwegian troops, had lost its sovereignty and now, despite widespread involvement in the Nazi regime, cast itself as a victim both of Hitler and his minions and of the Allied powers.⁷⁶

Fundamental changes of notions of the political accompanied this transition. Across Europe the war had brought the localisation of politics and given rise to the resurgence of an emphasis on individual and material needs. 'Peace' appeared in the shape of personal, material and social security. Home and family became the foci of discussions about the future peace, thus recoding the emphasis on family life that had characterised socialist, fascist and National Socialist social policies.⁷⁷ The constitution, in different ways, of the adult populations of Europe into collectivities of citizens that followed from this was probably the most important political accomplishment of

⁷³ Mark Mazower, 'The Cold War and the Appropriation of Memory: Greece after the Liberation', in Deák et al, *Politics of Retribution*, 212–32; Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁷⁴ Bradley F. Abrams, 'The Second World War and the East European Revolution', *East European Politics and Societies*, 16 (2003), 623–64, here 630; Claudio Pavone, *Una Guerra Civile. Saggio Storico sulla Moralità nella Resistenza* (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1992).

⁷⁵ Benjamin Frommer, 'Retribution as Legitimation: The Uses of Political Justice in Postwar Czechoslovakia', *Contemporary European History*, 13 (2004), 477–92; Omer Bartov, 'Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust', *American Historical Review*, 103 (1998), 771–816, here 772; Robert G. Moeller, 'Sinking Ships, the Lost *Heimat* and Broken Taboos: Günter Grass and the Politics of Memory in Contemporary Germany', *Contemporary European History*, 12 (2003), 147–81.

⁷⁶ Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Constantin Goschler, *Wiedergutmachung: Westdeutschland und die Verfolgten des Nationalsozialismus (1945–1954)* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1992).

⁷⁷ Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Susan E. Reid, 'The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40 (2005), 289–316; Mark Pittaway, 'Retreat from Collective Protest: Household, Gender, Work and Popular Opposition in Stalinist Hungary', in Jan Kok, ed., *Rebellious Families: Household Strategies and Collective Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 199–229.

the founding of the peace after the Second World War. It rested to a significant extent on an arrangement that regarded welfare states and social policies as crucial for establishing this aim, as ideas coalesced around certain ideas about the responsibilities of government for society – a framework that was to last until the 1970s and early 1980s.⁷⁸ This emphasis on material security – collective material prosperity as a precondition of peace, understood as stability – was a child of the 1930s. The welfare states in eastern and western Europe that were created after 1945, and the ideals of social peace that flowed from them, have to be placed in the context of the manifold and variegated yearnings for individual security and social peace that grew out of the experiences of violence and despair of the 1930s and the Second World War.⁷⁹

Popular dreams of affluence were products of feelings of intense want. Affluence and consumption offered an ideal way of forging some kind of heterogeneous consensus around different (often ideologically coloured) versions of the good life.⁸⁰ American post-war planners for stabilisation forcefully exploited ‘the peaceableness of its global project [of mass consumption] in a century marked by others’ as well as its own awful violence’ by applying the standard of living as a yardstick of good government.⁸¹ This was an ideal that even east European societies did not ignore.⁸²

Against this backdrop, populations across Europe demanded that governments focus on the immediate security needs of local communities as the most urgent form of creating peace.⁸³ As Mark Pittaway shows in his article on the Austrian–Hungarian border in this issue, the way in which the negotiations between occupying powers, local politicians and local populations worked out depended on how well the newly

⁷⁸ T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and social class and other essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

⁷⁹ Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); for Eastern Europe: Mark Pittaway, *Eastern Europe 1939–2000* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2004), 35–61. On parallels in Spain and Portugal cf. Mike Richards, ‘“Terror and Progress”: Industrialization, Modernity and the Making of Francoism’, in Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi, eds., *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 173–82; Antónia Costa Pinto, *Salazar’s Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1995), 147–208. On the predecessors cf. Victoria de Grazia, *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Shelley Baranowski, *Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁸⁰ For examples see Michael Wildt, *Am Beginn der ‘Konsumgesellschaft’: Mangelersahrung, Lebenshaltung, Wohlstandhoffnung in Westdeutschland in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 1994); Judd Stitzel, *Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics and Consumer Culture in East Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 2005); Susan E. Reid and David Crowley, eds., *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000).

