Article
Details
Citation
Roca-Royes S (2012) Essentialist Blindness would not preclude counterfactual knowledge. Philosophia Scientiae, 16 (2), pp. 149-172. https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.745
Abstract
This paper does two things. First, it defends, against a potential threat to it, the claim that a capacity for essentialist knowledge should not be placed among the core capacities for counterfactual knowledge. Second, it assesses a consequence of that claim—or better: of the discussion by means of which I defend it—in relation to Kment's and Williamson's views on the relation between modality and counterfactuals.
Keywords
Epistemology of counterfactuals; Epistemology of modality
Journal
Philosophia Scientiae: Volume 16, Issue 2
| Status | Published | 
|---|---|
| Publication date | 31/12/2012 | 
| URL | http://hdl.handle.net/1893/19908 | 
| Publisher | Kime Editions | 
| ISSN | 1281-2463 | 
People (1)
Senior Lecturer, Philosophy