Article
Details
Citation
Millar A (2016) Perceptual Knowledge and Well-Founded Belief. Episteme, 13 (1), pp. 43-59. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.54
Abstract
Should a philosophical account of perceptual knowledge accord a justicatory role to sensory experiences? This discussion raises problems for an afrmative answer and sets out an alternative account on which justied belief is conceived as well- founded belief and well-foundedness is taken to depend on knowledge. A key part of the discussion draws on a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities to account for how perception gives rise both to perceptual knowledge and to well-founded belief.
Keywords
evidence; experience; justified belief; perceptual knowledge; recognitional abilities; well-founded belief
Journal
Episteme: Volume 13, Issue 1
| Status | Published | 
|---|---|
| Publication date | 31/03/2016 | 
| Publication date online | 09/02/2016 | 
| URL | http://hdl.handle.net/1893/22836 | 
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press | 
| ISSN | 1742-3600 | 
| eISSN | 1750-0117 | 
People (1)
Emeritus Professor, Philosophy