⁸¹ Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005), 3, ch. 2 on standard of living.

⁸² Cf. Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., *Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Social-Cultural History of the GDR* (New York: Berghahn, 1999).

⁸³ Michael Geyer, ‘Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons’, in Hanna Schissler, ed., *Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany 1949–1968* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 376–408, here 398, and the case study by Mark Pittaway in this issue.

created states emerged as protectors and guarantors of security to local communities. While this worked quite well in Austria, the Hungarian state failed in its efforts to unite the population behind its socialist efforts at creating the peace. More generally in the Soviet sphere of influence (and for many west European communist parties), the residues of hatred after war served, paradoxically, as tools of mobilisation for a socialist peace.⁸⁴ In the Soviet occupation zone young Germans readily transferred the National Socialist language of sacrifice to the very different task of peaceful (and communist-led) reconstruction after 1945.⁸⁵ This implied a sense of social time that was diametrically opposed to the static one connected with the emphasis on ‘security’ in western Europe: the socialist peace of plenitude, harmony and happiness would come about in the future and thus came to serve at once as a tool for legitimisation and popular mobilisation.⁸⁶

It was the orientation towards the future which characterised communist and socialist peace politics at the time that made debates about peace so contested in western Europe. ‘Peace’ signalled movement, both literally, by means of protest marches, and metaphorically, through policies that transcended the binary framework of the cold war. It was the combination of these two elements that was of concern for many contemporaries. It threatened the sense of suspended time that had come to stand as synonymous with political stabilisation. What had been legitimate political activity in the interregnum immediately after the war, now came to be regarded as lying outside the boundaries of respectable politics.⁸⁷ Making peace in the cold war was thus also the history of profound loss. During the cold war, literal and metaphorical border crossing was a dangerous activity, as dissidents, exiles or politically active women appeared to represent the respective ‘other’ political allegiance.⁸⁸ While

⁸⁴ Richard Bessel, ‘The Politics of Hatred. Emotions and the Postwar History of East Germany’, *History & Memory*, 17 (2005), 195–216, especially 206; Kevin Adamson, ‘Discourses of Violence and the Ideological Strategies of the Romanian Communist Party, 1944–1953’, *East European Politics and Society*, 21 (2007), 559–87; Benjamin Frommer, *National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Till Kössler, *Abschied von der Revolution. Kommunisten und Gesellschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1968* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005).

⁸⁵ Nicholas Stargardt, *Witnesses of War. Children’s Lives Under the Nazis* (London: Cape, 2005), 337–8; Alan McDougall, ‘A Duty to Forget? The “Hitler Youth Generation” and the Transition from Nazism to Communism in Postwar East Germany, c. 1945–49’, *German History*, 26 (2008), 24–46, here 45.

⁸⁶ Costica Bradatan, ‘A Time of Crisis – A Crisis of (the Sense of) Time: The Political Production of Time in Communism and Its Relevance for the Postcommunist Debates’, *East European Politics and Societies*, 19 (2005), 260–90, especially 265–6.

⁸⁷ Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe 1850–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), chs. 18 and 19 with reference to the diverse literature.

⁸⁸ Philip Deery, ‘The Dove Flies East: Whitehall, Warsaw and the 1950 World Peace Congress’, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 48 (2002), 449–68; for a fascinating story see Anson Rabinbach, ‘Von Hollywood an den Galgen: Die Verfolgung und Ermordung des Otto Katz’, *Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte*, 2, 1 (2008), 24–36; Glenda Sluga, ‘No Man’s Land: The Gendered Boundaries of Post-War Trieste’, *Gender & History*, 6 (1994), 184–201; Margaret Poulos Anagnostopoulou, ‘From Heroines to Hyenas: Women Partisans during the Greek Civil War’, *Contemporary European History*, 10 (2001), 481–501; Amir Weiner, ‘The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics’, *Journal of Modern History*, 78 (2006), 333–76.

the border between the Eastern and Western bloc had begun as a zone of contact, it gradually came to be connected with dangers of subversion, as Mark Pittaway shows quite clearly in his contribution.

Ultimately, borders between the Western and the Eastern bloc became key markers for both the maintenance of peace (defined as international stability) and potential danger, should they be violated.⁸⁹ It was, therefore, more than mere cynicism when the leaders of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) referred to the border between Poland and the GDR as a 'border of peace', and when the East German leader, the first secretary of the Socialist Unity Party Walter Ulbricht referred to the Berlin Wall, built in August 1961, as an 'anti-fascist protection wall' that would keep the peace. The battle between the different ideals of peace that Lenin and Wilson had devised after the end of the First World War had now been inscribed into European geography, after having dominated domestic political discussions of the 1920s and 1930s.⁹⁰

Apart from building and reinforcing boundaries, the dynamic processes of stabilisation after the Second World War came at a substantial cost. First, they rested on the accumulation of arms during the cold war. Across Europe, welfare states were also warfare states, and the economic history of the European peace cannot properly be understood without taking account of the establishment of 'warfare states', in which armaments production and development played a central role both economically and structurally.⁹¹ Second, it was linked to varied and differentiated processes of 'becoming national', both in the political and in the economic sense.⁹² This prolonged those trends that had begun after the First World War, but came at an even greater human cost, as, this time, the borders remained intact while whole populations were displaced.⁹³ Not only was peace built on violence, but it contained the seeds of more violence. Integrating refugees and dealing with immigrants became one of the major problems of European post-war societies, especially as they arrived in

⁸⁹ For other case studies see Edith Sheffer, 'On Edge: Building the Border in East and West Germany', *Central European History*, 40 (2007), 307–39; Glenda Sluga, *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001); Glenda Sluga, 'Trieste: Ethnicity and the Cold War, 1945–54', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 29 (1994), 285–303.

⁹⁰ For case studies see Amir Weiner, 'D'jà Vu All Over Again: Prague Spring, Romanian Summer and Soviet Autumn on the Soviet Western Frontier', *Contemporary European History*, 15 (2006), 159–94; Daphne Berdahl, *Where the World Ended: Re-Unification and Identity in the German Borderland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). From the perspective of international history cf. Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

⁹¹ Cf. David Edgerton, *Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), as well as the review by Richard Toye in this issue.

⁹² Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Helga Schultz and Eduard Kubù, eds., *History and Culture of Economic Nationalism in East Central Europe* (Berlin: BWV, 2006); Weiner, *War*, ch. 6; Martin Mevius, *Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941–1953* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).

⁹³ Peter Gattrell, 'Introduction: World Wars and Population Displacement in Europe in the Twentieth Century', *Contemporary European History*, 16 (2007), 415–26.

poor rural districts.⁹⁴ The case of France demonstrates the violent potential of these conflicts in a colonial setting. It was during a political crisis caused by the French attempt to crush the independence movement in Algeria that the French government toppled and Charles de Gaulle established the Fifth Republic in the wake of a military coup.⁹⁵ The aggressive way in which the French state observed and policed peace demonstrations revealed a *longue durée* of colonial roots of policing and keeping the internal peace.⁹⁶ The renationalisation of European politics found its expression in the ‘de-internationalisation of the minority problem’ in the human rights discourse,⁹⁷ although human rights were themselves thought to form a guarantor of peace in the shadow of violence.⁹⁸ European integration in western Europe was an intrinsic part of this cold war return of the national as a politics of peace, since it rested on the model of governance that had its roots in the rural areas of continental Europe, with the strong support of Christian Democracy.⁹⁹ It became a key process, in which Germany’s bid for hegemony on the European continent that had lain at the root of the previous world wars was given a new form.¹⁰⁰

This cold war framework of the political did not go unchallenged, as Renato Moro’s article demonstrates in the case of Italy. The protesters in the GDR in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, the anti-nuclear weapons movements in the West, as well as the various protest movements of the 1960s in both eastern and western Europe vehemently challenged the shape of the cold war peace, especially in their critique of its binary coding in communism/anti-communism and in their transnational transcendence of the national paradigm. Protesting for peace involved the metaphorical crossing of boundaries.¹⁰¹ Moro’s case study examines how Italian Catholics came to terms with this issue in the context of the challenges posed by a mass electorate. While Italian Catholics initially regarded ‘peace’ as a Protestant concept, their desire to contest the communist monopolisation of peace propaganda led to

⁹⁴ Hans Günter Hockerts, ‘Integration der Gesellschaft: Gründungskrise und Sozialpolitik in der frühen Bundesrepublik’, *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform*, 32 (1986), S. 25–41; Pertti Ahonen, ‘Taming the Expellee Threat in Post-1945 Europe: Lessons from the Two Germanies and Finland’, *Contemporary European History*, 14 (2005), 1–21; Ágnes Tóth, *Migrationen in Ungarn 1945–1948. Vertreibung der Ungarndeutschen, Binnenwanderungen und Slowakisch-Ungarischer Bevölkerungsaustausch* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2001).

⁹⁵ Richard Vinen, *Bourgeois Politics in France 1945–1951* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁹⁶ Cf. Jim House and Neil MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁹⁷ Carole Fink, ‘Minority Rights as an International Question’, *Contemporary European History*, 9 (2000), 385–400, here 395; Mark Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950’, *Historical Journal*, 47 (2002), 379–98.

⁹⁸ Cf. Jay Winter’s piece in this volume. For the ambiguous character of the German debates cf. Lora Wildenthal, ‘Human Rights Advocacy and National Identity in West Germany’, *Human Rights Quarterly*, 22 (2000), 1051–9.

⁹⁹ Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Moravcsik, *Choice for Europe*.

¹⁰⁰ N. Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s* (London: Routledge, 2006), especially 171.

¹⁰¹ See Holger Nehring, ‘National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957–1964’, *Contemporary European History*, 14 (2005), 559–82.

a complex set of negotiations within the Catholic milieu – Christian Democratic Party, high and low clergy and the laity – about how ‘peace’ might be appropriated within a Catholic context. These negotiations of peace transcended the boundaries between institutional and non-institutional politics, as the Catholic Church provided an important link between civil society and the Christian Democratic government. As elsewhere in western Europe, peace protesters interpreted their societies as pre-war societies and sought to bring the feelings of openness and hope that had characterised the immediate post-war period back into politics.¹⁰² The politics of peace were often contested even within the movements, which often replicated cold war divisions between communist and non-communist allegiances. These discussions often overlapped with debates about how prominent ‘gender’ was to be in the politics of ‘peace’.¹⁰³

It was in the course of the 1970s, during this ‘axial crisis of the modern era’, that the dynamic equilibrium of peace that had been established across Europe during the preceding two or three decades saw its decline and its ultimate demise.¹⁰⁴ The period from the mid-1970s saw the weakening of the discipline of the cold war that had been invoked for post-war reconstruction and peace-building, the collapse of collaborative industrial relations and the breakdown of the international economic and financial system on which post-war affluence had rested. The decade also saw the breakdown of the premises of ‘Keynesian’ consensus, which had been characterised by a stable and favourable trade-off between employment and inflation that had been carried by the confidence that government spending would not lead to continuous inflation despite a rise in employment.¹⁰⁵ In the wake of this, the party systems that had carried the ‘peace’ of the 1950s and 1960s broke down, as new parties such as the Greens emerged, and the old nationalist right and regionalist parties saw a revival.¹⁰⁶ It was during the debates about political violence that affected West Germany, Italy and France in particular that new ideas of non-violent statehood emerged across political

¹⁰² Cf. Holger Nehring, *The Politics of Security: The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Social History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). On ‘1968’ as a moment of hope and opportunity, rather than merely the outcome of ‘value change’ see Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of ‘68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹⁰³ Irene Stoeck, ‘Cold War Communities: Women’s Peace Politics in Postwar West Germany, 1945–1952’, in Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, eds., *Home/Front: The Military, War, and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 331–4; Anna Scarantino, *Donne per la pace. Maria Bajocco Remiddi e l’Associazione internazionale madri unite per la pace nell’Italia della guerra fredda* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2006); Günther Wernicke, ‘The Communist-Led World Peace Council and the Western Peace Movements: The Fetters of Bipolarity and Some Attempts to Break Them in the Fifties and Early Sixties’, *Peace & Change*, 23 (1998), 265–311.

¹⁰⁴ Charles S. Maier, ‘Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives to the Modern Era’, *American Historical Review*, 807–31, here 823; Charles S. Maier, ‘The Collapse of Communism: Approaches for a Future History’, *History Workshop Journal*, 31 (1991), 34–59.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. the review essay by Richard Toye in this issue.

¹⁰⁶ Andrea Mammone, ‘The Transnational Reaction to 1968: Neo-fascist Fronts and Political Cultures in France and Italy’, *Contemporary European History*, 17 (2008), 213–36; Jon Burchell, *The Evolution of Green Politics: Development and Change within European Green Parties* (London: Earthscan, 2004).

cultures, based, however, on the significant yet invisible expansion of states' policing and surveillance powers.¹⁰⁷

In eastern Europe, structurally similar processes of renegotiation took place; they also had their origins in the 1970s, as the Soviet bloc was tied into the international economic and financial system and faced similar problems of structural adjustment.¹⁰⁸ The emphasis on human rights brought by the Helsinki Process of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) during the 1970s provided an incentive for non-institutional mobilisation.¹⁰⁹ Against this backdrop, the efforts of east European governments to mobilise their citizens failed, and opened a space for the increasingly frequent contestations of power, beginning with waves of strikes in Poland in the 1970s. Peace and environmental movements independent of the regime emerged and became increasingly popular as official efforts at mobilisation failed.¹¹⁰

As the cold war threatened to turn hot once again with the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, the US deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe during the early 1980s and the declaration of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, peace protests mobilised millions of Europeans, in both east and west.¹¹¹ The protests were carried by novel forms of interaction between state and citizens emerged in both eastern and western Europe. They were no longer oriented towards the model of the citizen soldier, but models of masculinity that were oriented towards social service.¹¹² Because of the previous experiences of working through experiences of violence, the protesters in most countries eschewed violence and sought to avoid it at all costs.¹¹³ These processes were framed and supported by complex sets of negotiations among European diplomats, as Frédéric Bozo shows in his article in this issue on

¹⁰⁷ Holger Nehring, 'The Era of Non-Violence: "Terrorism" and the Emergence of Conceptions of Non-Violent Statehood in Western Europe, 1967–1983', *European Review of History*, 14 (2007), 343–71.

¹⁰⁸ See Stephen Kotkin, *Steeltown, USSR: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of German Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), ch. 2; Eagle Glassheim, 'Ethnic Cleansing, Communism, and Environmental Devastation in Czechoslovakia's Borderlands, 1945–1989', *Journal of Modern History*, 78 (2006), 65–92; Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Petr Pavlínek and John Pickles, *Environmental Transitions: Transformation and Ecological Defence in Central and Eastern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 113, 310.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹¹⁰ See Mary Fulbrook, *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 269–88, and Pittaway, *Eastern Europe*, 155–99.

¹¹¹ See Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994).

¹¹² Patrick Bernhard, *Zivildienst zwischen Reform und Revolte. Eine bundesdeutsche Institution im gesellschaftlichen Wandel 1961–1982* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); Thomas Widera, ed., *Pazifisten in Uniform. Die Bausoldaten im Spannungsfeld der SED-Politik 1964–1989* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004); as well as Renato Moro's article in this issue.

¹¹³ Markéta Devátá, ed., *Charta 77: od obhajoby lidských práv k demokratické revoluci, 1977–1989* (Prague: Reprostdisko MFF UK, 2007); Karsten Timmer, *Vom Aufbruch zum Umbruch. Die Bürgerbewegung in der DDR 1989* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000).

French President François Mitterrand's ultimately unsuccessful plans of 1989–91 for a European Confederation. Against a backdrop of a biographically motivated fear of a breakdown of the European peace, Mitterrand sought to adapt the Kantian ideal of a confederation as an ideal for a 'perpetual peace' in Europe in order to cement French power in post-cold war Europe.¹¹⁴

The end of the cold war, the deepening of the European integration in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the enlargement of the European Union to embrace much of the former Soviet bloc did not end European negotiations about peace. In many ways, the end of the cold war has thrown some of the costs of the post-1945 peace settlement into even sharper relief. Due to the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union into European politics after the end of the Second World War, the growing prominence of India, China and Latin America in international politics and the growing importance of global connections, the European politics of peace has been provincialised. European negotiations about peace at the beginning of the twenty-first century involve conflicts that lie beyond the geographical confines of Europe (although they are directly connected to European colonising efforts of an earlier era), such as the Rwandan genocide, the attack on the World Trade Center and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Within these discussions, cold war suspicions and images of the enemy have retained a remarkable resilience, and not only in western European societies has 'communism' has been replaced by 'terrorism' as the enemy who endangers peace, understood as security. Once again, governments denounce more far-reaching claims to create peace, such as the preservation of civil liberties, as dangerous for national security. This is not a conflict that the United States has imposed upon the alleged European victims of its policies. It emerges directly from the manifold ways in which European societies in both East and west negotiated peace during the cold war, while they came to believe that they learned from the past. A closer look at the discussions shows that Europeans have not come clean. In east-central Europe new ideas of national salvation have emerged.¹¹⁵ It is also obvious that across Europe race and immigration continue to be important determinants of debates about social peace.¹¹⁶ In Britain in particular, immigration from eastern Europe has given rise to a broadly accepted and widely publicised form of racism that holds tax-paying immigrants responsible for the lack of funding for public services. With the discussion of Turkey's entry into the European Union, the question of peace as the geographical expression of (Christian) civilisation has regained a surprising level of popularity.

¹¹⁴ On the general context cf. Maurice Vaisse, 'A Certain Idea of Peace in France from 1945 to the Present Day', *French History*, 18 (2004), 331–7.

¹¹⁵ Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

¹¹⁶ Paul Gilroy, *'There Ain't no Black in the Union Jack': The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (London: Routledge, 2002; Karen Schönwälder, Rainer Ohliger und Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, eds., *European Encounters: Migration and European Societies since 1945* (Aldershot: Ashgate 2003); Jan T. Gross, *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz: An Essay in Historical Interpretation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

IV

'Peace' in twentieth-century Europe has resisted any attempt at neat classification, and we have not been able to touch on all the important issues, leaving out many problems and geographical areas. But we hope to have succeeded in making a more general argument. As the articles in this issue demonstrate, negotiating peace has been a fundamental part of politics in complex and highly differentiated modern societies. But the struggles over life, death and survival, and the yearnings for peace testify to the frailty of modern society. Crucially, the different versions of 'peace' that emerged, the different shapes negotiations took at different historical junctures, and the varied and various hopes and fears also entailed competing visions of how to deal with the problem of representation within mass society, both domestically and internationally.¹¹⁷

Our process-oriented approach, which straddles the boundaries between international relations and domestic societies and breaks down the borders between high and low politics, has, we hope, helped to highlight indeterminacies and ambiguities, but also languages of futurity as key for negotiating peace in twentieth-century Europe – elements that a history of violence can easily neglect. It thus helps to integrate the highly political popular cultures of hopes and expectations into the more well-known story of governmental policies and social history. Both hopes and disappointments connected with the politics of peace in twentieth-century Europe derive from a peculiar pattern of social time that negotiations of peace capture in its full intensity: the memories of peace in the past and the desire to stop time in order to achieve stability, on the one hand; on the other hand, a certain impatience towards the establishment of peaceful plenitude. The voices of disappointment and the permanent feelings of betrayal that have accompanied the processes of what 'peace' is have resisted closure. This history has been, and will continue to be, a story both of disenchantment and of indeterminate and never-ending hopes.

¹¹⁷ Cf., in particular, Renato Moro's essay in this issue.